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Glossary  
 
African Union – a union consisting of all 55 countries on the African continent. 
Their main aims are to rid the continent of colonisation and apartheid, promote unity 
and solidarity and coordinate and intensify cooperation and development.  
Bribe Payers Index (BPI) – Transparency International’s measure of how willing a 
nation’s business sector appears to be to engage in corrupt business practice. 
British Society of Criminology (BSC) – a society that aims to develop the 
knowledge of those engaged in work or teaching related to crime, criminal 
behaviour and the criminal justice system in the UK. 
Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) – a survey 
that provides firm level data on a broad range of issues about the business 
environment, including business-government relations, firm financing, labour, 
infrastructure, informal payments and corruption. 
Confederation of Business Industry (CBI) – the UK’s premier business 
organisation, providing a voice for firms at a regional, national and international 
level to policymakers. 
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) – an index compiled by Transparency 
International that measures the perceived levels of public sector corruption 
worldwide. 
Council of Europe – an international organisation comprised of 47 member states, 
with the power to enforce select international agreements reached by European 
states on various topics. 
Financial Action Task Force (FAFT) – an intergovernmental organisation founded 
in 1989 whose aim is to develop policies to combat money laundering. It monitors 
countries’ progress in implementing their ‘Recommendations’. 
Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) – the financial regulatory body for the UK, 
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and maintain the integrity of the UK’s financial markets. 
Global Witness – an independent, not-for-profit organisation that campaigns to end 
environmental and human rights abuses that are driven by the exploitation of natural 
resources and corruption in the global political and economic system. 
Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) – the government authority in Hong 
Kong responsible for maintaining monetary and banking stability. 
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heard.  
International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) – a global network 
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International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) – a monthly publication providing 
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International Monetary Fund (IMF) – an organisation comprised of 189 countries, 
working together to foster global monetary cooperation, secure financial stability, 
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investigating and preventing corruption, economic crimes and educating the public 
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services and humanitarian functions. 
Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) – an 
organisation whose aim is to promote policies that will improve the economic and 
social well-being of people around the world.  
Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys (PETS) – a tool that seeks to document 
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level of serious or complex fraud, bribery and corruption. 
Transparency International (TI) – an independent organisation whose mission is 
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levels across all sectors of society. 
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countries and territories, the UNDP works to eradicate poverty whilst protecting the 
planet. Additionally, the UNDP helps countries to develop strong policies, skills, 
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WBI Control of Corruption Index (CCI) – similar to TI’s CPI, this index uses a 
composite set of indices to measure corruption; however, the CCI only requires one 
source per country and employs a broader definition of corruption. 
World Economic Forum (WEF) – an independent international organisation 
committed to improving the state of the world by engaging business, political, 
academic, and other leaders of society to shape global, regional, and industry 
agendas. 
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Abstract 
There is a wealth of literature on the definition of corruption, its effects and 
preventative measures. Academics, non-government organisations, law and policy 
makers have grappled with what constitutes a phenomenon, which, despite being 
secretive, can still have a huge impact on societies, or that is such a common 
practice that to progress in life there is no alternative but to take part. However, 
there has never been a study that has utilised the opinions of the Anti-Bribery & 
Corruption function within the financial services sector and collectively analysed 
these against two other forms of data collection. The project has gathered opinions 
across three Strands. These included the interviewing of 10 Anti-Bribery & 
Corruption specialists in the UK, the issuance of an anonymous survey which 
received 173 responses and three focus groups held with financial services 
professionals in Hong Kong with eight attendees, India with eight attendees and 
Mexico with 10 attendees.    
This thesis presents a collective view on the challenges of defining corruption and 
the differences in legislation, along with an analysis as to which preventative 
measures are the most effective at reducing corruption. It is clear that even from a 
small-scale study corruption does not distinguish between western or non-western 
countries, although the visibility of it in everyday life may differ. Findings are given 
and recommendations are made to produce a global definition, supported by 
guidance notes; to increase academic research on corruption within developing 
countries; and to raise awareness of the limitations of Transparency International’s 
Corruption Perceptions Index and the consequences if misused. Additional 
recommendations are made that, if combined, may help to reduce the impact of 
corruption.  
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
“The unscrupulous are rewarded and the honest become demoralised” (Shacklock, 
Sampford & Connors, 2016, p. 1).  
Purpose 
This chapter will give an overview of the issues surrounding the social phenomenon 
of corruption, which has been studied from numerous angles and potentially affects 
each one of us across the globe. Thereafter, the chapter will discuss the value of this 
research, and how it is a unique contribution to the wealth of research already 
available, supporting and challenging previous findings, before concluding with a 
summary of the subsequent chapters.  
Context   
Each year, since 1994, Transparency International (TI) publishes a Corruption 
Perceptions Index (CPI), which ranks countries/territories by their perceived levels 
of public sector corruption. The CPI is used by many commercial industries to 
assess various risks, such as a banks’ exposure to money laundering or fraud across 
different countries. However, can an index that is built only upon perceptions be 
relied upon for such purposes? To answer this question, one must first understand 
what corruption is. This must take into consideration the various legislation, social 
norms and understanding across the globe. Understanding corruption from an 
unbiased perspective and having awareness as to how it affects society is key when 
devising measures to counter it. However, caution must be taken as western norms 
and values are clearly driving the western perception of developing countries, which 
in turn may be detrimental to them and their progress (Brooks, Walsh, Lewis & 
Kim, 2013). If international dialogue on corruption is shaped purely on views of the 
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dominant western liberal democracies, any reforms recommended by international 
agencies may not be effective in distinguishing and preventing corruption in non-
western societies (Akech, 2014).     
Research Aims 
The aim of this research was to obtain a better understanding of people’s perception 
of corruption against different cultures from a small selection of western and non-
western countries. The research also sought to obtain views as to whether corruption 
could be reduced in low transparency countries and to determine whether the use of 
TI’s CPI by commercial entities was fair and appropriate.  
Research Objectives 
The aims of this research were achieved through the following objectives;  
1. To examine the similarities and differences in the perception of corruption 
between multiple jurisdictions. 
2.  To outline the challenges in reducing corruption in low transparency 
countries. 
3.  To produce an assessment of the impact of using TI’s CPI within the 
financial services sector.  
Value of this Research  
With the introduction of the UK Bribery Act in 2011 came the corporate offence of 
‘failing to prevent bribery’ (Section 7) and the subsequent formation of a new 
compliance sub section in the commercial world, frequently referred to as the Anti-
Bribery and Corruption (AB&C) compliance function. To date there has been no 
academic research utilising the knowledge of this new compliance function in the 
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financial services sector. Many organisations, particularly those in the financial 
services sector, have turned to the CPI as a means of assessing and managing 
bribery and corruption risks; however, it would appear that the Index is being used 
as a means of assessing other risks, such as Money Laundering. This raises the 
question as to how appropriate the use of the CPI, which considers the perception of 
corruption within the public sector of a country, is in such situations and whether 
due consideration has been given to the impact this could have on low ranking 
countries. This research was a unique opportunity to target a specific new function 
within the financial services sector that has oversight and responsibility for advising 
on strategic issues of preventing bribery and corruption, driving enhancement 
strategies and maintaining good governance. The findings from the data gathered 
from the Anti-Bribery & Corruption specialists was supported and analysed against 
data obtained from 173 responses to an anonymous global survey and three focus 
groups comprising of financial services professionals in Hong Kong, India and 
Mexico. Although only a small-scale study, it had a diverse sample population 
across three methods of data collection, with the output being grouped into eight 
country specific categories. Following analysis, there were a number of findings and 
recommendations.   
This research combined academic knowledge with practitioner research skills, 
providing an original contribution to knowledge surrounding corruption from a more 
targeted focal point, particularly with input from Anti-Bribery & Corruption 
specialists. The study will hopefully have gone some way in dispelling any myth 
that corruption is a western phenomenon that might not be so widely understood in 
non-western countries due to cultural differences. It also highlights the potential 
misuse of TI’s CPI by the financial services sector and provides a number of 
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recommendations to further enhance the findings from this study. In line with the 
ethos of a Professional Doctorate, this research will also result in a contribution to 
practice (Fulton, Kuit, Sanders & Smith, 2013) through communicating the findings 
and relevant recommendations within the financial services sector and through 
engagement with non-government institutes who may wish to pursue these findings 
with future research.   
Thesis Outline 
This thesis provides a summary through a literature review (Chapter 2) of the 
challenges that numerous academics, law, policy makers and institutes have faced in 
defining corruption by asking, what is corruption? The concept of bribery against 
facilitation payments was then touched upon to provide some context when trying to 
understand the complexity of corruption evidencing the conflict between anti-
bribery and corruption legislation. If corruption affects societies globally, and social 
rules vary from one culture to another and amongst individuals (Melgar, Rossi & 
Smith, 2010), then a person’s values, morals and religion (Marquette, 2012) may 
affect their perception of corruption. This was examined in more detail by Almond 
and Verba (1965), Nye (1972), and Hooker (2003), as well as by other academics 
and through the data collection phase of this study. If corruption is to be controlled 
then there must be a robust methodology for measuring it. Such a methodology is 
likely to be as contentious as, and related to, the issue surrounding the definition of 
corruption itself (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2015). The subsequent section of Chapter 2 deals 
with the measurement of corruption with a focus on TI, explaining why such 
measurement is important whilst highlighting several advantages and disadvantages 
of the methodology and use of such an index. The literature review then examines 
the effects of corruption, raising awareness of the impact on individuals and society, 
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prior to concluding with a discussion on the preventative measures to combat 
corruption.  
The second part of this research was a data gathering exercise. The methodology is 
discussed in Chapter 3 and outlines how this was achieved through three strands of 
research: (i) an anonymous survey, (ii) 10 face-to-face interviews, and (iii) three 
focus groups held in Hong Kong, India and Mexico. Chapter 3 also outlines how 
this research was aligned to the professional doctorate ethos, including details on the 
research ethics, data collection considerations, data security and the data analysis 
itself. This provides a clear and transparent account of this research project for the 
benefit of any other researchers who may wish to examine similar topics. 
Chapter 4 moves into the Results section and reports on the demographics of the 
study across the three strands. Chapter 5 outlines the combined results and analysis 
for the justification of a number of dishonest scenarios from Strand I and Strand II, 
along with the outcome of a comparison of these results against two earlier studies. 
Chapters 6 through to 10 provide the details of the results and subsequent analysis 
from Strand I, the anonymous survey, and are structured in a similar order as the 
questions were posed. Chapter 11 details the results and subsequent analysis from 
Strand II, the face-to-face interviews with the Anti-Bribery & Corruption 
Specialists, and brings together the findings in subsections. Chapter 12 details the 
results from Strand III, the focus groups carried out with financial services 
professionals in Hong Kong, India and Mexico. This is followed by Chapter 13, 
which contains a discussion on the overall findings from the analysis across the 
three Strands and country categories, highlighting 9 key themes. Chapter 14 makes a 
number of recommendations which include producing a global definition; providing 
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ideas on how to further explore corruption in western and non-western countries; as 
well as providing a solution that could reduce low level corruption in developing 
countries by removing the day-to-day interaction of public officials with the general 
public. Another recommendation is put forward that points to raising awareness in 
the financial services sector of the limitations and methodology of TI’s CPI, which 
will be taken forward by the researcher. The conclusion of this study is contained in 
Chapter 15 with the final chapter being a reflective piece of work of the researcher’s 
thoughts.      
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Chapter 2 - Literature Review  
Introduction 
This chapter explores the basic concept of corruption by way of conducting a 
thematic literature review critically examining its different components. The sub 
sections of this chapter delve into the challenges of defining corruption: first by 
asking ‘what is corruption?’ then outlining the differences between ‘bribery’ and 
‘facilitation payments’. It also explores the grey area of gift giving from the view of 
‘when is gift giving corruption?’. The concept of whether background and culture 
influences one’s views of corruption is discussed, prior to examining the literature 
on measuring corruption with a particular focus on TI’s CPI. Having moved onto 
assessing the literature on the effects of corruption, this chapter concludes with a 
review of the preventative measures available in combating corruption.  
Sources (Inclusion/Exclusion Criteria) 
Corruption has been researched and documented for many years and has spanned 
many disciplines, for example, sociology, criminology and economics. Numerous 
associations, institutes, and non-government organisations have also undertaken 
research and produced literature on the subject. This has included isolated studies of 
a single country (Maier, 2002) as well as cross-country comparisons of culture that 
included a touch point with corruption (Almond & Verba, 1965). Due to the 
extensive amount of literature available, a detailed discussion of all sources has not 
been possible within this thesis. The literature selected for inclusion was targeted as 
is detailed in the search strategy below, and has hopefully given a broad enough 
scope to evidence the challenges not only around defining corruption, but also the 
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complexity in understanding it, to the point of raising awareness of the difficulties of 
measuring and therefore combatting it.  
Search Strategy 
To obtain the appropriate documents for review, the following sources were 
explored: 
• Google 
• Google Books 
• Google Scholar 
• Google Translate 
• My iLibrary E-books 
• The Electronic Library, Emerald Insight 
• University of Portsmouth Library catalogue 
• British Library catalogue 
The following ‘key-words’ were used to identify the relevant material: 
• Corruption 
• Definition of Corruption 
• Bribery 
• Facilitation Payments 
• Gift Giving 
• Culture and Corruption 
• Background and Corruption 
• Measuring and Combatting Corruption 
• Transparency International 
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What is Corruption? 
Introduction  
David Cameron said that corruption was “the cancer at the heart of so many 
problems we need to tackle in our world” (Associated Press, 2016, para. 12). This 
analogy is all very well, but it does not assist with understanding the concept of 
corruption. To understand corruption one should endeavour to understand how 
corruption is defined.  
The Definition of Corruption   
The definition of corruption has caused much debate and has presented difficulties 
to those who have researched it (Maxwell, Bailey, Harvey, Walker, Sharbatke-
Church & Savage, 2008; Sandholtz & Koetzle, 2000; Worldbank, 2010), from an 
academic, law and policy maker perspective. Over the years there have been 
numerous definitions that have been divided into categories surrounding public 
office, public interest or market-centred (Gardiner, 2009; Heidenheimer & Johnston, 
2002; TI, 2011). The word ‘corruption’ has many different meanings and there is no 
international consensus on its definition (Søreide, 2006).  
Fletcher and Herrmann (2012, p. 4) discuss the definition of corruption and cite 
Tanzi (1998, p. 564) who stated that corruption was the “abuse of public power for 
private benefit”. This is the same definition as used by the World Bank (Contreras-
Hemosilla, 2001, p. 11) and by Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2008). However, this does 
not encapsulate corruption either in the private sector or across the public and 
private sectors (Brown, 2016; Fletcher & Herrmann, 2012). The Asian Development 
Bank’s (2008) definition of “the abuse of public or private office for personal gain” 
broadens the scope, especially when the bank expanded on their definition to say 
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that “Corruption involves behaviour on the part of officials in the public and private 
sectors, in which they improperly and unlawfully enrich themselves and/or those 
close to them, or induce others to do so, by misusing the position in which they are 
placed” (Fletcher & Herrmann, 2012, p. 4).   
The definitions of corruption range from the decay of society to a single act of 
bribery (Cockcroft, 2012). Corruption can be divided into three distinct categories, 
dependent on the level of public official or government involvement (Lovei & 
McKenchie, 2000): (i) Grand corruption, which describes corruption at high levels 
of the administration, for example policy makers (Starke, Kobis & Brandt, 2016) 
and often involves contributions for political campaigns, extortion and nepotism 
(Fletcher & Herrmann, 2012); (ii) company management corruption, such as 
underhand payments for large contracts; and (iii) petty corruption, referring to the 
rather common corruption offences, for example, bribery of a police officer (Starke, 
Kobis & Brandt, 2016) or bribes to complete official paperwork for the purpose of 
granting licences, certification or permits.  
A small group of social scientists formulated definitions that were primarily related 
to demand, supply, and the exchange concepts derived from economic theory. 
Another group discussed corruption with regard to the concept of the public interest 
(Heidenheimer & Johnston, 2002).  
Friedrich (2009, p. 15) analysed the history of the different meanings and 
connotations of corruption and finally explained that: 
Corruption is a kind of behaviour; which deviates from the norm, prevalent 
or believed to prevail in a given context, such as political. It is a deviant 
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behaviour associated with a motivation, namely that of private gain at public 
expense.  
Rather than have a generic definition or offence of corruption, the Organisation of 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the Council of Europe, and the 
United Nations (UN) Conventions defined an international standard on the 
criminalisation of corruption by prescribing specific offences for a range of corrupt 
behaviours. The OECD Convention established the offence of bribery of a foreign 
public official, whereas the Council of Europe Convention established offences such 
as trading in influence and bribing domestic and foreign public officials. The 
mandatory provision of the UN Convention included embezzlement, 
misappropriation or other diversion of property by a public official and obstruction 
of justice (OECD, 2008). The United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) 
original definition of corruption was “the misuse of public power, office or authority 
for private benefit – through bribery, extortion, influence peddling, nepotism, fraud, 
speed money or embezzlement” (UNDP, 2008, p. 7). A definition that outlines the 
various activities that make up what is termed as corruption makes it clearer to 
understand what constitutes corruption. However, this definition was limited as it 
did not include the private sector. It has subsequently been amended to the “misuse 
of entrusted power for private gain”.  
Some countries have taken to defining corruption as a specific crime. As such, these 
definitions are often too general, vague or narrow (Brooks et al., 2013) from a 
criminal law perspective. However, international definitions of corruption for policy 
purposes are much more common. “Abuse of public or private office for personal 
gain” (OECD, 2008, p. 22), is a frequently used definition that covers a broad range 
 27 
of corrupt activities. In TI’s definition of corruption, the “misuse of entrusted power 
for private gain” (TI, 2017a, para. 1) there is a noted distinction between “according 
to rule corruption”, which consists of facilitation payments where a bribe is paid to 
receive preferential treatment for something that the bribe receiver is required to do 
by law, and “against the rule corruption”, which consists of bribes paid to someone 
to obtain services the bribe receiver is prohibited from providing (Akech, 2014, pp. 
5-6). However, this definition is flawed for explicitly referring to the paying of a 
bribe when there are many forms of corrupt activities that may not involve any form 
of financial transaction (Anderson & Heywood, 2009; Friedrich, 2009). An outcome 
of a corrupt act could include promotion, the placement of an order, the granting of a 
licence or a favourable outcome that would not have otherwise occurred if it were 
not for the specific payment. The non-financial aspect of corruption and “abuses or 
gains” could be “a rise in status, nepotism, political cronyism or sexual exploitation” 
(Maxwell et al., 2008, p. 143).  Furthermore, the gain need not be personal; it could 
be a direct benefit to a family member or other group. In this respect, TI’s 
perception of corruption has been criticised for being “blind to the ground realities 
of a developing society, especially one in the process of rapid transition from 
tradition to modernity” (Chadda, 2004, p. 122). 
In defining corruption, Gardiner (2009, p. 28) discusses corruption by public 
officials and their abuse of office. He explains that corruption is not just committed 
by public officials there is business corruption in the form of “kickbacks, fraud, 
theft, abuse, error and waste”. As the definition can differ slightly from country to 
country, it must be accepted that people’s understanding of corruption and what 
constitutes corruption will also vary (Fletcher & Herrmann 2012; Sullivan, 2006) 
irrespective of their day-to-day interaction with corrupt activity.  
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When discussing the definition of political corruption, some political cultures 
consider the ‘payoff’ as being the norm; however, in other cultures the ‘payoff’ can 
be viewed differently (Peters & Welch, 2002). Kiltgaard (1988, p. 64) opines that 
for a variety of cultural and historic reasons, societies differ in their “morals, 
customs and standard of behaviour”. He found from his study of corruption that 
nearly all cultures understood that it was neither “lawful nor customary”. The 
context of culture and background influencing one’s view of corruption will be 
discussed in greater depth later in this chapter.  
Chetwynd, Chetwynd and Spector (2003) talk about corruption in terms of “rent 
taking” (p. 7), “rent seekers” (p. 8), “rent seeking”, (p. 8) and “rent theory” (p. 9). 
They point out that “rent theory” draws on ideas of Rose-Ackerman (1978) and 
Krueger (1974), amongst others. Khan and Jomo (2000) state that the financial crisis 
in the 1990s, following the economic boom in Asia, was brought on by rent-seeking 
and corruption. Rent theory is used in economics and relates to excessive income 
and as such, there is an overlap with corruption literature and rent literature (Brooks 
et al., 2013).  
The UK Bribery Act was delayed twice as the UK Ministry of Justice endeavoured 
to draw up guidance notes to enable companies to understand it. There was a lot of 
speculation that the guidance notes provided would only address the subject of the 
new corporate offence of ‘failing to prevent bribery’. However, the Confederation of 
Business Industry (CBI) director of employment policy said that although the CBI 
welcomed an update to the anti-bribery legislation they wanted a “review to clarify 
the rules for areas like hospitality and third-party services to ensure that people who 
are engaged in legitimate activities are not caught out” (Tyler, 2011, para. 5). The 
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UK Ministry of Justice issued two documents in 2011 relating to the Bribery Act, 
which came into force in June that same year. One of the documents, the Bribery 
Act 2010 Quick Start Guide (Ministry of Justice, 2011a, p. 3), explicitly advised in 
the introduction that the Act was “not concerned with fraud, theft, books and records 
offences, Companies Act offences, money laundering offences or competition law”. 
It also stated that the Act was only concerned with bribery and gave a general 
definition of bribery as “giving someone a financial or other advantage to encourage 
that person to perform their functions or activities improperly or to reward that 
person for having already done so”. The Act also brought about a new offence of 
failing to prevent bribery by a corporation. What is interesting, and appears to be 
unique, is that the Guide was issued prior to the Act being brought into force, which 
highlights the complexity that surrounds what could have been deemed a simple 
piece of legislation. The Guide also stated that the practice of giving facilitation 
payments constituted bribery under the new Act, just as they were under the old law.  
Summary 
The literature review on the definition of corruption has evidenced that there has 
been much debate on the subject and that there is no universally agreed definition.  
However, it could be said that corruption covers a gradient of behaviour, starting 
with morally unacceptable actions that affect complete societies, from the offering 
of small gifts or favours, to providing a substantial unfair advantage to someone to 
undertake an action that they would not normally undertake. Corruption is 
essentially understood to be an umbrella term that covers a “broad range of actions 
and behaviours” (Banuri & Eckel, 2012, p. 3). Whether a universal definition is 
achievable remains open to debate, to put his into context, as noted by Hicks (2010), 
the definition of money laundering has been progressively expanded; however, 
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whether this expansion has reduced or improved matters is not yet clear. Something 
that would be beneficial would be to align legislation across countries so they either 
allow certain behaviour or not, but explaining either way, for example the conflict of 
facilitation payments between the UK and USA legislation. This would ensure that 
individuals do not fall foul of legislation that is stricter in a country than that which 
is in their own country. What is key is that there has been a need for a universal 
understanding of corruption covering international, cultural and religious borders 
(Anderson & Heywood, 2009; Brown, 2016; Knack, 2006). This study will evidence 
that there is a global understanding of what constitutes corruption and the difference 
between bribery and facilitation payments along with a collective view of the 
preventative measures that are the most effective.  
Bribery v Facilitation Payments 
Introduction 
“What may be perceived as a facilitation payment under one set of circumstances 
may not be similarly perceived under another set of circumstances” (Deming, 2014, 
p. 228).  
This section will review the literature that has focused on the difference between a 
bribe and facilitation payment, endeavouring to distinguish between the two. It will 
also highlight that there is conflicting legislation around the globe, with some 
countries potentially permitting small payments to speed up a service that one is 
already entitled to receive, as long as certain criteria are met.  
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The Difference Between a Bribe and a Facilitation Payment 
As highlighted in the previous section, corruption can take many forms including 
bribery, theft, misappropriation, nepotism and gift giving (Brooks et al., 2013; 
Fletcher & Herrmann, 2012; Nichols, 2009). However, there is often a distinction 
within laws and policies between bribes and facilitation payments, which are also 
known as ‘grease’ or ‘speed money’ payments (Bielgelman & Biegelman, 2010; 
Gray & Kaufman, 1998; Lawler, 2012). Facilitation payments are usually small 
payments given to government officials, generally those occupying lower grades 
(Kilne, 2010; Lawler, 2012) to carry out functions that they would usually undertake 
as part of their day-to-day responsibilities, but faster. The general idea of the 
payment is to expedite or ‘facilitate’ business transactions (Knapp, 2011). 
Conversely, a bribe is generally a much larger payment usually paid to a higher 
grade government official to secure something of worth, for example, a planning 
contract, a building permit, a change in government policy, to induce an illegal 
action or secure venues for sporting events (Kilne, 2010; Lawler, 2012). However, 
although ‘payment’ is mentioned, there are, in fact, unlimited ways in which bribes 
can be paid, settled or concealed. These include the giving of airline tickets, 
intercompany transfers and free use of luxury/other facilities, just to name a few 
(Comer & Stephens, 2016). It should be noted that money does not necessarily have 
to be involved in order to constitute or settle a bribe. The Bribery Act 2010 
Guidance (Ministry of Justice, 2011b, p. 18) defines facilitation payments as “small 
bribes paid to facilitate routine Government action”. This Guidance also refers to the 
2009 recommendation of the OECD that recognised the “corrosive effect of 
facilitation payments and asks adhering countries to discourage companies from 
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making such payments” (p. 18), noting that exemptions from this guidance 
undermines anti-bribery and corruption procedures.   
Under certain legislation, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 1977 (FCPA) for 
example, facilitation payments are legal; however, a company must keep accurate 
records noting the facilitation payments if it is to rely on them as a defence against 
any bribery allegations (Graycar & Smith, 2011). This is due to the fact that the US 
considers any request for a bribe as corruption (Banuri & Eckel, 2012). In relation to 
UK legislation, it would be at the discretion of the Serious Fraud Office as to 
whether it would prosecute a company or individual for making such a payment as 
the Bribery Act has no exception on facilitation payments, unlike the FCPA (SFO, 
2012). Only the US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Korea, allow 
facilitation payments to be made in their current legislation (Lawler, 2012).  
Corruption verses Money Laundering 
The fight against corruption is intertwined with the fight against money laundering; 
the ill-gotten gains of a corrupt public official are useless if they are not placed, 
layered and integrated into the global financial system in a way that does not raise 
suspicion. Significant funds from an unknown source owned by a public figure 
draws suspicion; whereas a drug dealer may be reliably confident of remaining 
anonymous with their vast sums of money (FATF, 2011). It has been said that an 
effective anti-money laundering framework reduces the channels by which illicit 
funds can be laundered, making crime and corruption activities less appealing 
(Pereira & Fontana, 2012). In the same way that corruption legislation varies across 
jurisdictions so does anti-money laundering legislation; however, the general 
principles of money laundering involve turning the proceeds of a crime into 
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legitimate funds with no obvious link to their criminal origins. In the UK the 
definition in the 2017 money laundering regulations includes the proceeds of any 
criminal offence, regardless of the amount involved. (Haines Watts, 2017). The 
issue from an international perspective is what constitutes a crime and how effective 
is the anti-money laundering legislation within a country? The other challenge is that 
the gain from a corrupt act does not have to result in physical money; however, if as 
a result of a bribe or facilitation payment physical money exchanges hands and these 
actions are illegal in a country then the result is considered to be the proceeds of a 
crime. The legislation in the UK; the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, the Money 
Laundering Financing and Transfer of Funds (Information on the Payer) Regulations 
2017, is robust enough to cover this off; however, this is not always the case in other 
countries. Under the different anti-money laundering legislation across the globe 
there is an obligation to report suspicious activity identified in the regulated sector; 
for example, banks have an obligation to report suspicious transactions to the 
relevant authorities so where funds are felt to have emanate from the proceeds of 
corruption, this is another means of reporting potential corrupt acts.       
Summary 
This section has endeavoured to outline the difference between a bribe and a 
facilitation payment. In brief, a bribe is usually something given (an advantage) to 
someone to undertake a task that may be illegal or to do something that they would 
not necessarily do, whereas a facilitation payment is usually a small nominal 
payment to a government official to expedite (speed up) a process. Although a bribe 
implies reciprocity, the distinction between a bribe and a gift is not always clear 
(Krambia-Kapardis, 2016).  
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It has been said that western scholars study gift-giving behaviour from the 
perspective of gift-giving motivation; however, Chinese scholars pay particular 
attention from the view of the relationship as gift-giving in Chinese culture plays a 
special and important role in building, maintaining and strengthening interpersonal 
relationships  (Liu, Lu, Liang & Wei, 2010). In the actual gift-giving behaviour, the 
‘face’ is an important facet (motivation), which cannot be ignored in the Chinese 
culture. ‘Face’ is a mixture of Chinese traditional culture, traditional values, 
personal characteristic and social culture (Liu, Lu, Liang & Wei, 2010, p. 606). 
Chinese people attach particular importance to themselves and other’s face, while 
gifts are a bond between individual relationships and a carrier of faces, the gifts are 
supposed to attract people’s attention, so the ‘shame culture’ as another part of 
Chinese traditional culture has increasingly far-reaching impact on gift-giving 
behaviour (Liu, Lu, Liang & Wei, 2010, p. 604). Gifts, entertainment or hospitality 
given with an expectation that a business relationship will be influenced will 
constitute a bribe under the UK Bribery Act as they are being used with the ‘intent 
to induce an improper conduct’ (IBE, 2012). Gift-giving in the form of disguised 
bribes distorts the social and moral importance of gift-giving practices (Dion, 2017). 
Caution should be taken when analysing gift-giving practices in foreign countries as 
researchers could interpret different practices through the lens of their own cultural 
customs (ethnocentric trap); however, it does not mean that researchers cannot 
morally judge the way giving (rule-based, or relationship based) cultures prevent or 
tolerate corrupt practices (Dion, 2017) or promote such acts.    
This section concluded by touching upon the relationship between corruption and 
money laundering; however, as money laundering is a vast topic in its own right and 
falls outside of the focus of this research.  
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Background and Culture 
Introduction  
“The elders insisted that interracial and same-sex marriages were wrong, while the 
high school students passionately argued against this racist and homophobic 
position” (Ricci, 2005, p. 144).  
This section will examine whether an individual’s background and culture shapes 
their view of corruption, largely from a western and non-western angle. It must be 
noted that cultural studies themselves are influenced by cultural and historical 
differences and therefore subject to change and cultural differences (Neumann & 
Nunning, 2012). Culture can be defined as the material, human and spiritual 
(indivisible) whole that makes it possible for human beings to resolve concrete and 
precise problems in their daily life. Culture ensures the continuity of social groups 
over time. Cultures produce specific sets of opportunities, and then impose rules, 
constraints, and disapproval. The structural elements of culture include: education, 
economy, artistic creation, knowledge systems, beliefs systems, moral systems and 
forms of expression (Dion, 2017, p. 77, citing Malinowski, 1968). 
Western v Non-Western Countries 
Social rules may vary dramatically from one culture to another and amongst 
individuals (Melgar et al., 2010). A person’s values, morals and religion (Marquette, 
2012) may affect their perception of corruption. In reality different cultures use 
inherently different systems to achieve things. Western cultures are predominantly 
rules-based and therefore business is organised around discrete deals, written 
contracts and enforced by a legal system. This differs from most of the world’s 
relationship-based cultures where their business is organised around personal 
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relationships that have been embedded by personal honour, friendship or long-term 
mutual obligations. The distinction of these two systems is only one of many 
cultural differences, but it creates different ethical norms (Hooker, 2003). 
Does Personal Background or Culture Shape A Person’s View of Corruption? 
Culturally, societies differ and what is an acceptable practice in one culture might be 
considered corrupt in another (Fletcher & Herrmann, 2012; Sullivan, 2006). This 
cultural difference may have a direct impact on a person’s perception of corruption. 
At times, corruption can have a devastating effect as it can produce a culture of 
distrust towards some organisations, or create a culture of gift-giving and potentially 
raise corruption in a society (Melgar et al., 2010; Pharr, 2009). Cultures are also 
constantly changing and what may be acceptable to one generation may not be 
acceptable to the next generation.   
Standard practices around the world of bribery, kickbacks, cronyism and nepotism 
are viewed by the west as unethical because of the west’s universalist outlook that 
every society works, or should work, in essentially the same manner. An example is 
the west’s business practices that should be based on an equal playing field market 
system that is characterised by transparency and regulated by laws. Failure by a 
country to conform to this model is viewed as underdeveloped or dysfunctional 
(Hooker, 2003). 
Attitudes towards corruption vary greatly. Nye (1972) points out that in certain West 
African countries there is little widespread sense of disgust about corruption. Not 
only is the tolerance of corruption relevant, but also the difference in attitude within 
a country is important, especially when endeavouring to devise a strategy to combat 
corruption.  
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Mungiu-Pippidi (2015) advised that the modern definition has the assumption that 
we have knowledge of the real norms governing a given society, not just the formal 
ones, and that the governance norm is public integrity. She stated that this definition 
relies on a presumption of modernity in all states and their correspondent societies, 
measuring themselves by the modern western benchmark. Along the same lines, 
Akech (2014) points out that because international dialogue on corruption is shaped 
on views of the dominant western liberal democracies, they may not be effective in 
distinguishing or preventing corruption in non-western societies. As a result, the 
reforms recommended by the international agencies for combating corruption may 
not be appropriate or effective. Many African governments have created 
organisations with the task of attacking corruption and changing practices: for 
example, the work of the Kenya Ethics and Anticorruption Commission (PPOA, 
1999); however, it is far too early to say whether such organisations are likely to 
achieve their stated aims and succeed.  
Summary 
We (academics, western law makers and policy writers) appear to ‘tar everyone with 
the same brush’ because western society’s perception of corruption has been the 
focus of much assessment and research. There has been little focus on the subject of 
developing countries, their traditions and norms in respect of the impact and ways to 
reduce corruption. Western norms and values are clearly driving the western 
perception of developing countries, which in turn may be detrimental, to their 
growth and progress. Academic research is required in developing countries to fully 
understand their values, norms and culture to establish whether there are countries 
that do not have a western influence yet have no corruption. Conversely research 
should be undertaken on western countries to establish whether corruption has been 
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reduced or whether it has simply gone underground.  Is it western greed that has 
driven the increase in corruption? The question as to whether corruption is driven by 
western culture or is endemic across human nature is also one that needs to be 
addressed.  
Measuring Corruption 
Introduction 
“The idea is that if the causes and magnitude of corruption can be measured with 
some accuracy, then it can be combated effectively” (Akech, 2014, p. 5). 
This section considers the relevance of measuring corruption and introduces some of 
the organisations that attempt to measure this phenomenon, along with their indices. 
There is a particular focus on TI’s CPI and the advantages and disadvantages this 
has across the financial services sector and the appropriateness of its use.   
Why Measure Corruption? 
It is important to measure corruption for two reasons. Firstly, it is an indicator as to 
how well a society is performing in terms of the government’s relationship with its 
citizens. If there is bribery, extortion, misappropriation, or self-dealing, if major 
capital and development projects serve an individual’s financial interests rather than 
the public interest, if foreign corporations bribe public officials to exploit natural 
resources, or if human rights abuses are tolerated, then society is more corrupt than 
those in which these behaviours are not part of the social sphere. Measuring these 
characteristics, either singly or in some aggregated form, gives an understanding of 
the potential for that country to be a significant player in global governance in 
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international business, and whether investing in that country would be sound 
(Graycar & Prenzler, 2013).  
Secondly, a need arises to diagnose the causes and magnitude of corruption to 
facilitate the targeting of good governance reforms (Akech, 2014). If preventative 
measures have been implemented then measuring corruption may give an indication 
as to how successful these measures are whilst evaluating progress in anti-bribery 
and corruption strategies and identifying which practices work best (Graycar & 
Prenzler, 2013) against those that fail.  
There are a number of international and governmental organisations, including Non-
Government Organisations (NGOs), who are dedicated to the study of corruption or 
the study of the perception of corruption and the fight against it; for example, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD), the OECD, the UN, Global Witness, the World Bank Institute 
(WBI) and TI.  
Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index 
TI (2013) explains that two decades ago international organisations did not focus on 
promoting transparency and anti-corruption; however, today it is no longer a ‘taboo’ 
subject but the most talked about problem in the world. TI is a global organisation 
that is present in more than 100 countries. It has undertaken studies of corruption in 
whole sectors including water (Graycar & Smith citing TI, 2008b), health (Graycar 
& Smith citing TI, 2006), and climate change (Graycar & Smith citing TI, 2010).   
TI has now been producing the CPI for 22 years, ranking countries based on how 
corrupt their public sector is perceived to be. The index standardises corruption 
indicators from different sources to place them on a comparable scale and calculates 
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an average to obtain one value for each country (Knack, 2006). The 2016 CPI 
measured the perceived level of corruption and reported on the level of public sector 
corruption across 176 countries. On a scale of 0 – 100 countries were assessed and 
counted, with 0 indicating the country is perceived to be ‘highly corrupt’, through to 
100 indicating the country is perceived to be ‘very clean’. Although no country had 
a perfect score, two-thirds of the countries scored below 50, indicating a perception 
of endemic corruption across the public sector. The cleanest countries were deemed 
to be Denmark (90), New Zealand (90) and Finland (89). At the other end of the 
scale were North Korea (12), South Sudan (11) and Somalia (10) (TI, 2017b). TI’s 
index was originally produced to raise awareness of corruption and give researchers 
information to analyse.  
The CPI itself is a composite index that combines 13 different international 
corruption surveys from reputable institutions. These surveys assess the perceptions 
of the levels of corruption in the public sector. TI does not commission these 
surveys itself (TI, 2017c). 
In 2016, reports in Macedonia painted an incorrect picture of the CPI methodology, 
leading to TI publically clarifying its approach. Of note was the fact that the score 
for Macedonia was aggregated from just seven data sources of the 13 available (TI, 
2017c). Within TI’s stated methodology a minimum of three sources must be used 
in order to produce a country assessment (TI, 2016). It is therefore clear that not all 
countries will be included in the assessment. Furthermore, it could be argued that 
countries are not being assessed on a comparable basis, therefore questions must be 
asked over the robustness of the methodology. In the 2016 CPI 15 countries were 
assessed using just three data sources, in contrast to four countries that were 
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assessed using 10 sources. No country had an assessment that included more than 10 
sources. In describing their methodology in detail, TI stated that, “where a data set 
covers a limited range of countries, we impute scores for all those countries that are 
missing in the respective data set” (TI, 2017b, Technical methodology note, p. 2). 
As demonstrated within Macedonia, it is clear that mis-understandings of the 
methodology do occur, and whether those who rely on the CPI fully understand the 
limited data sources and imputed scores is highly questionable. 
To add to the issues noted, TI’s methodology was reviewed and changed in 2012, 
hence it not possible to make a straightforward comparison of data before this, and 
2012 should now be regarded as the baseline (TI, 2017b, Technical methodology 
note). Furthermore, there were errors in the 2014 and 2015 CPIs (TI, 2017d). In 
2014 three countries’ scores were affected, which changed the ranks of 21 additional 
countries, and in 2015 11 countries’ scores were affected, impacting the ranking of 
31 countries (TI, 2017d). It remains unknown what impact, if any, this may have 
had on the individual countries affected. 
TI’s research, apart from being on perception, concentrates on individual states 
rather than having international reach and exploring the interlinked relationships of 
corruption (Brooks et al., 2013). The example provided by Brooks et al. (2013) is 
that of an autocratic state discovering oil within its country whilst working with a 
western oil company, the revenue it secures is often distributed to a few of its 
favoured citizens who then place this in the international financial system out of 
reach of its own people. They evidence the fact that the CPI is misleading and refer 
to the 2012 CPI, which ranked Switzerland 6th and Japan 7th out of 174 countries, 
highlighting that the low rankings indicate low levels of corruption. However, they 
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cite Shaxson (2007), who observed that Switzerland is known for harbouring illegal 
funds or funds that have been deposited in the country to avoid tax, and in Japan 
political establishment links to organised crime are well documented (Brooks et al., 
2013 citing Friman, 2001; Hill, 2003; Kaplan & Dubro, 2012). The CPI for 2016 
ranks Switzerland 5th and Japan 20th (TI, 2017b) with no evidence that anything has 
fundamentally changed with the transparency of Switzerland. In fact, when the 
International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) published the so-called 
Panama Papers in April 2016 they revealed that 1,339 Swiss lawyers, financial 
advisors and other middlemen had set up more than 38,000 offshore entities over the 
past 40 years. It later transpired that a further 450 individuals and companies in 
Switzerland were also connected to the Panama Papers; however, at the time of 
reporting it was unclear whether any offshore accounting was used to hide money 
from the tax authorities (Swiss Broadcasting Corporation, 2016). The point made by 
Brooks et al. (2013) potentially still stands that Switzerland may not be as free of 
corruption as the index suggests. It should be noted that Japan was also mentioned in 
the Panama Papers with articles reporting that Japanese individuals and companies 
listed owed more than ¥1 billion ($9.06 million) in taxes and undeclared income 
(Kyodo, 2017). This cannot possibly be the cause for Japan moving from 7th (2012) 
to 20th (2016) as the reports on the extent of the Japanese firms owing such sums 
were produced after the issuance of the 2016 CPI.   
The following table shows how the CPI ranking of the UK has changed over a five-
year period.  
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Table 1. Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index ranking of the 
UK 
Year CPI 2012 CPI 2013 CPI 2014 CPI 2015 CPI 2016 CPI 2017 
Ranking 17 14 14 10 10 8 
Although some of the variables have changed in the CPI methodology, as advised 
by TI, for example, the number of countries assessed, it would appear that the UK is 
perceived to be getting less corrupt since 2012. This is quite surprising considering 
there were a number of scandals over the same period; for example, stories of MPs’ 
expense abuse. The anti-mafia campaigner, Roberto Saviano, supported by TI stated 
that the UK was the most corrupt place on earth, highlighting that it was the leading 
centre for the laundering of corrupt monies from overseas into the UK property 
market, luxury goods and other sectors (Lusher, 2016). Furthermore, the media 
reported that the Panama Papers leak revealed details of thousands of offshore 
funds, including one run by the then Prime Minister, David Cameron’s father. The 
report outlined comments made by TI that tens of billions of pounds of corrupt 
money were being laundered through the UK each year (Lusher, 2016). Money 
laundering is the process of concealing illicit gains generated by criminal activity 
and therefore corruption and money laundering are fundamentally intertwined 
(FATF, 2010). Offences relating to money laundering are usually drug trafficking, 
fraud and non-drug smuggling, with other cases including bribery and corruption 
(Hicks, 2012). Through the course of committing an offence the proceeds of crime 
are generally laundered by way of placement, layering and integration (Hicks & 
Graycar, 2011) through the financial services sector.  
Irrespective of stories such as this the UK continues to move up the CPI, indicating 
that it is becoming ‘cleaner’. As more stories similar to the above keep appearing in 
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the media and whilst TI continues to acknowledge the issues, the question needs to 
be raised as to how can the UK be getting ‘cleaner’?  
In the 2015 CPI, TI makes the comment that “just because a country has a clean 
public sector at home, does not mean it is not linked to corruption elsewhere” (TI, 
2016, para. 19). They use the example of Sweden which was ranked third in the 
2015 Index, yet the Swedish-Finnish firm TeliaSonera, which was 37% owned by 
the Swedish state, was facing allegations that it had paid millions of dollars in bribes 
to secure business in Uzbekistan, which was ranked 153rd in the same index. TI 
advised that their research had shown that half of all OECD countries were violating 
their international obligations to crack down on bribery and corruption by their 
companies abroad (TI, 2016). 
Other Corruption Indices 
The WBI Control of Corruption Index (CCI) was later produced to complement TI’s 
index (Knack, 2006). This indicator measures the extent to which public power is 
exercised for private gain, including petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as 
capture of the state by elites and private interest. It also measures the strength and 
effectiveness of policies and the institutional framework to prevent and combat 
corruption (Millennium Challenge Corporation, n.d.) in a country. The WBI index 
was intended to improve and expand on TI’s CPI in a number of ways. These 
included providing a ranking for any country that could produce data from even one 
source (whilst the CPI requires three sources); weighting the difference sources 
(whereas TI’s sources are all equal); and including sources that TI rejects. Whilst TI 
lists the number of sources used, and the range and standard deviation among 
sources, WBI calculates a ‘standard error’ as an indicator of uncertainty 
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accompanying each point estimate (Knack, 2006). It should be noted that because of 
the varying sources, the fact that the sources change over time and can vary from 
country to country, the definition of corruption reflected in the index values would 
change over time. Knack (2006 p. 18) gave the example of Estonia’s 6.4 corruption 
rating against Latvia’s 4.2 corruption rating in the 2005 CPI being based on two 
different sets of indicators “hence on differing implicit definitions of corruption”. 
Knack further observes that for the 27 Europe and Central Asia countries, there are 
13 distinct combinations of sources in the 2005 CPI, so the 27 index values reflect 
13 different implicit definitions of corruption. This “definitional inconsistency” is 
the “price of maximising the number of countries covered in the index” (Knack, 
2006, p. 19).  
There are a number of other surveys and indices assessing corruption, for example: 
• Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) 
• World Economic Forum’s (WEF) ‘Executive Opinion Survey’ (Knack, 
2006) 
• Transparency International’s Bribe Payers Index (BPI), which ranks 
countries against the likelihood of companies winning business abroad by 
paying bribes. Unfortunately, the last assessment was made in 2011 (TI, 
2012) 
• International Country Risk Guide (ICRG)   
The WBI’s CCI and TI’s CPI are regarded as the most reliable data sets for cross-
national comparisons and country coverage (You & Khagram, 2005), with TI’s CPI 
being one of the best-known indices (Andrei, Matei & Rosca, 2009; Fletcher & 
Herrmann, 2012). However, although highly respected, the surveying of the 
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perception of corruption has brought criticism by some researchers and is deemed 
unreliable and generally poor (Lovei & McKechnie, 2000) at measuring corruption:  
Measuring perceptions of corruption can have an endogenous effect: if 
people read in the newspaper that Lithuania is perceived as a highly corrupt 
country, this will influence their own perception of corruption in Lithuania, 
which then is measured in another type of, or later survey. The results of 
such measurements are thus being reproduced and reinforced. (Fletcher & 
Herrmann, 2012, p. 20-21 citing Dahl, 2009, p. 164)   
Caution is required when interpreting corruption perception indices as measures of 
corruption experience or actual behaviour (Banuri & Eckel, 2012) because it has 
been found that “a number factors commonly thought to cause corruption seem to 
bias perceptions away from experience, that perceptions exhibit diminishing 
sensitivity to experience, and that they are influenced by absolute levels of 
corruption” (Donchev & Ujhelyi, 2013, p. 27).   
There are different methodologies adopted by various indicators to measure 
corruption, or the perception thereof, which have different purposes. These range 
from raising public awareness, advocating for institutional reforms, and assessing 
the extent to which such reforms are being implemented. Any efforts to measure 
corruption should therefore be informed by contextual and institutional factors 
(Akech, 2014; Mungiu-Pippidi, 2015). The original purpose of the CPI, which has 
been achieved, was to raise awareness of corruption and to provide researchers with 
data for analysing corruption (Knack, 2006). However, understanding the 
methodologies and limitations of this index is important, especially if they are to be 
used for a purpose other than research. The Hong Kong Monetary Authority 
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(HKMA), the Hong Kong financial services regulator, states the CPI as an example 
of an index that may be used when taking into consideration the political 
environment in a particular jurisdiction (HKMA, 2007). In principle there would 
appear to be a number of advantages in doing this, for example; it is a consolidated 
list of countries that have already been ranked using a number of sources; however, 
the disadvantages could outweigh the advantages and have a catastrophic impact on 
a country and its citizens if not used appropriately, for example, through social 
exclusion or lack of investment in certain countries. Organisations may use the 
index and conclude that they will not invest in certain countries due to their specific 
CPI ranking and perceived corruption risk.      
Leite and Weidmann (1999, p. 17) discuss the indices on corruption produced by 
‘investment advisory services’ and mention the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), 
the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), and the Business and Environmental 
Risk Intelligence (BERI). They point out that clients requiring these surveys are 
typically banks, multinational companies and international investors.  
To measure corruption from a quantitative perspective is difficult, but is achievable.  
This can be undertaken through public expenditure tracking surveys (PETS), service 
provider surveys and firm surveys (Reinikka & Svensson, 2003). PETS can be used 
to compare budget allocation to actual spending through various tiers of 
government, including the final recipient. Reinikka and Svensson (2003) discuss the 
use of PETS in the education and the health sectors in Africa, where it was found 
that salaries were being paid to teachers and health workers who were no longer 
even in service. They point out that with this knowledge more targeted and effective 
measures can be considered.   
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Another way to measure corruption is through verifiable datasets, for example, 
official complaints to the police, or corruption convictions. Brooks et al. (2013) 
explain that earlier methods of measuring corruption were undertaken through the 
examination of official records; however, they point out that the results of this kind 
of analysis would not necessarily articulate the level of corruption in a specific 
country, but would provide more of an indication of the availability of the data and 
potentially a reflection of the differing attitudes towards the reporting of corrupt 
activities. They give the example of the lack of reporting and enforcement in highly 
corrupt countries against countries that may report and prosecute numerous incidents 
of corruption, potentially portraying the image that corruption is rife.      
Summary 
This section has given an overview of the difficulties in measuring corruption, the 
limitations of certain indices and methods, and the conflict of the definition of 
corruption, with a particular focus on TI’s CPI. Many corruption surveys ask their 
population questions around perceptions rather than direct experience, which pose 
difficulties for those who are trying to assess the measurement of corruption itself 
(Donchev & Ujhelyi, 2013. Also perception indices raise concerns about biases 
(Reinikka & Svensson, 2003). Corruption is a covert activity and due to its very 
nature obtaining accurate information is difficult and gives those involved an 
incentive for altering or fabricating any information they provide (Langseth, 2006; 
Pellegrini & Gerlagh, 2008; Sandholtz & Koetzle, 2000; TI, 2011). However, 
indicators of corruption can be useful tools for its eradication, although much 
depends on what phenomenon is being measured and how the measures are used 
(Akech, 2014). As pointed out by Brooks et al. (2013), aggregated indicators (those 
that combine objective and subjective indicators) have been increasingly used since 
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the 1990s, which may make them more reliable. Organisations including those in the 
financial services sector should be mindful of the limitations of corruption indices, 
such as TI’s CPI when being used for more than just research. The impact of its use 
for example in investment decisions is at present unknown. The following section 
examines the literature on the effects of corruption.  
Effects of Corruption  
Introduction 
“The overall effect of corruption is the joint effect of the direct implications of the 
bribed and the effect of the rights created or transferred as a result” (Khan, 2009, p. 
472). 
This section will discuss how corruption affects society to varying degrees, outlining 
the impact it may have on direct foreign investment, wealth distribution and 
infrastructure in a county. This section will also discuss whether corruption is 
concerned with power or money. It is fair to say that more has been written on the 
adverse effects of corruption, than on any benefits that it may bring.  
A Culture of Distrust 
The key objective of corruption is normally personal enrichment, although it may be 
orchestrated by a group with the end goal of achieving or retaining political power, 
therefore these motives can become closely entwined (Cockcroft, 2014).   
Corruption can breed a culture of distrust from outside a country as well as from 
within. If government officials are perceived to be corrupt this may prevent direct 
foreign investment, potentially reducing economic growth and development. Large 
corporations, even if they would rather not pay a bribe, believe they must do so to 
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avoid missing out on commercial deals. The smaller business perspective is that they 
are not only at risk of missing out on commercial opportunities but potentially being 
highlighted as a troublesome company, not willing to conform and being harassed 
by corrupt officials if they refuse to pay a bribe (Bishara, 2011). When Asiedu and 
Freeman (2008) undertook a study on the effects of corruption on firm-level 
investment they found that it was under researched. They noted the comments of 
Svensson (2003) who had stated that there were limited studies on the economic 
effects of corruption at the firm level. The reduction in economic growth can slow 
development and affect the poor and vulnerable in a country (Al-Sadig, 2009 citing 
Mauro, 1995; Fletcher & Herrmann, 2012; Graycar & Smith, 2011; Lovei & 
McKenchnie, 2000; Myint, 2000; Shleifer & Vishny, 1993; Yanga, 2011). In 
considering the economic effects of corruption one might think of the senior state 
figures siphoning large sums of public money, bringing with it economic disaster 
and undermining government and institution processes (Kilne, 2010). Gray and 
Kaufman (1998) explain the results of the World Economic Forum’s Global 
Competitiveness Survey in 1997 that spanned 58 countries and involved more than 
3,000 firms. They found that companies tended to spend more management time 
negotiating for licences, permits and taxes in countries where bribery and corruption 
were more widespread and as such, this did not make business conduct cost 
effective. 
In developing countries the impact of corruption on private investment is deemed to 
be considerably harmful (Armstrong, 2005; Holmberg & Rothstein citing Akcay, 
2006; Myint, 2000). Bribe payments add to the cost of any project, whether that is 
for the payment for permits, local services or goods, thus putting a burden on the 
investor and increasing their costs (Myint, 2000; Sullivan, 2006). If bribes are used 
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to circumvent regulations then this may have a detrimental effect on the quality of 
the end product, thus potentially impacting the local people of that country (Rose-
Ackerman, 1996). If the outcome is of poor quality then this could lead to serious 
injury or death if certain regulations or building codes have been ignored 
(Armstrong, 2005). It has been stated that corruption in Nigeria has resulted in the 
majority of people being on an income of less that US$2 per day when the average 
annual income from oil within the country since 1970 is US$30 billion (Cockcroft, 
2014).  
Corruption contributes to the rise in the underground economy (Fletcher & 
Herrmann, 2012, p. 49 citing Gray & Kaufman, 1998, p. 8; Myint, 2000), and the 
informal or grey sector (Chetwynd, Chetwynd & Spector, 2003, p. 7). There are two 
forms of underground economies, those that are illegal, for example drug trafficking 
and the smuggling businesses, and those that are legal but not officially recorded, 
perhaps to evade tax or for some other reason. If the underground economies grow, 
the inflation rate, exchange rate and interest rates become distorted, as the figures 
cannot be relied on due to trade in the informal market not being officially recorded.  
Due to the fact that those who receive bribes are usually in the minority and in a 
position of power, income distribution is affected. The burden of corruption can fall 
on the poor as they cannot afford to pay bribes and therefore may have to go without 
essential day-to-day items. If the wealthy are in the minority they will be able to 
purchase the more expensive goods to show their worth; however, as the poor will 
not be able to purchase such luxuries the wealth will not be evenly distributed 
(Myint, 2000) within the country. 
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Sport is a multi-billion dollar industry, with intricate ties to political, social and 
cultural interests, often providing legitimacy to military regimes, increasing national 
pride, international prestige and stimulating economic and commercial success 
(Brooks, Aleem & Button, 2013). The recent increase in the commercialisation of 
sport has contributed to the increase of fraud and corruption and the global 
phenomenon of sport corruption has resulted in a variety of consequences, from 
damaged reputations and financial costs through to sanctions and employee turnover 
(Kihl, Skinner & Engelberg, 2017). When specifically examining the public sector, 
sport corruption is generally observed in the bribery of officials, such as the 
International Olympic Committee officials (Kelner, 2017; Mackay, 1999), or 
kickbacks in procurement and embezzlement of funds (Nassif, 2014).  
Several writers, or as Nye (1972) puts it, arguments between the moralists and the 
revisionists, point out that corruption may have a positive impact and may actually 
benefit economic growth by enhancing efficiency (Al-Sadig, 2009 citing Bardhan, 
1997; Detzer, 2010), political, or managerial benefits (Klitgaard, 1991), integration 
and government capacity (Nye, 1972) and not prevent investment and growth 
(Yanga, 2011 citing Mwenda, 2006). If the corrupt payments, whilst not socially 
productive as they do not add to the sum total of goods and services, remove 
inefficiencies, they may lead to a greater abundance of goods and services.  
Contreras-Hermosilla (2001, p. 12) asked the question as to whether corrupt 
behaviours contributed to ‘economic efficiency’ by allowing people to circumvent 
complicated and sometimes illogical rules. He points out that this argument was 
used to justify the large increase of commercial growth in some jurisdictions across 
South East Asia where corruption was rife. However, he goes on to say, by citing 
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Kaufman and Wei (2000), that there is nothing to support the argument that 
corruption increases development.  
It has been said that there are three ways in which corruption might promote 
economic development; ‘capital formation’, ‘cutting red tape’ and ‘entrepreneurship 
and incentives’. Where there is little private capital and governments are unable to 
tax the poor, corruption could become a good source of capital formation. If viewed 
as a form of taxation this way of raising money has enabled certain individuals to 
become very wealthy. The debate, however, is whether this wealth is then used to 
promote economic development or is invested for personal gain in off shore 
jurisdictions (Nye, 1972, pp. 465-466).  
Where there are complex rules and policies, corruption in many instances can enable 
government officials to be more flexible and enable certain controls to be 
circumvented, speeding up processes and/or overriding restrictions such as those 
applied to logging in tropical rain forests (Gray & Kaufman, 1988), or the issuing of 
permits or licences (Al-Sadig, 2009; Nye, 1972). In certain instances it allows firms 
and individuals the ability to avoid regulations and ineffective legal systems (Gray 
& Kaufman, 1998).  
Corruption may help overcome divisions in the ruling elite that might otherwise 
result in destructive conflict. He does not name the source; however, Nye (1972) 
explains that one observer believed that it helped bridge the gap between power and 
wealth.     
Overall, there is more written about the negative effect of corruption, in wasting 
resources, distorting policy, reallocating resources to the rich and powerful, those 
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with military or police power, or those with monopoly power (Klitgaard, 1991). 
Nichols (2009) states that Abed and Davoodi (2000), Drury, Kreickhaus and Lusztig 
(2006), Leite and Weidmann (1999), Maro (1996) and Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) all 
found a negative correlation between corruption and economic growth. He cites Mo 
(2001, p. 75) who found growth in gross domestic product (GDP) decreases by 
almost three quarters of a percent if the levels of corruption increase by one percent. 
Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) found that countries with higher corruption tend to have a 
poorer quality of infrastructure. Leite and Weidmann (1999) point out that this 
finding by Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) is supported by a study by Shleifer and 
Vishney (1993). Only when corruption circumvents already existing “distortions” 
can it be “economically, politically, or organisationally useful” (Klitgaard, 1991, p. 
35).  
Aidt (2010) explains that whilst the research into GDP verses corruption are 
valuable in understanding the macroeconomics of corruption, the focus should be 
considering social welfare, for example, social relations, health and personal safety. 
He states that research should be directed at questions related to sustainable 
development rather than economic development; however, corruption in developing 
countries is seen as a major contributing factor to the failure of economic growth 
(Akech, 2014). Aidt (2010, p. 2) states though that “sustainable development relates 
to an economy’s ability to maintain living standards through time; growth in GDP 
per capita is no guarantee for long-run sustainability”.  
Summary 
The literature review has evidenced that although some academics believe that 
corruption can benefit a country, the majority of research would indicate that 
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corruption has a detrimental effect from the potential of the reduction of foreign 
investment, redistribution of wealth and serious injury or death. It would appear that 
corruption does not discriminate between western and non-western countries. 
Personal enrichment by those in power and control will undoubtedly have serious 
consequences on society, especially the poor.  
Combating Corruption 
Introduction 
Once defined and quantified, an assessment is required to understand which 
measures are effective in combating corruption. This section firstly details a number 
of initiatives undertaken by organisations that have either independently or jointly 
worked with countries to drive reform in relation to corruption, prior to discussing 
the effectiveness of individual measures with a particular focus on the effectiveness 
of increasing government employee pay, including that of police officers.   
Country by Country 
There have been a number of reforms over the years with the intention of bringing 
countries together with a view to fighting corruption. Member states of the UN, 
supported by the UN Development Program and the OECD, following a number of 
studies have been promoting integrity, transparency and accountability. In 1997 
OECD countries, signed up to the Anti-Bribery Convention, which criminalises the 
bribery of foreign officials. The OECD issued further publications including 
Principles for Managing Ethics in the Public Service in 1998 and Guidelines for 
Managing Conflict of Interest in the Public Sector in 2003 (Armstrong, 2005). The 
OECD also produced the Good Governance for Development in Arab Countries 
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Initiative in 2006. This document laid out clear country actions to be carried out by 
seven Arab countries in an effort to promote good governance, supported by a 
number of UN member states (OECD, 2006).  Following a study by the UN in 
2003/04 it was found that across six Arab countries they were starting to implement 
conflict-of-interest declarations and protecting public interest disclosures 
(whistleblower protection).  
Across the globe countries are increasingly assessing and amending their legislation 
covering bribery as well as money laundering and terrorist financing. In May 2017, 
the Australian Federal Government tabled the Crimes Legislation Amendment 
(Combatting Corporate Crime) Bill 2017. If passed it will significantly amend 
Australia’s foreign bribery laws and introduce a deferred prosecution agreement 
regime. Proposed amendments include the introduction of a strict liability “failure to 
prevent bribery by associates” offence with an “adequate procedures” defence. This 
is similar to the UK legislation; however, if passed as drafted it is narrower as it will 
only apply to bribery of foreign public officials.  
In January 2018 the UK Government confirmed that it intended to make good on its 
commitment, made at the London Anti-corruption summit in May 2016 to establish 
a public register of beneficial owners of non-UK entities that own or buy UK 
property, or which participate in UK Government procurement (Griffiths, 2018). 
The measure is intended to crack down on the use of the London property market, in 
particular, as a haven for illicitly-gained funds and money laundering but will also 
provide the government with greater transparency on overseas companies seeking 
public contracts (Linklaters, 2018). Another measure implemented by the UK 
through the Criminal Finances Act 2017, which came into effect in January 2018, is 
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the unexplained wealth orders. The new power, available to prosecutors including 
the Serious Fraud Office, requires a person suspected of involvement in or 
associated with serious criminality to explain the origin of assets with a value over 
£50,000 that appear to be disproportionate to their known income. If the person fails 
to respond this will give rise to a presumption that the property is recoverable in any 
subsequent civil recovery. This new measure extends to politically exposed persons 
such as foreign politicians or officials or those associated to them, reflecting the 
concern that those involved in corruption overseas launder the proceeds of their 
crimes in the UK (Linklaters, 2018). In February 2018, the National Crime Agency 
(NCA) secured the first two unexplained wealth orders to investigate assets relating 
to two properties totalling £22m that is believed to be owned by a politically 
exposed person. In addition to the orders, interim freezing orders were granted 
meaning that the assets cannot be transferred, dissipated or sold whilst subject to the 
order (NCA, 2018).  Although such measures appear to be a step forward there is 
still some way to go in preventing individuals and corporations from keeping their 
ill-gotten gains out of sight of the authorities. The UK along, with other countries, 
still appears unwilling to change the rules of secrecy jurisdictions where large 
corporations can minimise tax through off shore companies. Whilst not necessarily 
corrupt they increase deposits that keep such places afloat (Cockcroft, 2014).     
Individual Measures to Fight Corruption 
There are numerous variables suggested as to the causes of corruption; however, 
they may be classified into three broad categories: economic, political and cultural 
explanations (You & Khagram, 2005). By grouping them it may assist with devising 
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measures to combat corruption; however, due to the nature of corruption assessing 
the effectiveness of individual preventative measures is difficult (OECD, 1999).  
While high-level programmes are necessary, if the best way to obtain an acceptable 
service from government officials continues to be through paying a bribe, then this 
is potentially where the greatest impact can be made. The main challenge will be 
changing the perception of those who are used to petty corruption and regard it more 
of as an everyday inconvenience rather than wrongdoing (Pakes, 2017).   
In a previous study (Baldock, 2016, p. 127), the measure thought to be the most 
‘highly effective’ was the ‘prosecution of high profile individuals’. There are many 
variables to consider in ensuring this is effective; for example, there has to be an 
appetite by the respective government to actually bring about a prosecution, and it is 
highly dependent upon law enforcement agencies being ‘clean’ enough to enforce 
the laws. Cockcroft (2014) points out that if corruption by a head of state or senior 
politician was accepted as a violation of human rights then the case could be referred 
to the International Criminal Court (ICC). At present its remit does not explicitly 
include the crime of corruption, but only crimes that account for major violations of 
human rights; for example, genocide, war crimes, and crime of aggression. He states 
that inclusion would be more than justified by the size and impact of corruption.   
The measures thought to be ‘ineffective’ and ‘highly ineffective’ were ‘increased 
salaries of government employees’ and ‘increasing salaries of police officers’ 
(Baldock, 2016, p.127). Although it is a widely accepted and logical theory that 
increased civil service pay deters corruption (Rijckeghem & Weder, 2001; Tanzi, 
1998; Wei, 1999) there is little in the way of recent empirical evidence that supports 
such assertions. Gong and Wu’s 2012 study into the effects of increasing civil 
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service pay in China debunks the myth that such action curbs corruption. Their 
findings demonstrate that despite implementing six major pay increments, both in 
absolute and relative terms, levels of corruption across China remained uncontrolled. 
Wu’s later paper (2014) concluded that better remuneration alone would not 
alleviate corruption and suggested that the severity of the penalty for corruption in 
China was low, hence it remained an attractive option for many. 
With respect to ‘increasing civil servant pay’ Foltz and Opoku-Agyemang (2015, p. 
24) assessed whether the doubling of Ghanaian Police pay reduced corruption. They 
had extensive data on bribes paid from over 2,100 truck trips in West Africa and 
found that rather than a decrease in petty corruption, the salary increase of the 
Ghanaian Police significantly increased the police officers efforts to collect bribes, 
the value of the bribes, and the amounts given by truck drivers to policemen in total; 
however, the instances of the police receiving a bribe decreased. They concluded, 
amongst other things, that their findings were “consistent with the idea that higher 
civil service salaries induce civil servants to demand higher bribes”.  This somewhat 
contradicts the observations of Brooks et al. (2013), whose literary research 
indicated that low salaries, along with the absence of career development and 
professional training, were likely to increase the tendency to become involved in 
corrupt behaviour. 
There are a number of factors associated with police corruption in Nigeria. These 
relate to poor pay, poverty, police culture, the hiring of underskilled and 
underprivileged people and the overall system. Society takes it as the norm to bribe 
the Nigerian police so consequently the police have come to expect this as a right. It 
has been stated that a ‘bottom up’ approach should be taken of educating the lower 
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end of the police force as a ‘top-down’ approach does not reach the members where 
change is so urgently required (Aremu, Pakes & Johnson, 2011).  
Bishara (2011, p. 282) talks about business ethics and in particular Middle East 
business structures, which are frequently family run. He advises that more research 
is needed to understand “business ethics failings” such as “corruption and weak 
governance alongside cultural, social, political, and economic influences”. Family 
relationship runs a number of risks as favouritism can set in and it is hard for 
outsiders to fit in.  
Summary  
There are various strategies for combating corruption, ranging from formal law 
enforcement regimes and a willingness to change, to individual preventative 
strategies such as training, corporate governance and whistleblowing reporting 
channels (Yanga, 2011); however, such measures have had limited effect, notably in 
Africa, where anti-corruption policies are often inconsistent with local culture 
(Yanga, 2011 citing Carr, 2007) and if the public believes that certain behaviour, for 
example, bribing a police officer is the norm, there needs to be significant societal 
change.   
There are numerous measures that may be utilised in an attempt to reduce 
corruption; however, with a lack of cultural acceptance of some of them and a lack 
of awareness of others this puts pressure on those who are attempting to fight 
corruption. Whilst corruption is seen as a means for government officials who are in 
power and control to support their wages and a convenient way of speeding up any 
government processes, new anti-corruption legislation will face challenges in being 
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effective (Pakes, 2017) if there are not consequences for being caught or there is no 
willingness to change from those who enact the legislation.     
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Chapter 3 - Methodology 
This chapter will outline the methodology used for this comparative research. The 
comparative method of research is an instrumental tool in enquiries involving 
globalisation and cross border crime and control; however, it needs to remain agile 
(Pakes, 2010, p. 19). This chapter opens with a brief overview of the difference 
between the qualitative, quantitative and mixed methods approaches to research and 
moves on to the means of collecting the data through the three different strands. It 
explains how the research was analysed and notes its limitations. Finally the chapter 
considers the ethics of this research.  
Qualitative v Quantitative - Mixed Method Approach 
There are basically two methodological traditions of research in social science, 
positivism and post-positivism (phenomenology). Positivism is the creation of 
knowledge through research which emphasises the model of natural science: the 
scientist adopts the position of objective researcher, who collects facts about the 
social world and then builds up an explanation of social life by arranging such facts 
in a chain of causality (Finch, 1986). Post-positivism is about a reality which is 
socially constructed rather than objectively determined. The task of the social 
scientist should not be to gather facts and measure how often certain patterns occur, 
but to appreciate the different constructions and meanings that people place upon 
their experience (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe & Lowe, 1991). Aligning the two 
traditions of research with the quantitative and qualitative paradigms; positivism, 
which is based on the natural science model of dealing with facts, is more closely 
aligned with the quantitative method analysis, whereas post-positivism, that deals 
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with understanding the subjectivity of social phenomena, requires a qualitative 
approach (Noor, 2008). Qualitative implies an emphasis on processes and meanings 
that are not rigorously examined or measured (if measured at all), in terms of 
amount, quantity and frequency (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994). Rather than hypothesis 
testing, researchers in the social sciences are sometimes interested in observations 
and developing an understanding. In recent years, the combining of quantitative and 
qualitative research methods has moved forward and there is now a greater 
understanding of a variety of issues, such as the ways in which they can be combined 
(Bryman, 2007). 
In studying corruption, some researchers have used objective data, for example: the 
number of prosecutions or arrests for corruption (Brooks et al., 2013), whilst others 
have used subjective, qualitative data, providing results based on perceptions about 
types of corruption that may be in a given sector/country/transaction or the instances 
of the crime being committed in different circumstances (Fletcher & Herrmann, 
2012). To obtain an accurate assessment it is essential to obtain information from as 
many sources as possible. This ensures that any biases or errors due to falsification, 
sampling or other problems can be identified and either taken into account or 
removed (Langseth, 2016).  
Research Outline 
The literature review highlights that to fully understand corruption across different 
countries any successful research needs to obtain data through difference mediums 
and that relying on ‘perceptions’ through a survey alone raises concerns. To ensure 
that this research examined corruption in a way that made it informative a three 
strand methodology to collect the data was devised; (i) an anonymous survey, (ii) 
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face-to-face interviews with Anti-Bribery and Corruption specialists employed in the 
UK financial services and (iii) three focus groups with attendees from the same 
financial services organisation who were employed in Hong Kong, Mexico and 
India. The researcher had access to the Anti-Bribery and Corruption specialists from 
a professional capacity as they were employed in a similar field. Although the 
researcher was employed within the same organisation as a high proportion of those 
who contributed to this research, this would not be regarded as ‘insider research’ as 
the research was not undertaken in or on the organisation itself (Brannick & 
Coghlan, 2007). Furthermore, the views given across the three strands were those of 
the participants, not those of the organisation.  
Strand I – Anonymous Online Survey 
The intended sample population for the survey was envisaged to be members of 
Banking Compliance Associations and Committees across several regions such as 
Asia, Africa, Latin America, the UK and the USA. Although this was discussed with 
a number of the Committee Chairs and representatives, the initial response rate was 
very poor. Members of the banking community across numerous countries were 
therefore traced through the social media medium, LinkedIn, with a request to 
‘connect’. Once they had connected they were contacted asking whether they would 
be willing to take part in this research and, if they confirmed, they were sent a survey 
link, along with appropriate consent forms.   
The respondents were asked to forward the link to the survey and the consent forms 
on to their colleagues and friends, producing a snowball sample (Bryman, 2012). As 
the response rate per country emerged, people in specific countries were then 
targeted through LinkedIn, with a view of growing the concentration of responses for 
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those countries (Cyprus, India, Pakistan, South Africa, UAE, UK & NI and USA). 
This was conducted with a view of enabling enough data per country to be collected 
to warrant analysis. Contact was also made with colleagues in these specific 
countries from the researcher’s own professional network and the survey link and 
consent forms were sent to those who agreed to take part.  
The survey was built through Bristol University Online Survey, an online survey 
provider. It was designed in such a way that the I.P. address of the respondents was 
masked, thereby giving anonymity. Text boxes were configured to enable enough 
space for the respondents to write a suitable answer where the question required it. 
Functionality was also included to prevent respondents from skipping questions; 
however, there was no mechanism for ensuring the answers in the text boxes were 
appropriate or contained enough detail to assist with the analysis. Following the 
issuance of the Bristol University Survey, feedback was received from respondents 
located in the Middle East advising that the survey link could not be opened. A 
review of the responses already received indicated that there were no responses from 
that Region. It was concluded that there must have been in-country restrictions that 
prevented the survey site from opening. To overcome this, an identical survey was 
built through Qualtrics, another online survey provider and the link was again 
distributed.  
Any research utilising a survey to gather data runs the risk of survey error. If a 
survey contains unclear instructions, ambiguous terms, or jargon this can lead to 
measurement error (Marsden & Wright, 2010). A survey should be written using 
words consistent with that used by the intended population (McIntyre, 1999).  The 
survey was therefore written in plain English, avoiding jargon or slang and the 
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questions were straightforward to answer (Bryman & Bell, 2003). The questions 
were designed in such a way as to avoid ambiguous terms (Bryman, 2012) and any 
rating scales had an equal number of positive and negative response options (Salant 
& Dillman, 1994) to avoid ‘neutral’ replies. The survey was made up of 24 questions 
(see Appendix 1), which was considered sufficient to gain enough information for 
analysis whilst not making the survey too long and onerous to complete (McIntyre, 
1999).  
As discussed within the literature review, the definition of corruption has caused 
debate amongst scholars and academics and the understanding of what constitutes 
corruption can vary from country to country. No definition of corruption was given 
to the sample population for this research, as one of the underlying aims was to 
assess an individual’s understating of what corruption meant to them.  
Strand I – Survey Structure  
The survey opened with five demographic questions asking the respondents to 
supply: their gender, age, location of current employment. Following the 
demographic questions the respondents were asked to write down three examples of 
what they regarded as corruption. They were then asked to define a ‘bribe’ and a 
‘facilitation payment’ for which free text boxes were provided. To endeavour to 
draw out how bribes and facilitation payments occur, the respondents were asked to 
provide examples for both. There was a real desire to fully understand when, and to 
whom, bribes or facilitation payments would be paid. These questions were worded 
carefully to enable respondents to answer truthfully without incriminating 
themselves.   
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As background and culture are prominent in the debate around corruption, 
respondents’ views were sought as to whether; “personal background shapes your 
view of corruption” and “culture shapes your view of corruption” on a scale of 1 – 6 
(1 being ‘strongly disagree’ and 6 being ‘strongly agree’) with a ‘don’t know’ 
option. It was acknowledged that having a ‘don’t know’ option was an area of 
controversy as people may select it rather than considering a response (Bryman, 
2012); however, by not having it may force respondents to express an opinion that 
they do not really hold. Taking this into consideration the ‘don’t know’ option was 
used with the open questions that were placed at the beginning of the survey.  
To benchmark whether tolerance levels of certain behaviours had changed over time 
and whether tolerating certain behaviours differed between countries, the 
respondents were presented with a selection of scenarios and were asked to state 
whether each could be justified. They were asked to select from the following 
options: always justified, sometimes justified, rarely justified, never justified and 
don’t know. 14 of the 19 scenarios that formed part of this study were included in the 
2011 British Election Study (Whiteley, 2012). Five more scenarios were added as 
they were more descriptive and focused on bribery. The rationale for this was to 
obtain an understanding as to whether respondents felt any of the ‘bribe’ scenarios 
were more justified than the others.  The five extra scenarios were: 
• Paying a Border Control Officer to advance to the front of the queue 
• Paying a Government Official to utilise a free service, for example, to enter a 
library 
• A business man bribing a public official to secure a contract which ensures 
viability and jobs within his company, which is in difficult circumstances 
 68 
• Bribing a traffic police officer to avoid delays and a larger fine for a non-
existent speeding offence 
• Giving a gift to a Government Official during a tendering process 
This was followed by two questions asking the respondents to rate using a scale of 
1–6 (1 being ‘not corrupt’ to 6 being ‘very corrupt’) three sectors 
(‘government/public sector’, ‘private sector’ and ‘non-government organisation’) on 
how corrupt they thought each sector was. To obtain an understanding as to where 
the respondents thought corruption might occur, they were asked to rate how 
susceptible 12 different business sectors were to bribery and corruption. Respondents 
were then provided with a selection of 10 categories, and were asked to select the 
effect corruption had on each, followed by whether they considered corruption was 
an issue that needed to be tackled. If they indicated ‘yes’, then they were asked to 
outline their view in a text box as to what could be undertaken to achieve this.  
The piloting and pre-testing of questions was a consideration, along with using 
questions that have been used before. The advantages for this include the fact that 
they have, in a sense, been piloted already (Bryman, 2012). The survey presented the 
respondents with 18 potential measures to help fight corruption that had been used in 
a previous study (Baldock, 2016) and they were asked to rank their effectiveness. 
Respondents were then asked whether they were aware of TI’s CPI. If they indicated 
‘yes’, they were asked whether they used the index within their organisation, and if 
so, what they thought the advantages and disadvantages of using the index were and 
whether they used any other indices. The final question asked, “who is the most 
responsible for fighting corruption?” and gave the options of ‘everybody’, ‘national 
government’, ‘international community’ and ‘commercial sector’.  
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Strand II - Face-to-Face Interviews 
To enable the triangulation of data it was deemed beneficial to carry out several face-
to-face interviews. With the enactment of the UK Bribery Act 2010 and the new 
corporate offence of ‘failing to prevent bribery’, numerous Anti-Bribery and 
Corruption compliance functions were formed across the commercial world. The 
researcher had access to these specialists from within the financial services sector 
because they were in the same field of employment. Semi-structured interviews were 
chosen as these offered sufficient flexibility to approach individual participants 
differently (Bryman & Bell, 2003) while still covering the same area of data 
collection. The questions replicated those within the survey and were designed to 
elicit the opinion of the individual rather than their organisation. The interviews 
included open questions with the view of exploring the participants’ understanding 
of the topics (see Appendix 2). 10 face-to-face interviews were held, with six males 
and four females. The duration of the interviews ranged between 19 and 43 minutes. 
Each participant was required to sign a consent form and advised that if they 
disclosed anything of a criminal nature the researcher would be obliged to report this 
to the relevant authorities. The interviews were digitally recorded and downloaded to 
a subfolder on the researcher’s personal password protected computer. The digital 
files of the interviews were submitted via a secure portal to a transcription service 
that, in turn, emailed the transcripts back as Word documents. These were then held 
securely in the same subfolder as the digital files.  
 
 
 
 70 
Strand III - Focus Group 
The attendees for each of the three focus groups were financial services professionals 
in Hong Kong (eight attendees), India (eight attendees) and Mexico (10 attendees), 
were all employed within the same international financial services organisation; 
however, it was explained to them that their answers should be articulated from their 
personal point of view, not that of the organisation. The main contact of each focus 
group was asked to gather a number of colleagues together to form the group. It has 
been stated that a focus group typically contains between five and eight attendees; 
however, some focus groups have been run with as few as four and some with as 
many as 12, although any focus group that exceeds 12 attendees has a tenancy to 
become fragmented (Krueger & Casey, 2015). Face-to-face sessions were 
undertaken in Hong Kong and Mexico, whereas the Indian session was held via 
video link and run from London. The structure of each session (see Appendix 3) 
followed a similar theme to the survey and the interviews. There was a mix of male 
and female attendees in each session and all were asked to give their signed consent 
prior to commencement. The duration of the sessions varied from 33 minutes to 45 
minutes and all were digitally recorded. The digital files were then sent through a 
secure portal to a transcription service and the transcripts were emailed back as 
Word documents. These were then held securely in a sub folder on the private 
computer of the researcher. 
Analysis 
The raw data from the surveys was downloaded from Bristol University Surveys and 
Qualtrics and merged to produce one Excel spreadsheet containing all 173 responses. 
The data was then corrected for spelling mistakes. By correcting the spelling 
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mistakes this enabled a more efficient and accurate search functionality. Any foreign 
words were converted into English through Google Translate.  
When undertaking group comparison analysis it has been suggested that a figure of 
15 individuals per group would be required (Mertens, 2005); however, it has also 
been stated that it is the quality of the responses that matters rather than the number 
of respondents (Wainwright, 1997). Upon completion of the grouping analysis of 15 
or more individuals per country, it became apparent that this did not incorporate any 
country from the Middle East Region. It was therefore decided to set the minimum 
number of individuals per country at 11. This enabled the UAE to be included in the 
country categories, allowing another dimension for analysis and a more 
comprehensive global perspective.   
Having merged, then cleansed the data from the surveys the data was grouped into 
eight country categories (Cyprus, India, Pakistan, South Africa, UAE, UK & NI, 
USA and Other). It was felt that with the 10 face-to-face interviews and three focus 
groups this would provide sufficient data for analysis. 
Strand I - Survey Analysis 
Each country category was independently analysed to draw out any common themes 
per question or across questions, undertaking a count for repeating words given by 
the individuals to enable a reoccurring count of words or terms to be assessed. Cross-
country comparison was then undertaken to identify any trends between the 
countries or any significant outliers of interest to report. In relation to the integrity 
indicator scenarios, the responses for a subset of the scenarios from the anonymous 
survey and face-to-face interviews were compared to a study undertaken in 2011 by 
Professor Whiteley (Whiteley, 2012). Additional analysis was undertaken on a 
 72 
smaller subset of the scenarios from the sample population against a set of scenarios 
within a 2000 study (Pattie, Seyd & Whiteley, 2004) with a view of understanding 
whether people had become more, or less, tolerant of certain behaviour. The findings 
from the anonymous survey have been presented in table format and the integrity 
indicator scenario analyses have been presented in bar charts being reported in the 
Results section of this thesis.  
Strand II – Interview Analysis 
Each transcript was analysed manually to draw out any themes or points to note per 
question. Because of the qualitative nature of the transcripts, quantitative analysis 
could only be undertaken on the number of themes produced or the amount of times 
a certain word appeared. Having drawn out common word groupings and themes 
these were assessed aggregated and reported in the Results section of this thesis.  
Strand III – Focus Group Analysis 
In a similar way to the Interview Analysis, the focus group transcripts were manually 
analysed to draw out any themes across each focus group. The results of this analysis 
were then recorded in the Results section of this thesis.  
Combined Strand Analysis  
The results of the three Strands were compared to each other with a view of 
identifying any common themes or points of interest, whether from an independent 
Strand or collectively. This triangulation analysis combined the workings of the 
three Strands rather than allowing one to stand-alone. Due to the structure of the data 
collection framework, each Strand complemented and supported each other, whilst 
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being combined allowed a holistic analysis, providing an overview of the findings. 
The results were then reported in the Results section of this thesis.  
Summary 
By undertaking a mixed-methods (qualitative and quantitative) approach to this 
research it was felt that the advantages of each would compensate for the 
disadvantages of the other; thereby enriching the outcome and providing a better 
insight into the perceptions of corruption from those taking part and obtain clear 
examples of how corruption affects society in a cross country comparison. By 
adopting a three Strand approach this enabled similar questions to be asked in 
different ways, thereby assisting with the triangulation of the data and allowing the 
rationale for certain points to be explored in more depth. Although some of the 
questions in the survey asked respondents to provide a justification or clear examples 
it was impossible to ensure that enough details were supplied and the quality of the 
data varied; however, by conducting interviews and focus groups this enabled further 
exploratory questions to be raised in relation to the responses provided. The three-
strand methodology to this research achieved the goal of obtaining enough data for 
analysis, resulting in key themes being drawn out of the answers, with clear rationale 
for comparison.   
Limitations 
A potential limitation was the fact that the survey was written in English, yet was 
distributed to some countries where English was not the respondents’ first language. 
As such, it was accepted that there may have been context challenges, or a 
misunderstanding of what the question was asking. Whilst highlighting this as a 
potential limitation, as has been stated, consideration was given to keep the questions 
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jargon free, clear and straightforward and there was no evidence to suggest that the 
questions were not understood.   
A further limitation was that corruption, by its very nature, is secretive and 
potentially some acts are criminal in nature. People may therefore not be entirely 
open and transparent in talking about the subject, especially when it comes to 
questions that ask whether they have paid or received a bribe or where bribe paying 
occurs. This was probably more pertinent when it came to the face-to-face interviews 
and focus groups. People may not wish to discuss such matters in front of their 
friends or colleagues or even the researcher. At the start of each interview and focus 
group the attendees were advised that if they disclosed something of a criminal 
nature then the researcher was obliged to report the event to the appropriate 
authorities. This statement alone may have limited the information they provided; 
however, no revelations of a criminal nature materialised as the participants talked 
more in a general nature rather than specific actions they had personally undertaken.     
Ethical Considerations 
Throughout this research consideration was given to the British Society of 
Criminology (BSC) (2015) Statement of Ethics, which seeks to provide a framework 
to “encourage and support reflective and responsible ethical practice in 
criminological research” (BSC, 2015, p. 2). The initial ethical consent form 
(Appendix 4) to carry out this research and the subsequent substantial amendments 
consent form (Appendix 5) to enable the face-to-face interviews to be incorporated 
into this research were assessed and approved by the University of Portsmouth 
Ethics Committee.  
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Conclusion  
There was one question towards the end of the survey that had significant blanks for 
one of the categories; however, the remainder of the questions received enough 
responses out of the 173 completed surveys to enable a robust analysis. The fact that 
the majority of the surveys were fully completed indicated that the survey structure 
and design was mostly successful at maintaining the respondents’ interest. This is 
also supported by the fact that there was limited use of the option ‘don’t know’. 
There were a couple of questions that required respondents to expand on their chosen 
initial option and some of these did not contain as much detail as anticipated or that 
enabled analysis. This could be due to the fact that the survey was issued in English 
and was completed by respondents where English was not their first language or 
respondents were reluctant to provide a rationale for their answers. Ideally, surveys 
should be fully translated into the native language for the country of issuance to 
ensure a full understanding or at least have a number of surveys in different 
languages so respondents can choose their preferred language.        
With regards to the face-to-face interviews and focus groups. Their design and 
methodology appeared appropriate in that enough information was elicited to enable 
a thematic review of the output and participants were relaxed and open with their 
answers. No complaints were received which would suggest that the participants 
were comfortable with the structure and content.  
The results of the survey and data obtained from the face-to-face interviews and 
focus groups were brought together and compared against each other. The intention 
was to gain an understanding of people’s views across the strands and undertake a 
cross-country comparison to draw out any common themes or identify any 
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significant variables. The next chapter will provide an overview of the results of this 
research.  
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Chapter 4 – Results – Demographics, Strands I, II and III 
Introduction 
The Results section comprises eight chapters. This chapter reports on the 
demographics of the study across the three Strands. Chapter 5 outlines the combined 
results for the justification of dishonest scenarios from Stand I and Strand II, as well, 
as the outcome of the comparison of the results compared against two earlier studies. 
Chapters 6 to 10 provide the details of the results from Strand I, the anonymous 
survey, and are structured in a similar order as the questions were posed. Chapter 11 
details the results from Strand II, the face-to-face interviews with the Anti-Bribery & 
Corruption Specialists, and brings together the findings in subsections. Chapter 12 
details the results from Strand III, the focus groups held with financial services 
professionals in Hong Kong, India and Mexico. This chapter will first outline the 
demographics of the sample population across the three strands.  
Strand I – Demographics 
173 respondents answered the majority of the questions in the anonymous survey. 
Where there were blanks this has been reported within the relevant sections. The 
results were grouped into country categories where 11 or more responses were 
received. The breakdown produced eight country categories (Cyprus, India, Pakistan, 
South Africa, UAE, UK & NI, and USA) for comparison including an ‘Other’ 
category. The ‘Other’ category contained the remaining responses from countries 
where there were less than 11 respondents.  The analysis of responses was carried 
out across the total population and key themes were extracted. Where there was 
something of interest or an outlying variable was identified, this was reported per 
country category. Additional cross-country analysis can be found in Appendix 6. A 
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number of respondents’ quotes have been provided where appropriate to give 
context. The first analysis in this chapter centers on the demographic questions and is 
for all respondents to the survey. Table 2 details the number of responses per country 
category.  
Table 2. Strand I. Number of responses to the survey per country category 
All 
Countries 
Cyprus India Pakistan South 
Africa 
UAE UK  & NI USA Other 
173 19 28 14 15 11 21 35 30 
 
The sample population was made up of 58% (n=100) male and 42% (n=73 female, 
with 40% being aged between 26-35 (n=69), followed by 29% (n=51) being aged 
between 36-45. 52% (n=90) were employed in compliance and 48% (n=83) were 
not.  
A detailed breakdown of the respondents from each country category is shown in 
Table 3.      
Table 3.  Strand I. Sample population breakdown per country 
Country Cyprus 
(N=?) 
India 
(N=?) 
Pakistan 
(N=?) 
South 
Africa 
(N=?) 
 
UAE 
(N=?) 
UK & NI 
(N=?) 
USA 
(N=?) 
Other 
(N=?) 
Total 
(N=?) 
Gender 
Male 9 21 7 6 6 12 19 20 100 
Female 10 7 7 9 5 9 16 10 73 
Age 
Under 25 0 1 2 2 0 0 3 1 9 
26-35 5 12 7 9 3 6 8 19 69 
36-45 10 13 4 1 5 4 7 7 51 
46-55 4 0 0 3 3 7 7 2 26 
56-65 0 2 1 0 0 4 10 0 17 
Employed in Compliance 
Yes 9 12 5 10 4 10 14 26 90 
No 10 16 9 5 7 11 21 4 83 
N.B. – Countries for comparison were selected from those that had 11 or more responses. Those with less were 
grouped into the ‘Other’ category. One respondent from the ‘Other’ category indicated that they were in the age 
range of 66 years +. As they were the only respondent in this age range the sub category has been omitted from the 
table. 
 
The USA provided the most responses, 20% (n=35), followed by the Other category, 
17% (n=30). UAE provided 6% (n=11) of responses, which was the lowest number 
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per category. There was little disparity between the male and female split for the 
majority of countries; however, there were three times as many males in India as 
females, and twice as many males as females in the Other category. 69% (n=120) of 
respondents across all country categories were aged between 26 and 45. The USA 
had the most respondents (6%, n=10) aged between 56 and 65, with India, Pakistan 
and UK & NI having only 4% (n=7) between them in the same age range. 5% (n=9) 
were aged under 25, split between India, Pakistan, South Africa and the Other 
category. The Other category was comprised of the following countries: Brazil 
(n=1), Canada (n=2), China (n=2), Egypt (n=1), Guatemala (n=1), Hong Kong 
(n=8), Mexico (n=6), Nigeria (n=1), Russia (n=3) and Sri Lanka (n=5). It was felt 
that the survey respondents though only 173 was a diverse sample population of 
adults from different cultures.  
Strand II - Demographics 
The sample population was selected because they were employed within the UK 
financial services sector as Anti-Bribery & Corruption Compliance specialists. It 
should be noted that this specialist function came about with the enactment of the 
UK Bribery Act 2010. Neither their name, age, nor length of service was requested 
from them; however, it can be reported that there were six males and four females. 
10 face-to-face semi-structured interviews were conducted. All advised that their 
organisation had a global footprint with offices across Europe, Middle East, Asia, the 
US and Latin America. All had the responsibility of advising various parts of the 
organisation on bribery and corruption related issues and ensuring those functions 
had effective and risk-based anti-bribery programmes. 
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Strand III - Demographics 
Focus groups were held with individuals employed in the same financial services 
organisation in Hong Kong (three males, five females), India (five males, three 
females) and Mexico (five males, five females). Their grades, roles and 
responsibilities were not requested.   
The next chapter reports on the findings of the sample population in Strand I and 
Strand II’s justification of a number of behaviour scenarios and the outcome of the 
comparison of the results from this study against two earlier studies assessing 
whether tolerance levels had changed overtime.     
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Chapter 5 –How Honest Are We?       
This chapter assesses and reports on the tolerance levels of certain behaviour of the 
respondents from Strand I and participants in Strand II by way of asking them to 
‘justify’ to varying degrees, a number of dishonest scenarios then comparing the 
results of a sub-set of the scenarios against two earlier studies in 2011 and 2000. In 
order to make a direct comparison the questions were phrased in an identical manner 
to that in the previous two studies. 
The reason for including this short piece of analysis was to create a benchmark for 
the wider research. By understanding whether honesty levels or tolerance levels of 
certain behaviours had changed over a period of time this could be a way of 
determining whether the views captured in the remainder of the research had altered 
over a period of time.        
Strand I - Testing Dishonesty 
Five new ‘corruption’ focused scenarios or as Whiteley (2012) puts it ‘integrity 
indicators' were added to 14 scenarios taken from the 2011 British Election study 
(Whiteley, 2012). Respondents were asked to indicate their degree of justification for 
each one. The options available were: ‘always justified’, ‘sometimes justified’, 
‘rarely justified’ and ‘never justified’. Table 4 details the responses to the 19 
scenarios, followed by a breakdown per option and country, highlighting the top 
three scenarios for each option.   
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Table 4. Strand I. Justification responses for the 2017 study 
Integrity Indicators Always 
Justified 
N=? 
(%) 
Sometimes 
Justified 
N=? 
(%) 
Rarely 
Justified 
N=? 
(%) 
Never 
Justified 
N=? 
(%) 
 
Giving a gift to a Government Official during a 
tendering process 
1 
(1) 
5 
(3) 
21 
(12) 
146 
(84) 
Driving under the influence of alcohol 0 4 
(2) 
25 
(14) 
144 
(83) 
Paying a Government Official to utilise a free 
service for example; to enter a library 
1 
(1) 
9 
(5) 
21 
(12) 
142 
(82) 
Paying a Border Control Officer to advance to 
the front of the queue 
0 8 
(5) 
24 
(14) 
141 
(82) 
A business man bribing a public official to 
secure a contract which ensures viability and 
jobs within his company which is in difficult 
circumstances 
0 7 
(4) 
25 
(14) 
141 
(82) 
Bribing a traffic police officer to avoid delays 
and a larger fine for a non-existent speeding 
offence 
1 
(1) 
9 
(5) 
23 
(13) 
140 
(81) 
Buying something that you know is stolen 2 
(1) 
5 
(3) 
27 
(16) 
139 
(80) 
Cheating on taxes if you have a chance 0 5 
(3) 
35 
(20) 
133 
(77) 
Claiming Government Benefits to which you are 
not entitled 
1 
(1) 
12 
(7) 
31 
(18) 
129 
(75) 
Making up something on a job application 0 13 
(8) 
36 
(21) 
124 
(72) 
Throwing away litter in a public place 4 
(2) 
7 
(4) 
38 
(22) 
124 
(72) 
Having an affair when you are married 2 
(1) 
16 
(9) 
39 
(22) 
116 
(67) 
Avoiding a fare on public transport 1 
(1) 
12 
(7) 
45 
(26) 
115 
(66) 
Failing to report accidental damage you’ve done 
to a parked car 
0 19 
(11) 
39 
(22) 
115 
(66) 
Having sex under the legal age of consent 6 
(3) 
26 
(15) 
34 
(20) 
107 
(62) 
Taking Cannabis 8 
(5) 
45 
(26) 
38 
(22) 
82 
(47) 
Keeping money that you found in the street 8 
(5) 
59 
(34) 
40 
(23) 
66 
(38) 
Lying in your own interest  5 
(3) 
44 
(25) 
57 
(33) 
67 
(39) 
Driving faster than the speed limit 1 
(1) 
51 
(29) 
80 
(46) 
41 
(24) 
N.B This table details the percentage of respondents who indicated whether an activity was ‘always justified’, 
‘sometimes justified’, ‘rarely justified’ or ‘never justified’ out of the 173 respondents. 
 
Analysis was conducted to identify the top three scenarios per justification category, 
firstly from the total population and then from a country-by-country perspective, to 
draw out any common themes and to compare the tolerance level across countries.  
Always Justified - Total Population   
The top three scenarios that received the most responses for ‘always justified’ were: 
• Taking Cannabis (5%, n=5) 
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• Keeping money that you found in the street (5%, n=8) 
• Having sex under the legal age of consent (3%, n=6) 
The three scenarios were then analysed from a cross-country perspective as detailed 
in Tables 5, 6 and 7.  
Table 5. Strand I. Country breakdown for the justification of ‘taking cannabis’ 
Country Cyprus 
N=? 
(%) 
India 
N=? 
(%) 
Pakistan 
N=? 
(%) 
South 
Africa 
N=? 
(%) 
UAE 
N=? 
(%) 
UK&NI 
N=? 
(%) 
USA 
N=? 
(%) 
Other 
N=? 
(%) 
Total plus 
of pop. 
N=? 
(%) 
 
Always 
Justified 
0 0 2 
(1) 
2 
(1) 
0 1 
(1) 
3 
(2) 
0 8 
(5) 
Sometimes 
Justified 
7 
(4) 
4 
(2) 
0 5 
(3) 
2 
(1) 
8 
(5) 
11 
(6) 
8 
(5) 
45 
(26) 
Rarely 
Justified 
3 
(2) 
4 
(2) 
4 
(2) 
5 
(3) 
4 
(2) 
7 
(4) 
6 
(3) 
5 
(3) 
38 
(22) 
Never 
Justified 
9 
(5) 
20 
(12) 
8 
(5) 
3 
(2) 
5 
(3) 
5 
(3) 
15 
(9) 
17 
(10) 
82 
(47) 
Total 19 (11) 
28 
(16) 
14 
(8) 
15 
(9) 
11 
(6) 
21 
(12) 
35 
(20) 
30 
(17) 
173 
(100) 
 
Although ‘taking cannabis’ (see Table 5) and ‘keeping money that you have found in 
the street’ (see Table 6), received the most responses (5%, n=8) for ‘always 
justified’, the majority of the respondents (47%, n=82) still believed that ‘taking 
cannabis’ was ‘never justified’. The ‘always justified’ responses were split across 
four countries: Pakistan (1%, n=2), South Africa (1%, n=2), the UK & NI (1%, n=1), 
and the USA (2%, n=3). More respondents indicated that it was ‘sometimes 
justified’ (26%, n=45) than ‘rarely justified’ (22%, n=38) to take cannabis. The split 
for ‘sometimes justified’ was across all groups of countries except Pakistan. 
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Table 6. Strand I. Country breakdown for the justification of ‘keeping money that 
you have found in the street’ 
Country Cyprus 
N=? 
(%) 
India 
N=? 
(%) 
Pakistan 
N=? 
(%) 
South 
Africa 
N=? 
(%) 
UAE 
N=? 
(%) 
UK & NI 
N=? 
(%) 
USA 
N=? 
(%) 
Other 
N=? 
(%) 
Total 
plus % of 
pop. 
N=? 
(%) 
Always 
Justified 
0 2 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
2 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
0 2 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
8 
(5) 
Sometimes 
Justified 
5 
(3) 
8 
(5) 
1 
(1) 
7 
(4) 
3 
(2) 
10 
(6) 
15 
(9) 
10 
(6) 
59 
(34) 
Rarely 
Justified 
4 
(2) 
4 
(2) 
7 
(4) 
5 
(3) 
3 
(2) 
4 
(2) 
9 
(5) 
4 
(2) 
40 
(23) 
Never 
Justified 
10 
(6) 
14 
(8) 
5 
(3) 
2 
(1) 
4 
(2) 
7 
(4) 
9 
(5) 
15 
(9) 
66 
(38) 
Total 19 (11) 
28 
(16) 
14 
(8) 
15 
(9) 
11 
(6) 
21 
(12) 
35 
(20) 
30 
(17) 
173 
(100) 
 
In the same way as the cannabis scenario, ‘keeping money that you found in the 
street’, received eight responses (5%) for ‘always justified’; however, the split was 
across six countries; India (1%, n=2), Pakistan (1%, n=1), South Africa (1%, n=1), 
UAE (1%, n=1), USA (1%, n=2) and Other (1%, n=1). Irrespective of this, the 
majority of respondents (38%, n=66) still indicated that ‘keeping money that you 
found in the street’ was ‘never justified’ with a split across all countries. However, 
this also identified that respondents had less condemnation for ‘keeping money that 
you found in the street’ than ‘taking cannabis’. More respondents indicated that it 
was ‘sometimes justified’ (34%, n=59) compared to ‘rarely justified’ (23%, n=40). 
Again there was a split across all countries for both ‘justification’ categories.   
Table 7. Strand I. Country breakdown for the justification of ‘having sex under the 
legal age of consent’ 
Country Cyprus 
N=? 
(%) 
India 
N=? 
(%) 
Pakistan 
N=? 
(%) 
South 
Africa 
N=? 
(%) 
UAE 
N=? 
(%) 
UK & NI 
N=? 
(%) 
USA 
N=? 
(%) 
Other 
N=? 
(%) 
Total 
plus % of 
pop.  
N=? 
(%) 
 
Always 
Justified 0 
3 
(2) 
1 
(1) 0 0 0 0 
2 
(1) 
6 
(3) 
Sometimes 
Justified 
5 
(3) 
5 
(3) 0 
1 
(1) 
5 
(3) 
7 
(4) 
2 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
26 
(15) 
Rarely 
Justified 
5 
(3) 
5 
(3) 
1 
(1) 
0 1 
(1) 
4 
(2) 
11 
(6) 
7 
(4) 
34 
(20) 
Never 
Justified 
9 
(5) 
15 
(9) 
12 
(7) 
14 
(8) 
5 
(3) 
10 
(6) 
22 
(13) 
20 
(12) 
107 
(62) 
Total 19 (11) 
28 
(16) 
14 
(8) 
15 
(9) 
11 
(6) 
21 
(12) 
35 
(20) 
30 
(17)  
173 
(100) 
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Table 7 outlines the ‘justification’ results for ‘having sex under the legal age of 
consent’ which received six (3%) ‘always justified’ responses. These came from 
India (2%, n=3), Pakistan (1%, n=1), and Other (1%, n=2). However, 107 (62%) of 
respondents disapproved by indicating ‘never justified’ thus condemning this more 
than ‘taking cannabis’ and ‘keeping money that you found in the street’, notably with 
14 out of the 15 respondents from South Africa (93%) indicating this. Responses 
were received from all countries except South Africa indicating ‘rarely justified’ 
(20%, n=34). Responses were received from all countries, except Pakistan, 
indicating ‘sometimes justified’ (15%, n=26).   
For a breakdown per country of gender analysis see Appendix 6. There were six 
scenarios where none of the respondents from any of the countries indicated that it 
was ‘always justified’ they were:  
• Failing to report accidental damage you’ve done to a parked car 
• Driving under the influence of alcohol 
• Cheating on taxes if you have a chance 
• Making up something on a job application 
• Paying a Border Control Officer to advance to the front of the queue 
• A business man bribing a public official to secure a contract which ensures 
viability and jobs within his company which is in difficult circumstances 
Six scenarios received only one response for being ‘always justified’. They were: 
• Claiming Government Benefits to which you are not entitled (Pakistan, 
Respondent 119) 
• Avoiding a fare on public transport (Pakistan, Respondent 121) 
• Driving faster than the speed limit (South Africa, Respondent 141) 
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• Paying a Government Official to utilise a free service for example; to enter a 
library (Pakistan, Respondent 119) 
• Bribing a traffic police officer to avoid delays and a larger fine for a non-
existent speeding offence (Other, Respondent 66) 
• Giving a gift to a Government Official during a tendering process (India, 
Respondent 86) 
A female respondent from Pakistan (Respondent 118) indicated the highest number 
(n=7) of scenarios as being ‘always justified’. These were:  
• Buying something that you know is stolen 
• Taking Cannabis 
• Keeping money that you found in the street  
• Lying in your own interest 
• Having an affair when you are married 
• Having sex under the legal age of consent  
• Throwing away litter in a public place	
Unfortunately, due to the fact that the rationale for answering in a certain way was 
not requested this could not be investigated further.  
Sometimes Justified – Total Population 
The top three scenarios that received the most responses across the entire population 
for ‘sometimes justified’ were: 
• Keeping money that you found in the street (34%, n=59) (See Table 6 on page 84 
for a country breakdown) 
• Driving faster than the speed limit (29%, n=51) 
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• Taking Cannabis (26%, n=45) (See Table 5 on page 83 for a country breakdown) 
These three scenarios were then analysed from a cross-country perspective. 
Table 8. Strand I. Country breakdown for the justification of ‘driving faster than the 
speed limit’ 
Country Cyprus 
N=? 
(%) 
India 
N=? 
(%) 
Pakistan 
N=? 
(%) 
South 
Africa 
N=? 
(%) 
UAE 
N=? 
(%) 
UK & NI 
N=? 
(%) 
USA 
N=? 
(%) 
Other 
N=? 
(%) 
Total plus 
% of pop. 
N=? 
(%) 
 
Always 
Justified 
0 0 0 1 
(1) 
0 0 0 0 1 
(1) 
Sometimes 
Justified 
3  
(2) 
5  
(3) 
5 
(3) 
6 
(3) 
3 
(2) 
9 
(5) 
12 
(7) 
8 
(5) 
51 
(29) 
Rarely 
Justified 
10 
(6) 
10 
(6) 
7 
(4) 
7 
(4) 
7 
(4) 
9 
(5) 
15 
(9) 
15 
(9) 
80 
(46) 
Never 
Justified 
6 
(3) 
13 
(8) 
2 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
3 
(2) 
8 
(5) 
7 
(4) 
41 
(24) 
Total 
19 
(11) 
28 
(16) 
14 
(8) 
15 
(9) 
11 
(6) 
21 
(12) 
35 
(20) 
30 
(17) 
173 
(100) 
 
Table 8 outlines the results for the scenario ‘driving faster than the speed limit’. 51 
(29%) respondents indicated that this was ‘sometimes justified’. These results were 
spread across all countries; however, a higher percentage of respondents felt that it 
was ‘rarely justified’ (46%, n=80) with a slightly lower percentage (24%, n=41) 
indicting ‘never justified’. Only one (1%) respondent (Respondent 141), who was 
from South Africa, indicated ‘always justified’.   
Never Justified/Rarely Justified - Country Analysis 
Condemnation comes in various forms and individuals may have some level of 
tolerance over certain actions being able to rationalise the behaviour depending on 
the circumstances. As it is never black and white, further analysis was conducted to 
identity how many respondents from each of the country categories had indicated a 
combination of  ‘rarely justified’ and ‘never justified’. The respondents (n=11) who 
only responded ‘never justified’ were excluded from the total count. There were 35 
(20%) respondents from the total population of 173 who indicated a combination of 
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‘rarely justified’ and ‘never justified’. Table 9 provides the results as a country 
breakdown for the respondents who indicated a combination of ‘rarely justified’ and 
‘never justified’.   
Table 9. Strand I. Country breakdown of respondents who indicated a combination 
of ‘rarely justified’ and ‘never justified’ for all scenarios 
Country Cyprus 
N=? 
(?) 
India 
N=? 
(?) 
Pakistan 
N=? 
(?) 
South 
Africa 
N=? 
(?) 
 
UAE 
N=? 
(?) 
UK &NI 
N=? 
(?) 
USA 
N=? 
(?) 
Other 
N=? 
(?) 
Total 
N=? 
(?) 
Never & 
Rarely 
Justified 
5 
(26) 
7 
(25) 
4 
(29) 
2 
(13) 
2 
(18) 
2 
(10) 
7 
(20) 
6 
(20) 
35 
(20) 
 
Of the 35 respondents who indicated a combination of ‘rarely justified’ and ‘never 
justified’, this analysis has highlighted that the most respondents came from India 
(n=7) with a country percentage of 25% and the USA (n=7) with a country 
percentage of 20%; however, the highest country percentage of respondents 
indicating this came from Pakistan (n=4, 29%) and Cyprus (n=5, 26%).  
Never Justified – Total Population 
The top three scenarios that received the most responses for ‘never justified’ were: 
• Giving a gift to a Government Official during a tendering process (84%, 
n=146) 
• Driving under the influence of alcohol (83%, n=144) 
• Paying a Government Official to utilise a free service for example; to enter a 
library (82%, n=142) 
The three scenarios that received the least number of responses for ‘never justified’ 
were: 
• Driving faster than the speed limit (24%, n=41) 
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• Keeping money that you found in the street (38%, n=66) 
• Lying in your own interest (39%, n=67) 
Never Justified - A Country Analysis 
A cross-country comparison was conducted to identity how many respondents from 
each country category indicated ‘never justified’ for all the scenarios, Table 10 
outlines the results of the analysis which identified that 11 respondents from the 173 
indicated ‘never justified’ for all scenarios.  
Table 10. Strand I. Country breakdown of respondents who indicated ‘never 
justified’ for all scenarios 
Country Cyprus 
N=? 
(%) 
India 
N=? 
(%) 
Pakistan 
N=? 
(%) 
South 
Africa 
N=? 
(%) 
 
UAE 
N=? 
(%) 
UK & NI 
N=? 
(%) 
USA 
N=? 
(%) 
Other 
N=? 
(%) 
Total 
N=? 
(%) 
Never 
Justified 
1 
(5) 
4 
(14) 
0 0 1 
(9) 
1 
(5) 
2 
(6) 
2 
(7) 
11 
(6) 
 
Further analysis has highlighted that more respondents from India felt that all the 
scenarios were ‘never justified’, equating to 14% of the Indian respondents and 2% 
of the total population. This section has provided a breakdown of the results from 
Strand I of the justification of scenarios in 2017. The next section will compare a 
sub-set of the 2017 data against previous studies.  
Has Integrity Changed Over Time? 
Whiteley (2012) undertook a comparison of a sub-set of scenarios from his study in 
2011 against the same set of scenarios used in a similar study in 2000 (Pattie, Seyd 
& Whiteley, 2004), for those that were ‘never justified’. This research replicates that 
comparison, using a subset of the 2017 data from the anonymous survey supporting 
this research project; however, a comparison was first made against the 2011 study. 
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Figure 1, outlines the percentage of respondents who thought that a scenario was 
‘never justified’ in 2017.  
Figure 1. Strand I. The percentage of respondents who indicated ‘never justified’ in 
2017 
 
 
 
Figure 1 shows the top three scenarios that were ‘never justified’ as: 
• Drunk driving (83%, n=144) 
• Accepting a Bribe (82%, n=142) 
• Buy stolen goods (80%, n=139) 
To obtain a figure for the scenario accepting a bribe, the ‘never justified’ responses 
to the five additional scenarios that related to a form of potential bribery were added 
together and divided by five to give a count and percentage.   
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The data in Figure 1 was compared with the results of the 2011 study, and is detailed 
in Figure 2.  
Figure 2. Strand I. Integrity Indicators in 2011 in Britain and 2017 Global View – 
percentages of respondents who indicated ‘never justified’ 
 
 
 
10 scenarios had more responses for ‘never justified’ in 2017 than they did in 2011. 
Analysis was undertaken to determine whether there was any significant difference 
by way of 10% or more variance between the scenarios. This would indicate that 
respondents were significantly less tolerant today of certain issues than they were in 
2011. Five scenarios had a variance of over 10%; ‘falsifying a job application’ 
(23%); ‘keeping money found in the street’ (19%); ‘having an affair when married’ 
(15%); ‘having sex under the age of consent’ (10%); and ‘buying stolen goods’ 
(10%). Four scenarios had less respondents indicting that it was ‘never justified’ in 
2017 than in 2011. These were ‘exceeding the speed limited’; ‘dropping litter in a 
public place’; ‘claiming benefits to which you are not entitled’ and ‘drunk driving’. 
Of these four scenarios ‘claiming benefits to which you are not entitled’ had the 
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biggest decrease (10%) of respondents who felt it was ‘never justified’, thereby 
indicting that in 2011 it was less tolerated.  
The same scenarios from 2011 and 2017 studies were then compared to the scenarios 
that were in the 2000 study. Figure 3 outlines the differences.  
Figure 3. Strand I. Integrity Indicators in 2000, 2011 and 2017 – percentages of 
respondents who indicated ‘never justified’ 
 
 
Tolerance levels towards certain activities dropped in 2011 from 2000 and then 
increased 2017. One scenario that had slightly increased in 2017, having dropped in 
2011, was ‘lying in your own interest.’ The activity where individuals appear to 
remain consistent with their view of something being ‘never justified’ was ‘dropping 
litter’, although there was a slight decrease in 2017. It is clear that individuals were 
more tolerant of drunk driving in 2017 than they have ever been. One activity that 
had a percentage drop, having risen in 2011, was ‘claiming benefits that you are not 
entitled to.’ In summary, although analysis was undertaken on a smaller sample 
population than in the 2011 and 2000 studies, it appears that people, having grown 
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more tolerent of low level dishonesty in 2011, were less tolerant in 2017, with the 
exception of ‘drunk driving’ and ‘claiming benefits’. It should be noted that the 
sample populations for the 2000 and 2011 studies took place in Britain only, with a 
large number of respondents, whereas the 2017 study had a global reach, but with 
less respondents. The full suite of scenarios that were put to those in Strand I were 
given to those in Strand II; however they were only asked whether it was ‘sometimes 
justified’ or ‘never justified’, the option of reducing the justification choices was 
taken to enable more in depth discussion on the participants rationale for their 
justificiation.    
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Strand II – How Honest Are We? 
Table 11 details the options chosen in order of the scenarios, commencing with 
where the highest number of participants indicated ‘never justified’.  
Table 11. Strand II. Justification of the 19 Scenarios 
Face-to-face Interview Results 
 Sometimes 
Justified 
Never 
Justified 
Cheating on taxes if you have a chance. 0 10 
Failing to report accidental damage you have caused to a parked vehicle. 1 9 
Throwing away litter in a public place. 1 9 
Paying a Border Control Officer to advance to the front of the queue. 1 9 
A businessman bribing a public official to secure a contract which ensures viability and jobs 
within his company which in in difficult circumstances. 1 9 
Claiming government benefits to which you are not entitled. 2 8 
Making up things up on a job application form. 2 8 
Buying something which you know is stolen. 3 7 
Having sex under the legal age of consent. 3 7 
Having an affair when you are married. 4 6 
Driving under the influence of alcohol. 4 6 
Avoiding a fare on public transport. 4 6 
Bribing a traffic police officer to avoid delays and a larger fine for a non-existent speeding 
offence. 5 5 
Paying a government official to utilise a free service. 6 4 
Giving a gift to a government official during a tendering process. 6 4 
Lying in your own interest. 8 2 
Keeping money that you found on the street. 9 1 
Taking Cannabis. 10 0 
Driving faster than the speed limit. 10 0 
N.B. Table 11 details the results of the 10 face-to-face interviews carried out in the UK.  
 
There was unanimous agreement that ‘cheating on taxes if you have a chance’ was 
‘never justified’. This was the only scenario where all participants believed it was 
‘never justified’. One participant for four scenarios chose ‘sometimes justified’; 
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however, it was a different participant for each one. The participant who indicated 
‘sometimes justified’ has been included below, alongside the scenario: 
• Failing to report accidental damage you have caused to a parked vehicle 
(Participant 2) 
• Throwing away litter in a public place (Participant 10) 
• Paying a Border Control Officer to advance to the front of the queue 
(Participant 5) 
• A businessman bribing a public official to secure a contract which ensures 
viability and jobs within his company which in in difficult circumstances 
(Participant 9) 
In relation to ‘failing to report damage’ Participant 2 felt that it was ‘sometimes 
justified’ because it should be assessed on a case-by-case basis and was dependent 
on the damage caused. They said that “you may do the honourable thing” and then a 
few months later receive a large insurance claim as the other party had “abused your 
honesty”. The general consensus from the other nine participants was that by 
‘reporting it’ they meant that they would leave a note on the windscreen. Participant 
10 indicated ‘sometimes justified’ for throwing away litter, with the rationale that 
although they found it very annoying and did not like it, they may not have an option 
if there were no “disposal bins”. Participant 9 admitted that they had done this; 
however, they could not justify it. Participant 5 advised that ‘paying a Border 
Control Officer’ was ‘sometimes justified’ “if it’s permitted”, with the addition of it 
being “written”. Participant 10 was challenged when they said they would “never” 
make such a payment with an example being put to them of being in a long queue 
when a customs officer approaches them and explains that if they pay $10 they 
would advance to the front. Participant 10 subsequently stated, “So I’ve been in 
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those situations and I have never done it”. Participant 9 added, “I’m one of those that 
just stand and wait”. Participant 9 also mentioned that it was ‘sometimes justified’ 
for ‘a businessman to bribe a public official to save their company’, because whilst 
“morally…you would say never, because it is a bribe” they felt that as the 
businessman was “looking after a company and loads of people work in there” it was 
acceptable. It was put to three participants whether they would simply let the 
company collapse if placed in that situation, and they confirmed they would 
(Participants 2, 5 and 10). A number of participants commented on ‘market 
economy’ being the fact that it was ‘never justified’ for ‘a businessman to bribe a 
public official to save their company’, because it “undermines the competition law” 
and that “effects of that can be more damaging than on one company…” (Participant 
4). Another said, “that’s the market economy we work in and if that company goes 
down because it didn’t get that contract, it means another company did…another set 
of people are in gainful employment” (Participant 3).    
The scenarios that received a more even split (four ‘sometimes justified’ and six 
‘never justified’) across the participants included the following options: 
• Having an affair when you are married  
• Driving under the influence of alcohol  
• Avoiding a fare on public transport  
As the variance narrowed, participants began to provide context around the rationale 
for choosing ‘sometimes justified’. These included ‘having an affair’, which was 
dependant on the circumstances (Participant 1), perhaps due to a marriage breaking 
down (Participant 8), or divorce proceedings having already commenced (Participant 
7). Similarly ‘drink driving’ in an emergency (Participants 1, 7 and 10) was 
 97 
‘sometimes justified’. Although one of the participants explained that they once had 
an emergency situation, having been drinking, when their daughter was taken to 
hospital by ambulance. Even though their first reaction was to get into their car, they 
decided not to drive; hence, they indicated ‘never justified’ (Participant 5). In the 
same way participants might drink drive in an emergency, it was ‘sometimes 
justified’ to ‘avoid paying a fare on public transport’ in an emergency (Participant 4) 
or when faced with “some sort of urgency” or “threat” (Participant 10).  
Only one scenario received the same number of responses for each option (five 
‘sometimes justified’ and five ‘never justified’). This was: 
• Bribing a traffic police officer to avoid delays and a larger fine for a non-
existent speeding offence  
The five participants (Participants 2, 5, 6, 7 and 9) who indicated that it was ‘never 
justified’ felt that “low scale bribes morph into larger ones and that is when you start 
talking about this is the cultural thing…” (Participant 2) and that it should be done 
the “right way and appeal it” (Participant 5), or take the ticket and go to court 
(Participants 7 and 9) because “it would be very difficult to argue with the police 
either way, so you might as well just have something that’s on record” (Participant 
6).  
The other five participants expressed a view that it would depend upon the country. 
If the scenario occurred in the UK then there would be some faith in the justice 
system. Accordingly, Participant 1 would take the ticket and contest it; however, if it 
was in another country, where the justice system was weaker, they felt it was better 
to pay it. This was also the opinion of Participant 4, especially “if you found that 
your life was in danger”. Participant 8 indicated that paying the fictitious fine 
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prevented “getting points on your licence which you’re going to pay for down the 
road for insurance”, as such, they would pay the fine and then report it to an 
independent body, “not at the same station”.    
At the other end of the spectrum where all, or nearly all, participants indicated that 
the scenarios were ‘sometimes justified’ were: 
• Keeping money you found in the street (nine ‘sometimes justified’ and one 
‘never justified’) 
• Taking cannabis (10 ‘sometimes justified’) 
• Driving faster than the speed limit (10 ‘sometimes justified’) 
Nine of the participants indicated that ‘keeping money you found in the street’ was 
‘sometimes justified’ and one (Participant 3) indicated that it was ‘never justified’. 
The majority of those who indicated it was ‘sometimes justified’ advised that it 
would depend upon the amount, and two advised that they would give it to charity. 
Participants 1 6, 7, 8 and 10 all had conditions attached to their decision, depending 
on the amount found. Participant 8 said “Yes, I think if you found a suitcase full of 
ten grand, you would go to greater extents to find out who the owner is, but if you 
found a £10 note and there’s nobody obviously standing nearby, then you’re not 
going to go to any efforts to find out who the owner is”. Participants 6 and 10, again 
depending on the amount, would hand it into the police. Interestingly, Participant 2 
stated that they would not do this because it would create “a load of bureaucracy 
when actually you can just donate it to a charity”. Participant 4 advised the same as 
Participant 2 about giving it to charity, adding “usually when you hand it into the 
police, they keep it anyway, like I learned before when I was young”. 
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All participants indicated that it was ‘sometimes justified’ to take cannabis with nine 
articulating the rationale being for medicinal purposes. Participant 6 provided the 
most extensive rationale for taking cannabis, stating “…if you’re taking it for 
medicinal purposes or if you’re in a lot of chronic pain from cancer, or I guess if you 
have extreme anxiety or something that no other medication can help with”.  
 All participants indicated that it was ‘sometimes justified’ to drive faster than the 
speed limit. Seven participants (Participants 1, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9 and 10) all said that it was 
justified in an emergency. Participant 5 added a condition to explain their view, 
stating “if there was a medical emergency and again I guess, to lots of my comments 
in terms of society’s accepted norms, 10% above the speed limit is generally 
accepted…It’s an unwritten rule…”. Participant 3 would speed in order to “avoid 
danger”, whilst Participant 7 said “everyone does I think, that is life”. Participant 2, 
when asked in what context they would speed said, “I just think the speed limits in 
this country [UK] are not always reflective of the roads and the road conditions”.  
Where participants felt that the scenarios were ‘sometimes justified’ this was usually 
supported by some form of rationale, for example, an emergency in the case of drink 
drive or medicinal purposes in the case of taking cannabis. Additionally, clarification 
of the country was sought in the case of paying a police officer for a fictitious fine, 
and details of the country and legislation were requested in the case of ‘sex under the 
legal age of consent’. Where such additional detail was required it was clear that 
participants were endeavouring to understand the wider circumstances of the 
scenario with a view of assessing whether they could ‘justify’ it.    
This chapter has assessed how attitudes and tolerence levels to low level dishonesty 
have changed overtime by comparing a small scale data set from 2017 across two 
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Strands of research against two previous studies from 2011 and 2000. The overall 
findings from this part of the research will be revisited in the discussion section of 
this thesis. The next chapter will outline the understanding of corruption and the 
differences between a bribe and facilitation payment that were highlighted in Strand 
I.  
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Chapter 6 – Strand I Results 
Introduction  
This chapter outlines the key theme words identified following analysis of the 
answers to the questions that asked respondents in Strand I to provide three examples 
of what they regarded as corruption, and then to define a bribe and a facilitation 
payment. Analysis was initially conducted on the responses across the total 
population, then a cross-country comparison was undertaken to determine how many 
respondents from each country used each theme word. A selection of respondents’ 
answers has been included in the relevant section of this chapter.   
Strand I - Definition of Corruption 
Introduction  
To produce specific themes, certain words within the responses were grouped to 
form categories. For example, ‘Public Official’ included the words Government 
Official, Public Official and Politician, whereas ‘Fraud’ included the words 
Embezzlement, Fraud and Theft.   
Table 12 details the 13 key theme words that were identified and the number of 
respondents who mentioned each word across each country.   
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Table 12. Strand I. Key theme words for defining corruption 
 
The most common theme word identified was ‘bribery’, which was mentioned by 
46% (n=79) of the total population. It was cited by 46% (n=16) of respondents from 
the USA, compared to 74% (n=14) from Cyprus and 43% (n=13) from the Other 
category. It was mentioned the least (14%, n=2) by respondents from Pakistan. The 
least mentioned theme identified was ‘conflict of interest’ which was only referenced 
by six (3%) respondents, three from Cyprus, and one from India, the USA and Other 
respectively. From a legislation perspective there were a number of actual offences 
mentioned as well as ‘bribery’ by people from across several countries; for example, 
‘fraud’, ‘money laundering’ and ‘tax evasion’.   
Country Cyprus 
N=? 
(?) 
India 
N=? 
(?) 
Pakistan 
N=? 
(?) 
South 
Africa 
N=? 
(?) 
UAE 
N=? 
(?) 
UK & NI 
N=? 
(?) 
USA 
N=? 
(?) 
Other 
N=? 
(?) 
Total plus % 
of total pop. 
N=? 
(?) 
Bribery 
14 
(74) 
12 
(43) 
2 
(14) 
6 
(40) 
7 
(64) 
9 
(43) 
16 
(46) 
13 
(43) 
79 
(46) 
Public 
Official 
5 
(16) 
8 
(29) 
3 
(21) 
2 
(13) 
3 
(27) 
7 
(33) 
6 
(17) 
12 
(40) 
46 
(27) 
Abuse of 
Power 
7 
(36) 
2 
(7) 
3 
(21) 
3 
(20) 
3 
(27) 
4 
(19) 
10 
(28) 
4 
(13) 
36 
(21) 
Personal 
Gain 
2 
(10) 
3 
(11) 
2 
(14) 
2 
(13) 
2 
(18) 
2 
(10) 
6 
(17) 
9 
(30) 
28 
(16) 
Fraud 
3 
(16) 
4 
(14) 
0 3 
(20) 
2 
(18) 
3 
(14) 
0 2 
(7) 
17 
(10) 
 
Nepotism/ 
Cronyism 
2 
(10) 
1 
(3) 
0 3 
(20) 
1 
(9) 
4 
(19) 
2 
(6) 
2 
(7) 
15 
(9) 
Favouritism 
2 
(10) 
4 
(14) 
1 
(7) 
1 
(7) 
1 
(9) 
0 0 1 
(3) 
10 
(6) 
 
Money 
Laundering 
1 
(5) 
0 1 
(7) 
2 
(13) 
0 2 
(10) 
1 
(3) 
2 
(7) 
9 
(5) 
Gift Giving 
0 2 
(7) 
0 0 2 
(18) 
1 
(5) 
1 
(3) 
2 
(7) 
8 
(5) 
 
Lobbying 
1 
(5) 
0 3 
(21) 
0 0 0 2 
(6) 
2 
(7) 
8 
(5) 
 
Tax 
Evasion 
1 
(5) 
3 
(11) 
0 0 0 2 
(10) 
2 
(6) 
0 8 
(5) 
 
Facilitation 
Payment  
0 1 
(3) 
0 0 0 3 
(14) 
2 
(6) 
1 
(3) 
7 
(4) 
Conflict of 
Interest 
3 
(16) 
1 
(3) 
0 0 0 0 1 
(3) 
1 
(3) 
6 
(3) 
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One respondent from the Other category defined corruption as “the abuse of 
entrusted power for private gain” and gave the examples “abuse of public or private 
office to obtain an undue advantage, directly or indirectly, such as: trading in 
influence; abuse of office; nepotism; favouritism; illegal lobbying” (Respondent 40). 
A Cypriot response, which did not contain any of the theme words but was very 
detailed, described corruption as “Decisions based on personal aims. Exploiting your 
position for earning money illegally. Offering the job to your friend instead of being 
fair” (Respondent 163). Other respondents listed specific scenarios, for example, an 
Indian respondent wrote “police taking bribe for licenses or letting go off [sic] a 
violator of traffic laws; Government officials taking bribe for giving tender; Black 
money and evading taxes” (Respondent 38).  
 
 
 
 
  
 104 
Strand I - Define a Bribe 
The respondents to the survey were asked to define a ‘bribe’. Table 13 lists the seven 
key theme words and the number of respondents who mentioned it from the total 
population and each country category.  
Table 13. Strand I. Key theme words for defining a bribe  
Country Cyprus 
N=? 
(%) 
India  
N=? 
(%) 
Pakistan 
N=? 
(%) 
South 
Africa 
N=? 
(%) 
 
UAE  
N=? 
(%) 
UK & NI  
N=? 
(%) 
USA 
N=? 
(%) 
Other  
N=? 
(%) 
Total plus 
% of pop.  
N=? 
(%) 
 
Money 13 
(68) 
19 
(76) 
7 
(5) 
10 
(67) 
5 
(45) 
11 
(52) 
19 
(57) 
10 
(33) 
94 
(56) 
Payment 1 
(5) 
2 
(8) 
2 
(14) 
2 
(13) 
3 
(27) 
8 
(38) 
5 
(15 ) 
7 
(23) 
30 
(18) 
Gifts 7 
(37) 
8 
(32) 
1 
(7) 
1 
(7) 
0 1 
(5) 
5 
(15 ) 
4 
(13) 
27 
(16) 
Favour(s) 0 2 
(8) 
3 
(21) 
2 
(13) 
2 
(18) 
3 
(14) 
2 
(6) 
2 
(7) 
16 
(10) 
Reward 3 
(16) 
4 
(16) 
2 
(14) 
2 
(13) 
1 
(9) 
0 1 
(3) 
2 
(7) 
15 
(9) 
Other 
Benefits 
0 2 
(8) 
1 
(7) 
2 
(13) 
1 
(9) 
0 5 
(15) 
1 
(3) 
12 
(7) 
Inducement 0 3 
(12) 
0 0 0 1 
(5) 
2 
(6) 
1 
(3) 
7 
(4) 
N.B. – Three Indian and two USA respondents failed to answer. One Other respondent indicated ‘don’t know’.  
 
The most comprehensive and legalistic response came from the Other category: 
“The act of offering, promising or giving a financial or other advantage, 
either directly or indirectly, with the intent to induce or reward the improper 
performance (or delayed or non-performance) of a business or public 
function, or otherwise influence any act or decision in order to obtain or 
retain business or an advantage in business; the act of requesting, agreeing to 
receive, or accepting a financial or other advantage, either directly or 
indirectly, with the intention that, in consequence (or in anticipation), a 
relevant function or activity should be performed improperly or influenced 
('passive bribery'); Improper performance includes any activity which is any 
one of the following: illegal; or a breach of trust; or a breach of good faith; or 
a breach of duty to act impartially; or dishonestly”. (Respondent 40) 
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Theme Word Analysis 
Money 
‘Money’ was the most common theme word across all country categories with 54% 
(n=94) of respondents mentioning this. In categorising ‘money’ other terms were 
included, such as ‘monetary’, ‘cash’ and ‘financial advantage’. It was mentioned by 
at least 33% of respondents from each country category with India having the 
highest percentage of 76% (n=19).   
Country examples included:  
Cyprus: “money given under the table to a politician to fix a contract” (Respondent 
162). 
India: “An act of soliciting money/favour in return of a favourable decision that is 
not based on merit, honesty and integrity” (Respondent 126). 
Payment 
At least one respondent per country category mentioned the term ‘payment’. A total 
of 17% (n=30) from the entire population made reference to this, with the UK & NI 
having the most respondents (38%, n=8), followed by Other (23%, n=7). Only one 
respondent mentioned this in Cyprus.  
Country examples were:  
Other: “A personal payment to a government official or a person in power to obtain 
desired results / speed up the process” (Respondent 88). 
Other: “paying or providing a services or kind to get something done which is 
against the law” (Respondent 67). 
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Gifts 
The term ‘gifts’ was mentioned by 16% (n=27) of the entire population, except 
UAE. India had the most respondents (32%, n=8) mentioning this term, followed by 
Cyprus (37%, n=7). It was mentioned only once in Pakistan, South Africa and UK & 
NI.  
Country examples were: 
USA: “Lavishing a Client or Counterparty with expensive dinners, gifts, etc., to 
obtain their business” (Respondent 1). 
Cyprus: “Accepting money / gift / exchange of favours as to abuse position held” 
(Respondent 155). 
Favour(s) 
The term ‘favour(s)’ was mentioned by 9% (n=16) of the entire population across all 
country categories, except Cyprus. Pakistan (21%, n=3) and UK & NI (14%, n=3) 
were the countries that had the most respondents to reference this term. The 
remaining country categories had two responses each.  
Country examples were:  
Other: “money or favour given or promised in order to influence the judgment or 
conduct of a person in a position of trust, or something that serves to induce or 
influence” (Respondent 68). 
UK & NI: “The passing of cash, goods, favours to an individual, group or entity 
(often public officials who hold a lot of power) that renders the payer an advantage 
he would not have enjoyed without having made the pass” (Respondent 173). 
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Reward 
The term ‘reward’ was mentioned by 9% (n=15) of the entire population across all 
country categories, except UK & NI. India had the most responses (16%, n=4) 
followed by Cyprus (16%, n=3). It was mentioned the least by one respondent in 
UAE and one in the USA.  
Country examples were: 
USA: “receiving a reward or payment to do something unlawful” (Respondent 13). 
Pakistan: “Giving the individual money or a reward to fix it in a certain way” 
(Respondent 120). 
Other Benefit 
The word ‘benefit’ appeared in numerous responses; however, only in the context 
where it related to the receipt of a ‘benefit’ was it included for analysis. A total of 
7% (n=12) of the entire population across all country categories, with the exception 
of Cyprus and UK & NI, mentioned the term ‘benefit’. They were; India (8%, n=2), 
Pakistan (7%, n=1), South Africa (13%, n=2), UAE (9%, n=1), the USA (15%, n=5), 
and Other (3%, n=1). 
Country examples were: 
UAE: “obtain influence by offering money or some other benefit” (Respondent 56). 
South Africa: “Any form of benefit, pecuniary or otherwise, offered to an official to 
unlawfully influence any regulatory or legislative process (Respondent 135). 
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Inducement  
The word ‘inducement’ was mentioned by 4% (n=7) of respondents across four 
countries. They were from India (12%, n=3), UK & NI (5%, n=1), USA (6%, n=2) 
and Other (3%, n=1). India had the most respondents referencing this term.    
Nil Returns 
Three respondents from India and two from the USA failed to answer the question. 
One respondent from the Other category wrote “don’t know”. 
Strand I – Define a Facilitation Payment  
The respondents were asked to define a ‘facilitation payment’. There was more 
agreement across the population as to what constituted a ‘facilitation payment’ 
therefore less theme words were identified. Table 14 details the three theme words 
and the number of respondents across the entire population who mentioned these.    
Table 14. Strand I. Key theme words for defining a facilitation payment 
Country Cyprus 
N=? 
(%) 
India 
N=? 
(%) 
Pakistan 
N=? 
(%) 
South 
Africa 
N=? 
(%) 
UAE 
N=? 
(%) 
UK & NI 
N=? 
(%) 
USA 
N=? 
(%) 
Other 
N=? 
(%) 
Total plus 
% of pop. 
N=? 
(%) 
Payment to 
an Official 
4 
(21) 
14 
(56) 
3 
(21) 
6 
(40) 
5 
(45) 
3 
(14) 
14 
(42) 
10 
(33) 
59 
(35) 
Speeds up 
process 
2 
(10) 
14 
(56) 
1 
(7) 
3 
(20)  
4 
(36) 
12 
(57) 
11 
(33) 
11 
(37) 
58 
(35) 
Bribe 12  
(63) 
9 
(36) 
9  
(64) 
4 
(27) 
2 
(18) 
5 
(24) 
3 
(9) 
7 
(23) 
51 
(30) 
Don’t 
know 
2 
(10) 
0 0 1 
(7) 
0 1 
(5) 
2 
(6) 
1 
(3) 
7 
(4) 
N.B. – There were three blanks from India and two from the USA. 
 
Payment to an Official  
This theme included phrases such as “I believe it's a payment to a government 
official or public servant…”, “a payment to an official…” and “payment made to a 
public or government…”. It also included the phrase “a payment of a sum of money 
to obtain fast tracking of an application for a visa / import licence”. Although this 
phrase did not actually contain the term ‘public’ or ‘government official’ it was 
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assumed that to obtain a ‘visa/import licence” one would have to go through some 
form of government administration. There were responses from all countries 
mentioning this theme, starting at 14% (n=3) from the UK & NI to 56% (n=14) from 
India.  
Country examples were:  
Cyprus: “A facilitation payment is a payment made to a public or government 
official as an incentive for the official to complete some action or process 
expeditiously, to the benefit of the party making the payment” (Respondent 159). 
UK & NI: “Charging of ‘fees’ or ‘licences’ for what should be standard government 
services” (Respondent 96). 
Speed Payments 
More than 20% of respondents from India (56%, n=14), South Africa (20%, n=3), 
UAE (36%, n=4), UK & NI (57%, n=12), USA (33%, n=11) and Other (37%, n=11) 
associated a facilitation payment with ‘speeding up a process’, or ‘expediting a 
process’. Cyprus had 10% (n=2) and Pakistan had 7% (n=1) who mentioned this 
theme.   
Country examples were:  
UK & NI: “Any payment made in order to make something happen a bit quicker 
than it might otherwise have done. In other words, a bribe.” (Respondent 79). 
India: “government official is given money or goods to perform (or speed up the 
performance of) an existing duty” (Respondent 169). 
 
 110 
Bribe 
There were a number of respondents from all countries who indicated that a 
‘facilitation payment’ was a ‘bribe’. Over 20% of respondents from Cyprus (63%, 
n=12), India (36%, n=9), Pakistan (64%, n=9), South Africa (27%, n=4), UK & NI 
(24%, n=5), and Other (23%, n=7) mentioned ‘bribe’. Lower percentages came from 
UAE (18%, n=2) and the USA (9%, n=3). In contrast, seven respondents from India, 
Pakistan, South Africa, UAE, USA, and Other, having described what they thought a 
facilitation was, also stated that it was ‘not considered to be an act of bribery’. 
Country examples were:  
UK & NI: “A kind of bribe given (usually to an individual) to provide a speedy 
service or look the other way” (Respondent 64). 
Other: “A payment made to public officials to facilitate the processing of certain 
activities (e.g. granting of a licence, expediting visa approval process, etc.)” 
(Respondent 32). 
Seven respondents (two from Cyprus, two from the USA and one from UK & NI, 
South Africa, and Other respectively) indicated that they did not know what a 
facilitation payment was.  
A respondent from Cyprus and India each wrote “as above”, which indicated that 
they were relying on their answer to the previous question, which had asked them to 
define a bribe. The Cypriot (Respondent 162) had previously written “money given 
under the table to a politician to fix a contract” and the Indian (Respondent 44) had 
written “An inducement offered / received to expedite a service which otherwise 
should have been provided in the normal course of business.” It is assumed that 
neither differentiated between a ‘bribe’ and a ‘facilitation payment’.   
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Having been asked to give three examples of what they regarded as corruption, and 
to define both a bribe and a facilitation payment, it is clear that the respondents in 
Strand I believed a number of behaviours and criminal offences constitutes 
corruption and there are a number of ways to commit bribery through the seven key 
theme words identified. The intention of the next two questions was to understand 
whether bribe paying, or the making of facilitation payments, was a practice in the 
respondent’s country, and if so, in what context did this occur. The next chapter 
details the responses to these two questions. 
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Chapter 7 – Strand I - The Practice of Bribe Paying and making 
Facilitation Payments 
Introduction  
This chapter outlines the analysis to the questions: 
• ‘if bribe paying is a practice in your country, in what context does this 
happen?’ 
• ‘if having to make facilitation payments is a practice in your country, in 
what context does this happen?’ 
Table 15 and Table 16 detail the response rates for both questions across each 
country category. Tables 17 and 18 record the key theme words identified from 
analysis of the answers reporting the number of respondents who mentioned them 
across each country and out of the entire population. A breakdown of the numbers 
and percentages of the respondents from a country perspective is articulated under 
each key theme word.  
Bribe Paying as a Practice 
11% (n=19) of respondents from the overall population selected the option ‘prefer 
not to say’. 36% (n=10) of the Indian respondents chose this option, with the 
remainder coming from UAE (n=1), USA (n=3) and Other (n=5). 25% (n=39) of 
responses were received from the overall population for ‘N/A’, with the highest 
percentage being 48% (n=10) from UK & NI. No-one from Cyprus or Pakistan 
indicated ‘N/A’. Providing ‘N/A’ as a response could indicate that the respondents 
felt that paying a bribe was not a common practice in their country; although as the 
question was conditional it was not possible to draw any firm conclusion from the 
‘N/A’ responses. Table 15 outlines the response rate on a per country basis.  
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Table 15. Strand I. The response rate to the question ‘if bribe paying is a practice in 
your country, in what context does this happen?’  
 Country Cyprus 
N=? 
(%) 
India 
N=? 
(%) 
Pakistan 
N=? 
(%) 
South 
Africa 
N=? 
(%) 
UAE 
N=? 
(%) 
UK & 
NI 
N=? 
(%) 
USA 
N=? 
(%) 
Other 
N=? 
(%) 
Total plus 
% of pop.  
N=? 
(%) 
Response 
Received 
16 
(84) 
14 
(50) 
13 
(93) 
13 
(87) 
7 
(64) 
9 
(43) 
18 
(51) 
15 
(50) 
105  
(61) 
N/A 0 3  
(11) 
0 1 
(7) 
3  
(27) 
10  
(48) 
13  
(37) 
9  
(30) 
39  
(23) 
Prefer 
not to say 
0 10 
 (36) 
0 0 1  
(9) 
0 3 
 (9) 
5  
(17) 
19  
(11) 
No 
Response
/ Blank 
3 
(16) 
1 
 (4) 
1  
(7) 
1  
(7) 
0 2  
(9) 
1  
(3) 
1  
(3) 
10 
(6) 
 
Unfortunately, there were very few descriptive contextual answers with the majority 
of respondents just recording single words, for example “health”, “sports”, and 
“political parties”; however, five theme words (categories) were identified and 
thematic analysis was conducted on the 105 responses where the respondents had 
provided comments. Table 16 outlines the five theme words identified with the 
number of responses per country category.  
Table 16. Strand I. Theme words with number of respondents, per country, for ‘if 
bribe paying is a common practice in your country, in what context does it happen?    
Country Cyprus 
N=? 
(%) 
India 
N=? 
(%) 
Pakistan 
N=? 
(%) 
South 
Africa 
N=? 
(%) 
UAE 
N=? 
(%) 
UK & NI 
N=? 
(%) 
USA 
N=? 
(%) 
Other 
N=? 
(%) 
Total plus 
% of pop. 
N=? 
(%) 
 
Government 8 
(50) 
4 
(29) 
5 
(38) 
9 
(69) 
1 
(14) 
4 
(44) 
7 
(39) 
8 
(53) 
46 
(44) 
Police 0 2 
(14) 
2 
(16) 
9 
(69) 
1 
(14) 
1 
(11) 
1 
(6) 
1 
(7) 
18 
(17) 
Public/ 
Private Sector 
2  
(12) 
2  
(14) 
0 5 
(38) 
0 2 
(22) 
1 
(6) 
2 
(13) 
14 
(13) 
Sport 2  
(12) 
1    
(7) 
1       
(8) 
0 0 0 1 
(6) 
0 5 
(5) 
Health  3 
(19) 
0 0 0 0 1  
(11) 
0 0 4    
(4) 
 
Of the 105 respondents who provided enough detail for analysis, 83% (n=87) 
mentioned one or more of the key theme words.  
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Government 
44% (n=46) of respondents from the entire population, across all countries, made 
reference to ‘government’, Cyprus (50%, n=8), India (29%, n=4), Pakistan (38%, 
n=5), South Africa (69%, n=9), UAE (14%, n=1), UK & NI (44%, n=4), USA (39%, 
n=7) and Other (53%, n=8). This was the most frequently used key word identified.  
Police 
Respondents from India (14%, n=2), Pakistan (16%, n=2), South Africa (69%, n=9), 
UAE (14%, n=1), UK & NI (11%, n=2), USA (6%, n=1) and Other (7%, n=1) 
indicated that bribery occurred when there is interaction with the police.  
Public/Private Sector 
Respondents from Cyprus (12%, n=2), India (14%, n=2), South Africa (38%, n=5), 
UK & NI (22%, n=2), USA (6%, n=1) and Other (13%, n=2), mentioned that bribery 
occurs in both the public and private sector. This was not mentioned in the responses 
from Pakistan or the UAE.   
Sport  
Respondents from Cyprus (12%, n=2), India (7%, n=1) Pakistan (8%, n=1) and the 
USA (6%, n=1) indicated that there was bribery in ‘sport’. 
Health 
Respondents from Cyprus (19%, n=3) and UK & NI (11%, n=1) indicated that there 
was bribery within the ‘health’ sector.  
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Bribe Paying - Country Analysis 
A country analysis was conducted with a view of obtaining examples of where bribe 
paying was a practice and in what context this occurred, rather than just identifying 
themed words.  
 Cyprus – Bribe Paying 
Of the 16 responses received, eight respondents indicated that it related to 
‘Government’, with one stating “I have heard through the grapevine that it happens 
often in contracts and also in hiring, especially in the public sector” (Respondent 
148). Two respondents indicated that it happens in the ‘Public/Private sector’ with 
one stating “from the money scandals that come up every day, I believe bribery 
happens to 98% among politicians and public officials and about 60% among private 
sector (Respondent 154). Two respondents indicated ‘Sport’, whilst also indicating 
‘Government,’ with one respondent advising that bribe paying occurred “between 
the football teams, referees and the Cyprus Football Association” (Respondent 156). 
Three respondents indicated ‘Health’ but gave no context. Three respondents did not 
answer the question.  
India - Bribe Paying  
Of the 14 text responses received, 10 respondents chose ‘prefer not to say’, three 
indicated ‘N/A’, potentially meaning that they did not think it occurred in their 
country, and one respondent failed to answer the question. Of the 14 text responses, 
three respondents indicated that it occurred in every context. Four respondents 
indicated ‘Government’, with one respondent providing a comprehensive response:   
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“Bribery is widely practised and accepted as way of life. In most interactions 
where some kind of service is expected from the public/elected officials, 
bribery comes into play. For example applying for a license, running a trade, 
construction of a house – bribery would come into play to ensure completion. 
In fact the corruption/bribery is almost a daily topic in the news in India”. 
(Respondent 104) 
Two respondents indicated that bribery occurred in both the public and private 
sectors, from “petty bribes such as those involving traffic violations…the corporate-
government nexus”, although they felt this was getting less in “light of stricter laws” 
(Respondent 51). One respondent indicated “Sports bodies” (Respondent 100) but 
did not elaborate further. No respondents indicated that bribe paying occurred in the 
health sector; however, two respondents indicated that such activity could be 
observed within the police. 
Pakistan – Bribe Paying 
Of the 13 text responses received, five respondents indicated ‘Government’. One 
respondent advised that when they were in the Army those who knew him tried to 
bribe him to “allow them into my VIP suits [sic] or guest rooms free of charge” 
(Respondent 119). None of the respondents indicated that bribery occurred in the 
‘Public/private sector’ or ‘Health’; however, one respondent mentioned ‘Sport’ and 
two mentioned ‘Police’, with one stating “it happens all the time. If someone speeds 
or has an accident and pays police officers extra money, they will ignore it and forget 
about it” (Respondent 118). 
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South Africa – Bribe Paying  
Of the 13 text responses provided, nine respondents indicated ‘Government’. One 
respondent gave a number of examples including “Bribing of customs officials at 
border post not to conduct a search of one’s cargo or not to impose duty on what is 
being imported into the country” and “Bribing staff members of the Department of 
Home Affairs to issue identity and/or travel document to non-qualifying individuals, 
national of foreign countries” (Respondent 125). There were a number of 
comprehensive responses with four respondents mentioning, ‘tendering’ in 
connection to government contracts’, whereas another mentioned “procurement in 
the government sector” (Respondent 136). Five respondents considered that bribe 
paying occurred in both the public and private sectors with one stating: 
“While the perception (and probably the reality) is that bribery largely takes 
place in the public sector, facilitation payments and bribes are common, 
though executed in a more sophisticated way, between the private and state 
sectors and between private and private”. (Respondent 132)  
Nine respondents indicated ‘Police’, this being the highest percentage (69%) from a 
country to indicate this key theme word. They were all in the context of Traffic 
Police taking a bribe to enable someone to “get out of a traffic infringement” 
(Respondent 124) or “to avoid a traffic fine of any kind (speeding, over the alcohol 
limit etc.)” (Respondent 143). One respondent, who indicated both ‘Government’ 
and ‘Police’, wrote:  
“At a low level, it is not uncommon for bribes to be paid to officials to avoid 
traffic prosecution or to attempt to short circuit processes like the issuing of a 
birth certificate or a telephone line.  There is allegedly significant corruption 
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and nepotism in government procurement.  This extends all the way to the 
head of state and, as the saying goes; the fish rots from the head”. 
(Respondent 135) 		
Another wrote, “Our president takes bribes. All government officials, from traffic 
cops to tender fraud” (Respondent 133). None of the respondents indicated that bribe 
paying occurred in ‘Sport’ or ‘Health’.   
UAE – Bribe Paying 
Seven respondents provided text responses; however, they were limited in detail.  
One respondent mentioned ‘Government’ in their response of “government offices” 
(Respondent 55) and one indicated ‘Police” in their response of “to avoid traffic 
fines etc.” (Respondent 52). One respondent wrote “kickbacks for awarding 
contracts” (Respondent 42), another wrote “Yes, to achieve Tenders, facilitate 
business” (Respondent 62), and another just wrote the word “regularly” (Respondent 
58). It was not possible to attribute specific themes to these responses. One 
respondent advised that it was “not heard as a practice in UAE” (Respondent 56) and 
three others indicated ‘N/A’. The final respondent wrote “underhand/unreported due 
to media control” (Respondent 69).  
UK & NI – Bribe Paying 
Nine respondents gave text responses, although the majority had limited detail. Four 
respondents indicated ‘Government’, with responses such as “public officials at all 
levels” (Respondent 172) and “everywhere that politicians and civil servants are 
involved” Respondent 151). Two respondents indicated that bribe paying occurred in 
both the public and private sectors with one stating, “I think it is rife in government 
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and industry at a high level” (Respondent 79). One respondent indicated ‘Health’ 
and one indicated ‘Police’. No one indicated ‘Sport’. One of the respondents 
indicated ‘Government’, ‘Both Public/Private Sector’, ‘Health’ and ‘Police’ within 
their response and stated: 
“Have not come across this in the UK, but I am originally from Kazakhstan, 
and it is quite a widespread, proactive [sic] over there. It happens with 
government tenders, road control police, people 'buy' driving licenses, or 
construction permits without necessary surveying procedures. In state 
healthcare system, to be able to get analysis faster, people are encouraged to 
pay the hospital staff in charge”. (Respondent 171) 
USA – Bribe Paying 
Of the 18 respondents who provided text answers, four indicated that they were 
either not aware of bribe paying taking place, or that it was not a common practice. 
One respondent (Respondent 4) just wrote “report” and another (Respondent 5) 
wrote “high level”. No key theme words could be attributed to these answers. 
Likewise, no key theme words could be attributed to the response “those purchasing 
are frequently wined and dined by vendors often to the point where bribes are 
offered” (Respondent 39). 
Seven respondents indicated ‘Government’ with examples of “campaign finance” 
(Respondent 6), “it happens in government” (Respondent 12) and “political 
donations from corporation or lobby groups” (Respondent 13). One respondent who 
indicated ‘Government’ wrote “Although I live in USA, in my native country, Egypt, 
it is a normal practice in government offices and giving gifts to some companies 
officials secure a good employment or to close business deals” (Respondent 36). One 
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respondent indicated that bribe paying occurred in the ‘Public/Private Sector’, one 
indicated ‘Sport’, and one indicated ‘Police’, stating “military or police road blocks” 
(Respondent 139).  
Other 
Of the 15 text responses received eight indicated ‘Government’, with examples of 
“political people and government employees” (Respondent 166), “it is very prevalent 
and common among the public sector” (Respondent 41), and “in all the government 
entities, starting from the street police straight up to the president” (Respondent 93). 
The respondent who mentioned their president came from Mexico. Two respondents 
indicated ‘Public/Private Sector’ with a response from Hong Kong of “a malaise that 
is prevalent in both public and private sectors” (Respondent 33). The other 
respondent was from Brazil and wrote, “it occurs with certain frequency in high risk 
sectors such as construction, judiciary and public administration in general” 
(Respondent 48). Only one respondent indicated ‘Police’ which was the Mexican 
response above. No one indicated ‘Sport’ or ‘Health’.  
Facilitation Payments as a Practice 
When the respondents were asked ‘if making facilitation payments is a practice in 
your country, in what context does it happen?’ limited context was provided. This 
was due to the fact that 72 (42%) respondents indicated that it was either ‘not 
applicable’, ‘not sure/no idea/don’t know’ or that they chose ‘prefer not to say’. 
There were also 22 (13%) ‘blank’ responses, however, this did not prevent some 
analysis. Table 17 provides a breakdown across the country categories as to how 
individuals responded.  
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Table 17. Strand I. Country category breakdown of how individuals responded to the 
question, ‘if having to make facilitation payments is a practice in your country, in 
what context does it happen?’ 
Country Cyprus 
N=? 
(%) 
India 
N=? 
(%) 
Pakistan 
N=? 
(%) 
South 
Africa 
N=? 
(%) 
UAE 
N=? 
(%) 
UK & 
NI 
N=? 
(%)  
 
USA 
N=? 
(%) 
Other 
N=? 
(%) 
Total 
plus % of 
pop. 
N=? 
(%)  
 
Response 
Received 
14 
(74) 
12 
(43) 
9 
(64) 
8 
(53) 
7 
(64) 
7 
(33) 
9 
(26) 
13 
(43) 
79 
(46) 
N/A 0 6 
(21) 
0 0 3 
(27) 
11 
(52) 
19 
(54) 
8 
(27) 
47 
(27) 
No 
Response/ 
Blank 
4 
(21) 
2 
(7) 
3 
(21) 
6 
(40) 
0 3 
(14) 
3 
(9) 
1 
(3) 
22 
(13) 
Prefer not to 
say 
0 8 
(29) 
0 0 1 
(9) 
0 4 
(11) 
8 
(27) 
21 
(12) 
Not sure/ no 
idea/ don’t 
know 
1 
(5) 
0 2 
(14) 
1 
(7) 
0 0 0 0 4 
(2) 
 
The countries that provided the highest ‘not applicable’ responses were the USA 
(54%, n=19) and UK & NI (52%, n=11), which is not terribly surprising, as these 
countries are not generally known for this practice. 46% (n=79) of respondents 
provided commentary in their answers, although some were not particularly 
descriptive. Nevertheless, analysis was conducted and Table 18 details the five 
theme words identified and the number of respondents per country who mentioned 
them from a total population of 79 respondents.   
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Table 18. Strand I. Theme words per respondent, per country from analysis, ‘if 
making facilitation payments is a common practice in your country, in what context 
does it happen?    
Country Cyprus 
N=? 
(%) 
 
India 
N=? 
(%) 
 
Pakistan 
N=? 
(%) 
 
South 
Africa 
N=? 
(%) 
 
UAE 
N=? 
(%) 
 
UK & NI 
N=? 
(%) 
 
USA 
N=? 
(%) 
 
Other 
N=? 
(%) 
 
Total 
plus % 
of pop. 
N=? 
(%) 
 
Government 4 
(29) 
4 
(33) 
0 1 
(12) 
3 
(43) 
4 
(57) 
2 
(22) 
4 
(31) 
22 
(28) 
Public/Private 
Sector 
0 1 
(8) 
0 0 0 0 0 1   
(8) 
2 
(2) 
Health  1 
(7) 
0 0 0 0 1 
(14) 
0 0 2 
(2) 
Police 0 0 0 1    
(12) 
0 1 
(14) 
0 0 2 
(2) 
Sport 0 0 1     
(11) 
0 0 0 0 0 1 
(1) 
 
Of the 79 respondents who provided enough detail for analysis 37% (n=29) 
mentioned one or more of the key theme words.  
The following section outlines the five key theme words and the number of 
responses. It also provides examples where respondents indicated that making 
facilitation payments was a common practice in their country.   
Government  
Across all countries, except Pakistan, a total of 22 respondents used the term 
‘government’. The response rate was Cyprus (29%, n=4), India (33%, n=4), South 
Africa (12%, n=1), UAE (43%, n=3), UK & NI (57%, n=4), USA (22%, n=2), and 
Other (31%, n=4).  
Country examples were: 
Cyprus: “Politicians are accepting bribes and have the political parties influence if 
something goes wrong. These are strictly bribes and have nothing to do with national 
interests” (Respondent 156). 
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UK & NI: “A facilitation payment is always regarded as a bribe and happens at all 
civil servant levels” (Respondent 172). 
Public/Private Sector 
Two respondents, one from India and one from Other, used the term ‘public/private 
sector’. 
Country examples were: 
India: “Facilitation payments are only one of the many methods where politicians, 
big corporates and multinationals camouflage their nefarious activities while trying 
to maintain a "clean" image” (Respondent 102). 
Other: “Mainly in the companies that operate in my country when they try to make 
new business or open new facilities, they have to make multiple payments to the 
government to speed up their paperwork” (Respondent 93). 
Health  
Two respondents, one from Cyprus and one from UK & NI, used the term ‘health’.  
Country examples were: 
Cyprus: “hospitals” (Respondent 157) 
UK & NI: “road police, state healthcare, getting a child in a 'good school'” 
(Respondent 171). 
Police 
Two respondents, one from South Africa and one from UK & NI used the term 
‘police’. The example from the UK & NI is cited above under ‘Health’. The South 
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African respondent stated “All contexts across the board. Awarding of Tenders, 
Bribing traffic officials, buying dockets. If you can think it, it is happening in SA” 
(Respondent 134). 
Sport 
Just one respondent from Pakistan mentioned ‘sport’ (Respondent 119). Their 
example was “…in cricket when Pakistan were only playing a finals match, someone 
paid the Pakistani team enough money for them to lose the match!”  
This chapter has outlined the results for the questions relating to the definition of 
corruption, bribe paying and facilitation payments. Thematic analysis has drawn out 
key theme words from the text responses and the tables detail the number of 
respondents from each country category who mentioned them. The next chapter will 
outline the results and findings of the analysis from the questions in Strand I relating 
to ‘background’ and ‘culture’.  
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Chapter 8 – Strand I - Background and Culture 
Personal Background 
Respondents were asked to indicate whether they agreed or disagreed, to varying 
degrees, that ‘personal background shapes your view of corruption’.  Table 19 details 
the responses per country.  
Table 19. Strand I. The degree to which respondents agreed or disagreed with the 
statement “personal background shapes your view of corruption” 
Country Cyprus 
N=? 
(%) 
India 
N=? 
(%) 
Pakistan 
N=? 
(%) 
South 
Africa 
N=? 
(%) 
UAE 
N=? 
(%) 
UK & NI 
N=? 
(%) 
USA 
N=? 
(%) 
Other 
N=? 
(%) 
Total plus 
% of pop. 
N=? 
(%) 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
5 
(26) 
9 
(32) 
6 
(43) 
6 
(40) 
5 
(45) 
7 
(33) 
9 
(26) 
7 
(23) 
54 
(31) 
Agree 5 
(26) 
6 
(21) 
2 
(14) 
7 
(47) 
5 
(45) 
7 
(33) 
14 
(40) 
11 
(37) 
57 
(33) 
Somewhat 
Agree 
6 
(32) 
8 
(29) 
2 
(14) 
1 
(7) 
1 
(9) 
7 
(33) 
9 
(26) 
7 
(23) 
41 
(24) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
1 
(5) 
4 
(14) 
0 1 
(7) 
0 0 
 
1 
(3) 
1 
(3) 
8 
(5) 
Disagree 0 0 2 
(14) 
0 0 0 1 
(3) 
3 
(10) 
6 
(3) 
Strongly 
Disagree 
2 
(10) 
0 2 
(14) 
0 0 0 0 0 4 
(2) 
Don’t 
know 
0 1 
(4) 
0 0 0 0 1 
(3) 
1 
(3) 
3 
(2) 
 
The majority of respondents (88%, n=152) agreed to varying degrees, which was 
replicated in a country breakdown, with the statement that ‘personal background 
shapes your view of corruption’. In the case of UAE and UK & NI no respondents 
disagreed. India, Pakistan and Other had the most respondents, four each, who 
disagreed to some extent. Two respondents from Cyprus and Pakistan ‘strongly’ 
disagreed with the statement and one respondent from India, USA and Other 
respectively ‘did not know’.  
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Culture 
Respondents were asked to indicate whether they agreed or disagreed, to varying 
degrees, that ‘culture shapes your view of corruption’. Table 20 details the responses 
per country. 
Table 20. Strand I. The degree to which respondents agreed or disagreed with the 
statement “culture shapes your view of corruption.”  
Country Cyprus 
N=? 
(%) 
India 
N=? 
(%) 
Pakistan 
N=? 
(%) 
South 
Africa 
N=? 
(%) 
UAE 
N=? 
(%) 
UK&NI 
N=? 
(%) 
USA 
N=? 
(%) 
Other 
N=? 
(%) 
Total plus 
of pop. 
N=? 
(%) 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
4 
(21) 
8 
(29) 
3 
(21) 
5 
(33) 
3 
(27) 
6 
(29) 
8 
(23) 
6 
(20) 
43 
(25) 
Agree 8 
(42) 
10 
(36) 
4 
(28) 
7 
(47) 
4 
(36) 
5 
(24) 
17 
(49) 
13 
(43) 
68 
(39) 
Somewhat 
Agree 
3 
(16) 
6 
(21) 
3 
(21) 
1 
(7) 
2 
(18) 
9 
(43) 
8 
(23) 
6 
(20) 
38 
(22) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
1 
(5) 
4 
(14) 
1 
(7) 
1 
(7) 
1 
(9) 
0 0 2 
(6) 
10 
(6) 
Disagree 1 
(5) 
0 0 1 
(7) 
1 
(9) 
1 
(5) 
1 
(3) 
2 
(6) 
7 
(4) 
Strongly 
Disagree 
2 
(10) 
0 3 
(21) 
0 0 0 0 0 5 
(3) 
Don’t know 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
(3) 
1 
(3) 
2 
(1) 
 
The majority of respondents (86%, n=149) agreed to varying degrees, which was 
replicated in a country breakdown, with the statement that ‘culture shapes your view 
of corruption’. Two respondents from Cyprus and three from Pakistan ‘strongly’ 
disagreed and two respondents, one from the USA and one from Other selected 
‘don’t know’.  
The Worse Offender 
To obtain an understanding as to who the respondents felt was the worse offender in 
a bribery transaction they were asked “if you consider bribery to be wrong, which 
party do you think is the worse offender”. Table 21, details the responses per 
country. 
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Table 21. Strand I. Country responses for when the respondents were asked, “if you 
consider bribery to be wrong, which party do you think is the worse offender?” 
Country Cyprus 
N=? 
(%) 
 
India 
N=? 
(%) 
 
Pakistan 
N=? 
(%) 
 
South 
Africa 
N=? 
(%) 
 
UAE 
N=? 
(%) 
 
UK & NI 
N=? 
(%) 
 
USA 
N=? 
(%) 
 
Other 
N=? 
(%) 
 
Total 
plus % 
of pop. 
N=? 
(%) 
 
Giver 2 
(10) 
0 3     
(21) 
2  
(14) 
1     
(9) 
0 2    
(6) 
2    
(6) 
12      
 (7) 
Receiver  6  
(32) 
1    
(4) 
2     
(14) 
2  
(14) 
3   
(27) 
4  
(19) 
5  
(14) 
7    
(23) 
30   
(17) 
Equal 
(Both) 
11  
(58) 
26  
(93) 
9     
(64) 
11  
(73) 
7  
(64) 
16  
(76) 
28  
(80) 
21  
(70) 
129  
(75) 
Don’t 
know 
0 1     
(4) 
0 0 0 0 0  0 1        
(6) 
Blank 0 0 0 0 0 1    
(5) 
0 0 1       
(6) 
 
The majority of respondents indicated that it was ‘equal’, meaning that the ‘giver’ 
and the ‘receiver’ were equally at fault. The highest response rate for ‘equal’ was 
93% (n=26) from India and the lowest was from Cyprus with 58% (n=11). Where 
fault was not considered equal, the ‘receiver’ was generally thought to be the worse 
offender across the country categories, with the exception of Pakistan, where 21% 
(n=3) of respondents thought that the ‘giver’ was worse than the ‘receiver’ and South 
Africa where they received the equal number of responses (n=2, 14%). One 
respondent from India indicated ‘don’t know’ and one respondent from UK & NI 
failed to answer the question. 
What Influences the Level of Corruption? 
Respondents were asked to describe the three most important factors that they felt 
influenced corruption. Table 22 details eight themes that were extracted from the 
respondents’ answers. 
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Table 22. Strand I. The eight themes for the question “please write down the three 
most important factors which, in your view influences the level of corruption”  
Country Cyprus 
N=? 
(%) 
India 
N=? 
(%) 
Pakistan 
N=? 
(%) 
South 
Africa 
N=? 
(%) 
UAE 
N=? 
(%) 
UK & NI 
N=? 
(%) 
USA 
N=? 
(%) 
Other 
N=? 
(%) 
Total 
plus % of 
pop. 
N=? 
(%) 
 
Poverty/ 
Economy 
1 
(5) 
8 
(29) 
1 
(7) 
4 
(27) 
7 
(64) 
13 
(62) 
11 
(31) 
13 
(43) 
58  
(34) 
Lack of/  
Weak Law/ 
Regulation/ 
Governance 
3 
(16) 
 
 
3 
(11) 
2 
(14) 
8 
(53) 
3 
(27) 
6 
(29) 
14 
(40) 
7 
(23) 
46 
(27) 
Culture 5 
(26) 
6 
(21) 
0  4 
(27) 
2 
(18) 
2 
(10) 
15 
(43) 
10 
(33) 
44  
(25) 
Lack of 
punishment 
7  
(37) 
4 
(14) 
2 
(14) 
4 
(27) 
1 
(9) 
6 
(29) 
5 
(14) 
5 
(17) 
34  
(20) 
Greed 1 
(5) 
4  
(14) 
3 
(21) 
7 
(47) 
3 
(27) 
3 
(14) 
4 
(11) 
1 
(3) 
26 
(15) 
Education 2  
(11) 
3 
(11) 
2 
(14) 
1 
(7) 
1 
(9) 
2 
(10) 
3 
(9) 
8 
(27) 
22 
(13) 
Lack of 
account-ability 
4 
(21) 
0  2  
(14) 
0 
 
0  
 
1 
(5) 
1 
(3) 
0 
 
8 
(5) 
Personal 
background/ 
Upbringing 
2 
(11) 
1 
(4) 
0 1 
(7) 
0  0  2 
(6) 
2 
(7) 
8 
(5) 
 
The most popular factor (theme) was ‘poverty/economy’ which was mentioned by 
34% (n=58) of all respondents. It was mentioned in each country category with over 
50% of respondents in UAE and UK & NI citing this. ‘Lack/Weak 
Law/Regulation/Governance was the second most mentioned theme by 27% (n=46) 
of respondents across all country categories, the country with the highest percentage 
being South Africa (53%, n=8). Other factors mentioned were ‘culture’ across all 
country categories except Pakistan; ‘lack of punishment’; ‘greed’; and ‘education’, 
which were mentioned by at least one respondent from all country categories. ‘Lack 
of accountability’ and ‘personal background/upbringing’, although not mentioned 
across all country categories, were both mentioned by eight respondents, being 5% 
of the total population. It is difficult to draw anything further from this analysis, 
except the frequency each theme was mentioned, as the respondents were not 
required to elaborate on their answer. 
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This chapter has reported on the results from the questions on ‘background’ and 
‘culture’, whilst also covering who was the worse offender in a bribery transaction 
and providing insight into what influences the level of corruption from the questions 
in Strand I. The next chapter will outline the results and findings from analysis of the 
data collected from Strand I with regards to where corruption occurs and which 
sectors is the most susceptible to bribery and corruption.   
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Chapter 9 – Strand I - Where is Corruption?  
Which is the Most Corrupt Sector? 
To obtain an understanding as to whether the respondents felt that one sector was 
more corrupt than another, they were asked to indicate on a scale of 1 – 6 (1 being 
not corrupt to 6 being corrupt) how corrupt each sector was. The options were 
Government/Public Sector, Private Sector or Non-Government Organisation. Table 
23 details the scale of corruption believed to be in the Government/Public Sector 
across the population. Table 24 details the scale of corruption believed to be in the 
Private Sector across the population and Table 25 details the scale of corruption 
believed to be in the Non – Government / Non-Profit Organisation Sector.  
Table 23. Strand I. Scale of corruption in the Government/Public Sector 
Scale of 
Corruption 
1 
N=? 
(%) 
2 
N=? 
(%) 
3 
N=? 
(%) 
4 
N=? 
(%) 
5 
N=? 
(%) 
6 
N=? 
(%) 
Total 
N=? 
(%) 
 
Total 1 (1) 
9 
(5) 
11 
(6) 
32 
(18) 
51 
(29) 
69 
(40) 
173 
(100) 
 
Table 24. Strand I. Scale of corruption in the Private Sector 
Scale of 
Corruption 
1 
N=? 
(%) 
2 
N=? 
(%) 
3 
N=? 
(%) 
4 
N=? 
(%) 
5 
N=? 
(%) 
6 
N=? 
(%) 
Total 
N=? 
(%) 
 
Total 1   (1) 
31   
(18) 
46   
(27) 
51   
(29) 
28   
(16) 
16     
(9) 
173  
(100) 
 
Table 25. Strand I. Scale of corruption in the Non – Government / Non-Profit 
Organisation Sector 
Scale of 
Corruption 
1 
N=? 
(%) 
2 
N=? 
(%) 
3 
N=? 
(%) 
4 
N=? 
(%) 
5 
N=? 
(%) 
6 
N=? 
(%) 
Total 
N=? 
(%) 
Total 7   (4) 
29  
(17) 
58  
(34) 
40  
(23) 
28  
(16) 
11   
(6) 
173  
(100) 
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The Government/Public Sector was felt to be the most corrupt by 40% (n=69) of the 
entire population who chose 6 on the scale. 88% (n=152) of the entire population 
indicated 4, 5 and 6 on the scale for this Sector as opposed to 55% (n=95) indicating 
4, 5 and 6 for Private Sector and 46% (n=79) indicating 4, 5 and 6 for the Non-
Government/Non-Profit Organisation. This outcome is consistent with the findings 
of a previous study (Baldock, 2016) and literature on corruption as outlined in the 
literature review of this research. No one in Cyprus, India, Pakistan or South Africa 
indicated that the Government/Public Sector was not corrupt. For a full country 
category breakdown of responses see Appendix 6.  
Giving a Gift to a Public Official 
Having determined that the majority of respondents felt that the Government/Public 
Sector was more corrupt that the Private Sector and Non-Government/Non-Profit 
Organisation, respondents were then asked to indicate on a scale of 1 – 6 (1 being 
not corrupt – 6 being corrupt) whether giving a gift or money to a Public Official to 
obtain public services constituted corruption. Table 26 details the responses across 
the entire population.  
Table 26. Strand I. How corrupt is the following? ‘Giving a gift or money to a Public 
Official to obtain public services' 
Scale of 
Corruption 
1 
N=? 
(%) 
2 
N=? 
(%) 
3 
N=? 
(%) 
4 
N=? 
(%) 
5 
N=? 
(%) 
6 
N=? 
(%) 
Blank 
N=? 
(%) 
Total 
N=? 
(%) 
 
Total 1 (1) 
2 
(1) 
5 
(3) 
12 
(7) 
28  
(16) 
106 
(61) 
19 
(11) 
173 
(100) 
 
A total of 146 respondents (84%) ranked the statement as 4, 5, or 6 with 106 (61%) 
actually ranking it 6, thereby indicting that it was a very corrupt practice. The highest 
percentage came from the USA where 28 respondents indicated 6 on the scaler, this 
was 16% of the total population. Eight respondents in total ranked the scenario 1, 2, 
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or 3, indicating the lower grading of not being corrupt. They were split between six 
countries (Cyprus, India, Pakistan, UAE, UK & NI and Other). Only one respondent 
who was from the UAE ranked it 1 (not corrupt). There were 19 blanks, split 
between three countries (India (n=10), UK & NI (n=2) and Other (n=7)). For a full 
country breakdown see Appendix 6. 
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Susceptibility to Bribery & Corruption 
To understand whether one sector was more susceptible to bribery and corruption 
than another, respondents were asked to rank on a scale of 1 – 6 (1 not susceptible – 
6 highly susceptible) a list of 12 sectors. Table 27 outlines the responses from the 
entire population. For a country per country breakdown see Appendix 6. 
Table 27. Strand I. Susceptibility of bribery & corruption in a sector 
Sector 1 
N=? 
(%) 
2 
N=? 
(%) 
3 
N=? 
(%) 
4 
N=? 
(%) 
5 
N=? 
(%) 
6 
N=? 
(%) 
Blank 
N=? 
(%) 
Total 
N=? 
(%) 
 
Government & 
Public Admin. 
0 6  
(3) 
7   
(4) 
14  
(8) 
45  
(26) 
100 
(58) 
1    
(1) 
173  
(100 ) 
Oil & Gas 2  
(1) 
2  
(1) 
16  
(9) 
21  
(12) 
49  
(28) 
82  
(47) 
1    
(1) 
173  
(100 ) 
Construction 1  
(1) 
5  
(3) 
14  
(8) 
31  
(18) 
49  
(28) 
72  
(42) 
1    
(1) 
173  
(100 ) 
Mining 3  
(2) 
10  
(6) 
20  
(12) 
35  
(20)  
43  
(25) 
60  
(35) 
2    
(1) 
173  
(100 ) 
Banking & 
Financial Services 
7  
(4) 
24  
(14) 
23  
(13) 
40  
(23) 
37  
(21)  
41  
(24) 
1    
(1) 
173  
(100 ) 
Forestry 7  
(4) 
22  
(13) 
39  
(23) 
35  
(20) 
35  
(20) 
34  
(20) 
1    
(1) 
173  
(100 ) 
Healthcare 6  
(3) 
17  
(10) 
17  
(10) 
21  
(12) 
19  
(11) 
24  
(14) 
69  
(40) 
173  
(100 ) 
Fishing & Hunting 8  
(5) 
31  
(18) 
51  
(29) 
28  
(16) 
31  
(18) 
23  
(13) 
1 
(1) 
173  
(100 ) 
Agriculture 11  
(6) 
23  
(13) 
42  
(24) 
42  
(24) 
35  
(20) 
19  
(11) 
1    
(1) 
173  
(100 ) 
Technology 7  
(4) 
41  
(24) 
51  
(29) 
30  
(17) 
25  
(14) 
18  
(10) 
1    
(1) 
173  
(100 ) 
Manufacturing 1  
(1) 
22  
(13) 
42  
(24) 
53  
(31) 
38  
(22) 
16  
(9) 
1    
(1) 
173  
(100 ) 
Consumer Retail 9  
(5) 
39  
(23) 
45  
(26) 
43  
(25) 
24  
(14) 
12  
(7) 
1    
(1) 
173  
(100 ) 
 
The sector thought to be the most susceptible to corruption was ‘government & 
public administration’ which is not surprising as the scale of corruption was felt to 
be the greatest in the government/public sector, as indicated previously in Table 23. 
92% (n=159) of the population indicated 4, 5 and 6 on the scale (6 being the most 
susceptible to corruption) for this sector. The sectors thought to be the next most 
susceptible to bribery and corruption were Oil & Gas, Construction and Mining. 
Although 47% (n=82) indicated the higher end of the scale (6) for Oil & Gas, 
compared to 42% (n=72) for Construction, if the responses are calculated for 4, 5 
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and 6 on the scale the total number of responses is 152 (88%) for both sectors. At the 
other end of the spectrum Technology, Manufacturing and Consumer Retail were 
thought to be the sectors least susceptible to bribery and corruption.     
This chapter has reported on the results from Strand I when the respondents were 
asked which sector they felt was the most corrupt and which sector was the most 
susceptible to bribery and corruption. The following chapter is the final chapter of 
the results and findings of analysis from Strand I. It covers the respondents’ views of 
the effects of corruption and what they thought were the advantages and 
disadvantages of TI’s CPI.     
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Chapter 10 – Strand I - Understanding Corruption and Preventative 
Measures 
This chapter examines the respondents’ views in Strand I of the effects of corruption 
against a number of categories. Tackling corruption is then explored with the 
intention of understanding which measures are felt to be the most effective in the 
prevention of corruption. Having understood the respondents’ views in the area of 
tackling corruption, this chapter then goes on to report on the respondents’ thoughts 
on the advantages and disadvantages of TI’s CPI, prior to concluding with the results 
obtained from asking who is the most responsible for fighting corruption?        
Effects of Corruption 
Corruption can impact various parts of society. To gain an understanding of this, 
respondents were asked to rank the ‘effect’ of corruption had on ten categories with 
the following options to choose from: major effect; some effect; limited effect; no 
effect and don’t know. Table 28 details the responses from the total population. For a 
breakdown of a country per country analysis, see Appendix 6.   
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Table 28. Strand I. Effects of Corruption 
 Major 
Effect 
N=? 
(?) 
Some 
Effect 
N=? 
(?) 
Limited 
Effect 
N=? 
(?) 
No Effect 
N=? 
(?) 
Don't 
know 
N=? 
(?) 
 
Total 
N=? 
(?) 
Government Efficiency 148  
(86) 
19  
(11) 
2      
(1) 
1     
(1) 
3     
(2) 
173  
(100) 
Political/Legal Life 145  
(84) 
21  
(12) 
3      
(2) 
2     
(1) 
2     
(1) 
173  
(100) 
A Nation's Development 142  
(82) 
27  
(16) 
1      
(1) 
1     
(1) 
2    
(1) 
173  
(100) 
Trust in Government 141  
(82) 
25  
(14) 
4      
(2) 
1     
(1) 
2    
(1) 
173  
(100) 
Society's ruling 
Values/Ethics 
131  
(76) 
35  
(20) 
5      
(3) 
1     
(1) 
1     
(1) 
173  
(100) 
Economic/Trade activity 119  
(69) 
43  
(25) 
7      
(4) 
1     
(1) 
3     
(2) 
173  
(100) 
Society's Customs and 
Manners 
105  
(61) 
48  
(28) 
18  
(10) 
1      
(1) 
1     
(1) 
173  
(100) 
Healthcare 72  
(42) 
60  
(35) 
33  
(19) 
7     
(4) 
1     
(1) 
173  
(100) 
Education Profession 65  
(38) 
86  
(50) 
17  
(10) 
3     
(2) 
2     
(1) 
173 
(100) 
Private/Family/Tribal Life 57  
(33) 
76  
(44) 
32  
(18) 
6     
(3) 
2     
(1) 
173  
(100) 
 
Corruption was believed to have the most ‘major effect’ on ‘government efficiency’ 
(86%, n=148); however, in combining the response rates for ‘major’ and ‘some 
effect’, ‘a nation’s development’ was effected the most (98%, n=169). Expanding on 
the combined rates ‘government efficiency’ (97%, n=167) was next most impacted 
followed by ‘political/legal life’, ‘trust in government’ and ‘society’s ruling 
values/ethics’ all receiving response rates of 96% (n=166). At the other end of the 
scale, where corruption had a lesser degree of ‘major’ and ‘some effect’, 76% 
(n=132) indicated ‘healthcare’. This was made up of respondents from six country 
categories, the majority coming from USA (6%, n=11) then UK & NI (5%, n=8) and 
Other (5%, n=8). The category that received the most responses for ‘no effect’ was 
also ‘healthcare’. This was comprised of respondents from India (1%, n=2), UAE 
(1%, n=2) and Other (2%, n=3). Only one respondent from the Other category 
indicated ‘no effect’ for all the categories; however, as no explanation was requested, 
it is unclear why they chose this option. Only three respondents indicated ‘don’t 
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know’ for two of the categories. A South African respondent indicated ‘don’t know’ 
for four of the ten categories.  
Tackling Corruption 
Respondents were asked, “Do you consider corruption is an issue that needs to be 
tackled?” Two respondents, one from Pakistan and the other from UAE, indicated 
that they did not know; however, the remaining 171 respondents indicated ‘yes’ and 
provided varying degrees of justification on how this could be achieved.  
Thematic analysis was conducted which identified eight themes, which included 
Audits, Change of Culture, Development / Salaries, Education, Prosecution / 
Punishment / Penalty, Media, Transparency, and Whistleblowing / Rewarding those 
who speak up. Table 29 details the themes and the number of respondents per 
country.  
 
Table 29. Strand I. Key word themes and the number of respondents per country 
 Cyprus 
N=? 
(%) 
India 
N=? 
(%) 
Pakistan 
N=? 
(%) 
South 
Africa 
N=? 
(%) 
UAE 
N=? 
(%) 
UK & NI 
N=? 
(%) 
USA 
N=? 
(%) 
Other 
N=? 
(%) 
Total plus 
% of pop. 
N=? 
(%) 
Prosecution/ 
Punishment/ 
Penalty 
15 
(79) 
10 
(36) 
6 
(43) 
12 
(80) 
5 
(45) 
12 
(57) 
16 
(46) 
17 
(57) 
93 
(54) 
Education 0 5 
(18) 
3 
(21) 
3 
(20) 
3 
(27) 
3 
(14) 
5 
(14) 
10 
(33) 
 
32 
(18) 
Transparency 2 
(10) 
3 
(11) 
0 2 
(13) 
0 8 
(38) 
3 
(9) 
3 
(10) 
 
21 
(12) 
No Comment, 
N/A 
0 4 
(14) 
0 0 2 
(18) 
1 
(5) 
6 
(17) 
2 
(7) 
 
15 
(9) 
Media 1 
(5) 
1 
(4) 
2 
(14) 
2 
(13) 
1 
(9) 
0 5 
(14) 
3 
(10) 
 
15 
(9) 
Change of 
Culture 
2 
(10) 
5 
(18) 
0 1 
(7) 
1 
(9) 
2 
(9) 
0 3 
(10) 
 
14 
(8) 
Audits 1 
(5) 
1 
(4) 
2 
(14) 
 
1 
(7) 
1 
(9) 
1 
(5) 
0 0 7 
(4) 
Development/ 
Salaries 
0 0 1 
(7) 
1 
(7) 
0 1 
(5) 
2 
(6) 
1 
(3) 
 
6 
(3) 
Whistleblowing
/ Rewarding 
those who 
speak up.  
1 
(5) 
0 1 
(7) 
0 1 
(9) 
0 0 0 3 
(2) 
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No Comment or N/A  
Respondents from India (n=4), UAE (n=2), UK & NI (n=1), USA (n=6) and Other 
(n=2) all indicated that corruption was an issue that needed to be tackled; however, 
they followed up by either declining to comment or stated ‘don’t know’ or ‘N/A’.  
Tackling Corruption Theme Words 
Prosecution/Punishment/Penalty 
Responses across the full suite of countries included some form of 
‘prosecution/punishment/penalty’ or an interpretation of those key words. Contained 
in this grouping included words such as: ‘enforce law’; ‘put in jail’; ‘stronger laws’; 
‘increase punishment’; ‘sound legal system’; ‘better enforcement’; ‘prosecution’; 
‘punish’; ‘stiffer penalties’; ‘strict laws’; ‘discipline’; and ‘strong action’. Responses 
included “unbearable penalty should be imposed on those who take part and 
facilitate, which will dissuade anyone from even thinking of participating” 
(Respondent 75); “punish corrupt officials in position of power in case of any 
corruption issues” (Respondent 100); and “take a stand and hold white collar 
criminals fully accountable for their crimes. Our society lets them off the hook, and 
it is silently destroying the moral fibre of our country, the USA” (Respondent 115). 
Education 
No one from Cyprus mentioned ‘education’; however, it was mentioned from 
respondents from the other country categories. Responses included: “not sure unless 
people change. Educating the next generation would be the best for now” 
(Respondent 71); “values-based education…” (Respondent 136); and “Education. 
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Corruption can be rooted out by a good education system which inculcates good 
values and behaviours in the countries citizen” (Respondent 41). 
Transparency 
Responses from Cyprus (n=2), India (n=3), South Africa (n=2), UK & NI (n=8), 
USA (n=3) and Other (n=3) contained the word ‘transparency’ or associated words 
or terms for example, ‘integrity’ and ‘managed independently’. Responses included: 
“transparency in government and all decisions of the executive.  All politicians and 
senior civil servants must undergo scrutiny of their finances every year” (Respondent 
151); “promote transparency at all levels, especially at high levels” (Respondent 
148); and “transparency is the key especially in offshore investments/banking” 
(Respondent 165).  
Media 
This term was mentioned in Cyprus (n=1), India (n=1), Pakistan (n=2), South Africa 
(n=2), UAE (n=1), USA (n=4) and Other (n=3). This key word grouping included: 
‘name and shame’; ‘more investigative journalism’; ‘public awareness’; and 
‘publicly denounce’. Responses included: “Publicity of corruption. Deprecate 
corruption by politicians, media etc.” (Respondent 158); and “punish, perpetrators, 
publically” (Respondent 141). 
Change of Culture 
13 respondents from Cyprus (n=2), India (n=5), South Africa (n=1), USA (n=1), UK 
& NI (n=2) and Other (n=3) indicated ‘culture’. This may have indicated that there 
was a need to the change culture of organisations and nations by way of ‘education’ 
(another key word) or it was about the ‘culture’ per se. Response examples included: 
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“change the culture of organisations and nations by educating stakeholders and by 
imposing harsh sentences for corruption” (Respondent 151); and  “Active 
prosecution is the stick and both the giver and the receiver should be prosecuted. 
This is the stick but it meaningless if public officials are not properly paid and held 
with respect by the community. It is as much about the culture as about the economic 
reasons” (Respondent 135). 
Audits 
Seven respondents from Cyprus (n=1), India (n=1), Pakistan (n=2), South Africa 
(n=1), UAE (n=1) and UK & NI (n=1) responded by indicating ‘audits’ or some kind 
of ‘check and balance’ over individuals or a form of monitoring as a method to 
tackle corruption. Responses included: “controls and measures to be put on place and 
monitor the things frequently” (Respondent 85); and “Accountability. Proper audit of 
each and every single individual, department and organisation” (Respondent 112).   
Development/Salaries 
Six respondents from Pakistan (n=1), South Africa (n=1), UK & NI (n=1), USA 
(n=2) and Other (n=1), mentioned ‘development’, ‘economy’ or ‘salaries’. Examples 
included: “Ensure that economy is growing and income is sufficient to meet 
individuals needs” (Respondent 36); and “Moral values, pride and respect in any job 
you do. Pay liveable salaries especially to people in roles where corruption can lead 
to social impact” (Respondent 60). 
Whistleblowing/Rewarding Those Who Speak Up 
These grouping key words were identified in Cyprus (n=1) Pakistan (n=1) and UAE 
(n=1). The Pakistan respondent gave six measures they felt would best tackle 
 141 
corruption: “1. Special Task force, 2. Punishment and set examples. 3. 
Implementation of laws, 4. Zero tolerance at all level. 5. Speak Up policy and 
tracking. 6. Public Awareness” 	(Respondent 127). 
Prevention of Corruption 
There are different measures used in the fight against corruption. Respondents were 
asked to rank a list of 18 preventative measures as to how effective they thought they 
were from ‘highly effective’ through to ‘highly ineffective’. Table 30 details the 
responses of effectiveness from the total population.   
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Table 30. Strand I. Effectiveness of Preventative Measures  
N.B. There were 169 responses in total plus two blanks from India and two from the USA. 
 
The measure deemed to be the most ‘highly effective’ by 61% (n=103) of the total 
population was the ‘prosecution of high profile individuals’. In combining ‘highly 
effective’ and ‘effective’ 87% (n=147) indicated that the most effective measure was 
‘more resources to investigate and prosecute corruption cases’, followed by 86% 
(n=146) indicating ‘prosecution of high profile individuals’ and ‘greater 
transparency of government tendering procedures’. The top three ‘effective’ 
measures were: ‘legal protection for whistle-blowers’ (47%, n=82); ‘more research 
Category Highly 
Effective 
N=? 
(%) 
 
Effective 
N=? 
(%) 
 
Neither 
Effective or 
Ineffective 
N=? 
(%) 
 
Ineffective 
N=? 
(%) 
 
Highly 
Ineffective 
N=? 
(%) 
 
Prosecution of high profile individuals 103 
(61) 
43 
(25) 
13 
(8) 
7 
(4) 
3 
(2) 
Tougher legislation enabling more 
prosecutions and harsher sentences for 
corruption 
93 
(55) 
48 
(28) 
14 
(8) 
10 
(6) 
4 
(2) 
Greater transparency of government 
tendering procedures 
87 
(51) 
59 
(35) 
16 
(9) 
5 
(3) 
2 
(1) 
More resources to investigate and 
prosecute corruption cases 
85 
(50) 
62 
(36) 
16 
(9) 
4 
(2) 
2 
(1) 
Disclosure by top government officials of 
their financial interests 
76 
(45) 
65 
(38) 
17 
(10) 
9 
(5) 
2 
(1) 
Greater internal financial controls and 
internal audits of government spending 
72 
(43) 
66 
(39) 
22 
(13) 
7 
(4) 
2 
(1) 
Increased commitment by political and 
business leaders to fight corruption and 
fraud 
71 
(42) 
65 
(38) 
14 
(8) 
14 
(8) 
5 
(3) 
Vigorous media investigation of 
corruption 
65 
(38) 
76 
(45) 
18 
(11) 
8 
(5) 
2 
(1) 
Schools placing more emphasis on moral 
values 
62 
(37) 
69 
(41) 
25 
(15) 
9 
(5) 
4 
(2) 
A single independent agency dedicated to 
fighting corruption 
55 
(33) 
65 
(38) 
31 
(18) 
13 
(8) 
5 
(3) 
Legal Protection for Whistle-blowers 47 
(27) 
82 
(47) 
20 
(11) 
14 
(8) 
6 
(4) 
Religious community placing greater 
emphasis on promoting moral values in 
everyday life 
47 
(28) 
55 
(33) 
41 
(24) 
9 
(5) 
17 
(11) 
A media campaign to raise public 
awareness of the extent and cost of 
corruption 
39 
(23) 
74 
(44) 
37 
(22) 
13 
(8) 
6 
(4) 
More research on the causes, nature and 
effect of corruption 
33 
(20) 
78 
(46) 
38 
(22) 
18 
(11) 
2 
(1) 
Regular anti-corruption conferences that 
bring together all sectors and stakeholders 
28 
(17) 
61 
(36) 
21 
(13) 
25 
(15) 
27 
(16) 
Increased salaries for police officers 23 
(14) 
57 
(34) 
52 
(31) 
24 
(14) 
13 
(8) 
Increased salaries for government 
employees 
20 
(12) 
48 
(28) 
50 
(30) 
33 
(20) 
18 
(11) 
National Anti-Corruption Hotline 17 
(10) 
62 
(37) 
54 
(32) 
28 
(17) 
8 
(5) 
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on the causes, nature and effect of corruption’ (46%, n=78); and ‘vigorous media 
investigation of corruption’ (45%, n=76). The top three measures that were ‘neither 
effective’ or ‘ineffective’ were: ‘national anti-corruption hotline’ (32%, n=54); 
‘increased salaries for police officers’ (31%, n=52); and ‘increased salaries for 
government employees’ (30%/n=50).  
At the other end of the ‘effectiveness’ scale, the top three measures that were jointly 
‘ineffective’, with respondents across the countries indicating either ‘ineffective’ or 
‘highly ineffective’, were: ‘regular anti-corruption conferences that bring together all 
sectors and stakeholders’ (31%, n=52); ‘increased salaries of government 
employees’ (31%, n=51); and ‘increased salaries for police officers’ (22%, n=37). 
From a singular ‘effectiveness’ perspective, the top three measures indicated by the 
respondents across all the countries as ‘ineffective’ were: ‘increase salaries for 
government employees’ (20%, n=33); ‘national anti-corruption hotline’ (17%, 
n=28); and ‘regular anti-corruption conferences that bring together all sectors and 
stakeholders’ (15%, n=25). The top three measures that respondents indicated were 
‘highly ineffective’ were: ‘regular anti-corruption conferences that bring together all 
sectors and stakeholders’ (16%, n=27); ‘increased salaries for government 
employees’ (11%, n=18); and ‘religious community placing greater emphasis on 
promoting moral values in everyday life’ (11%, n=17).  
From a cross-country perspective (See Appendix 6) the respondents from four 
countries Cyprus (n=16), India (n=13), UK & NI (n=17) and the USA (n=20) 
indicated that the measure which was the most ‘highly effective’ was the 
‘prosecution of high profile individuals’. Respondents from Pakistan (n=10) and 
UAE (n=8) indicated the measure that was the most ‘highly effective’ was ‘tougher 
legislation enabling more prosecutions and harsher sentences for corruption’.  
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Both ‘tougher legislation enabling more prosecution and harsher sentences for 
corruption’ and ‘greater transparency of government tendering procedures’ were felt 
to be the most ‘highly effective’ by 19 respondents from the Other country category. 
The measure ‘greater transparency of government tendering procedures’ was 
indicated to be the most ‘highly effective’ from 12 respondents from South Africa.  
The measure of ‘increased salaries for government employees’ was considered to be 
one of the most ‘highly ineffective’ measures by respondents from Cyprus (n=3), 
Pakistan (n=2), South Africa (n=2), UK & NI (n=3), USA (n=4) and the Other (n=2). 
Cyprus (n=3), Pakistan (n=2) and UK & NI (n=3) respondents indicated that 
‘increased salaries for police officers’ was one of the most ‘highly ineffective’ 
measures. India’s (n=2) most ‘highly ineffective’ measure was ‘a single independent 
agency dedicated to fighting corruption’ and the UAE’s (n=2) was ‘religious 
community placing greater emphasis on promoting morals values in everyday life’.  
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Measuring Corruption 
The literature review has debated the measuring of corruption and the organisations 
and indices that endeavour to achieve this. Respondents were asked if they had heard 
of TI’s CPI. Table 31 details those who had and those who had not heard of the 
index from both a country and total population perspective.  
Table 31. Strand I. Responses to the questions, ‘have you heard of Transparency 
International Corruption Perceptions Index?’ 
Country Cyprus 
N=? 
(%) 
India 
N=? 
(%) 
Pakistan 
N=? 
(%) 
South 
Africa 
N=? 
(%) 
UAE 
N=? 
(%) 
UK&NI 
N=? 
(%) 
USA 
N=? 
(%) 
Other 
N=? 
(%) 
Total plus 
% of pop 
N=? 
(%) 
Yes 15 
(79) 
19 
(68) 
1 
(7) 
10 
(67) 
11 
(100) 
18 
(86) 
27 
(77) 
24 
(80) 
125 
(74) 
No 4 
(21) 
7 
(25) 
13 
(93) 
5 
(33) 
0 3 
(14) 
6 
(17) 
6 
(20) 
44 
(26) 
N.B.  – Four respondents failed to answer from India (two) and USA (two). 
 
A high proportion, 72% (n=125), across the entire survey population indicated that 
they had heard of TI’s CPI. At least 67% of the respondents had heard of TI’s CPI 
across each country category, except in Pakistan where only 7% (n=1) had heard of 
the index. In the UAE all respondents had heard of the index. Where respondents 
indicated that they had heard of the index, they were then asked if they used it within 
their organisation. Table 32 outlines the responses from both a country comparison 
and total population perspective.       
Table 32. Strand I. Responses to the question, ‘do you use Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perceptions Index in your organisation?’ 
Country Cyprus 
N=? 
(%) 
India 
N=? 
(%) 
Pakistan 
N=? 
(%) 
South 
Africa 
N=? 
(%) 
UAE 
N=? 
(%) 
UK & NI 
N=? 
(%) 
USA 
N=? 
(%) 
Other 
N=? 
(%) 
Total plus 
% of pop. 
N=? 
(%) 
 
Yes 8 
(53) 
15 
(79) 
1 
(100) 
6 
(60) 
10 
(91) 
16 
(89) 
22 
(81) 
18 
(75) 
96 
(77) 
No  5 
(33) 
0 0 0 0 0 1 
(4) 
3 
(12) 
9 
(7) 
Prefer not 
to Say 
0 1 
(5) 
0 2 
(20) 
1 
(9) 
1 
(6) 
2 
(7) 
2 
(8) 
9 
(7) 
Don’t 
know 
2 
(13) 
3 
(16) 
0 2 
(20) 
0 1 
(6) 
2 
(7) 
1 
(4) 
11 
(8) 
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Across all countries, the majority (77%, n=96) of those who confirmed they had 
heard of the index also indicated that they used it within their organisation. 7% (n=7) 
preferred not to say and 8% (n=11) said they did not know.  
Advantages of TI’s CPI 
Respondents were asked what the advantages of the CPI were. The most common 
response was that it could be used as a part of risk assessment for clients or 
jurisdictions. Cyprus (n=5), India (n=10), Pakistan (n=1), South Africa (n=4), UAE 
(n=7), UK & NI (n=7), USA (n=7) and Other (n=8) provided various benefits of 
using the CPI as a risk assessment tool such as: “it’s a simple way in which the ease 
of doing business in a country can be assessed” (Respondent 140) and “a better and 
scientific view to assess the corruption risk that a country may pose to a business” 
(Respondent 103).  
Two respondents mentioned it in the context of being used in money laundering risk 
assessment with “you may evaluate the AML risk by accepting clients from highly 
corrupted countries. It affects your customer acceptance policy” (Respondent 160) 
and “Provides you with the overall rating of the country with regard to corruption 
status and anti money laundering regulations in a particular country so that when you 
are completing your checks on the routing of funds on a transaction you are aware of 
certain risk” (Respondent 60).  
Disadvantages of TI’s CPI 
Respondents were then asked what they thought the disadvantages were of using the 
index. India (n=5), UAE (n=2), UK & NI (n=4), USA (n=2) and Other (n=3) all 
indicated that there were no disadvantages, or none that they were aware of; 
however, a South African respondent felt that the index:  
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… lacks an on the ground understanding of the nuances and dynamics of the 
countries ranked. In this context, it applies a top down view taken from a 
specific paradigm and cultural context that does not necessarily factor in the 
micro dynamics in a market. Major investment decisions are made according 
to TI analysis, which has the effect of skewing global economic flows and 
therefore affecting growth in the markets that need investment most. I believe 
the TI approach is out dated and results in structural disadvantages to 
investors and therefore some economies. (Respondent 132) 
A respondent from the USA said “I think the main downfall is that in each of these 
corrupt countries are individuals that are doing the right thing in their daily life but 
are burdened by the label on their country” (Respondent 18).  Another from the USA 
advised “When countries unearth and tackle corruption, their score goes down 
instead of up” (Respondent 25).  
Other Indices 
The respondents who had initially indicated that they had heard of TI’s CPI were 
also asked whether they used any other indices. Respondents from Cyprus (n=4), 
India (n=2), South Africa (n=5), UAE (n=1), UK (n=7), USA (n=4) and Other (n=4) 
all provided responses. Those listed were Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 
country reports, Trace Index, Trace Matrix, World Bank, OECD, Thomson Reuters 
Country Checker, Worldcheck, Basel AML Index, International Narcotics Control 
Strategy Report (INCSR) and an internal model.  
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The Fight Against Corruption 
The survey concluded by asking respondents whom they felt was the most 
responsible for fighting corruption. Table 33 details the responses both per country 
responses and out of the total population.  
Table 33. Strand I. Responses to the question ‘Who is the most responsible for 
fighting corruption?’ 
Country Cyprus 
N=? 
(%) 
India 
N=? 
(%) 
Pakistan 
N=? 
(%) 
South 
Africa 
N=? 
(%) 
UAE 
N=? 
(%) 
UK & NI 
N=? 
(%) 
USA 
N=? 
(%) 
Other 
N=? 
(%) 
Total plus 
% of pop. 
N=? 
(%) 
 
Everybody 15 
(79) 
25 
(89) 
8 
(57) 
12 
(80) 
8 
(73) 
17 
(81) 
25 
(71) 
24 
(80) 
134 
(77) 
National 
Govt. 
4 
(21) 
1 
(4) 
6 
(43) 
2 
(13) 
3 
(27) 
3 
(14) 
4 
(11) 
4 
(13) 
27 
(16) 
Blanks 0 2 
(7) 
0 0 0 0 4 
(11) 
0 6 
(3) 
International 
Community 
0 0 0 1 
(7) 
0 0 1 
(3) 
2 
(6) 
4 
(2) 
Commercial 
Sector 
0 0 0 0 0 1 
(5) 
0 0 1 
(<1) 
Other 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
(3) 
0 1 
(<1) 
 
The results indicated that the majority of respondents from all the countries believed 
that it is the responsibility of ‘everyone’ to fight corruption. This was followed by 
responses indicating that it was the responsibility of ‘national government’, Cyprus 
(n=4), India (n=1), Pakistan (n=6), South Africa (n=2), UAE (n=3), UK & NI (n=3), 
USA (n=4) and Other (n=4). Four responses indicated the ‘international community’, 
South Africa (n=1), USA (n=1) and Other (n=2). One response from the UK & NI 
indicated ‘commercial sector’. The one respondent from the USA who indicated 
‘other’ wrote “int'l community, and national, state, and local govts.” (Respondent 
144). There were six blanks, India (n=2) and the USA (n=4). 
Summary of Strand I Results 
In examining the similarities and differences in the perception of corruption, the 
main key term identified was ‘bribery’. It was clear that there was some 
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understanding of what constitutes a corrupt act along with the fact that it can be used 
as an umbrella term for a number of offences, for example, fraud and money 
laundering. It was evident that the sample population knew the difference between a 
bribe and facilitation payments.  
The most popular factor, which was mentioned across all countries that influenced 
the level of corruption was ‘poverty/economy’ followed by ‘Lack/Weak 
Law/Regulation/Governance’. Other factors identified were ‘lack of punishment’, 
‘greed’ and ‘education’. These are all factors that effect society to varying degrees 
and as there is no single factor influencing the levels of corruption preventative 
strategies therefore have to be multi-faceted and rely heavily on governments, who 
themselves maybe corrupt which poses numerous challenges in low transparent 
countries.  
The majority (n=125/74%) of the sample population in Strand I had heard of TI CPI 
with it most common use known to be a contributor to risk assessments for clients or 
jurisdictions. Slightly concerning was the fact that it was stated that a Bank may use 
it as part of the customer acceptance policy which potentially run’s the risk of social 
exclusion or investment decision. This use could have a devastating impact on a 
society in a low transparency country.   
This chapter concludes the reporting on the results from the anonymous survey in 
Strand I. The following chapter outlines the results from Strand II, the face-to-face 
interviews with the Anti-Bribery & Corruption specialists and, through analysis, 
draws out the common themes that are similar to those identified in the other 
Strands, or any significant variances.  
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Chapter 11 – Strand II Results  
This chapter reports on the results from Strand II, the 10 face-to-face interviews with 
the Anti-Bribery & Corruption specialists for this research. It should be noted that 
the participants were all employed in the UK and although a number of them have 
given examples relating to other countries, the answers predominantly relate to a UK 
perspective. The layout of this chapter is similar in structure to the reporting of the 
results from Strand I and covers: the participants’ views on the definition of 
corruption; the difference between bribery and facilitation payments; bribe paying in 
the UK; who they felt was the worst offender in a bribery transaction; the 
justification of certain scenarios; susceptibility of corruption, effects of corruption; 
and their views on the advantages and disadvantages of TI’s CPI. Each participant 
was assigned a numbered 1 through to 10, which has been used to attribute the 
quotes to the respective participant. 
Strand II Definition of Corruption 
The participants were asked to give three examples of what they regarded as 
corruption. Thematic analysis was conducted on the responses to draw out theme 
words or phrases. Table 34 lists the 14 themes identified and the number of 
participants who mentioned it, along with the frequency.  
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Table 34. Strand II. Examples of corruption 
Categories Number of 
Participants 
Number of 
Occurrences 
Government Official/Public Official 9 13 
Personal gain/Own means 4 6 
Gifts/Entertainment/Money/other 
benefits/advantage 
4 6 
Position of Power/Authority 4 5 
Obtain/Retain business 4 4 
Collusion 2 4 
Abuse of position 3 3 
Improper performance 1 3 
Facilitation Payments 2 2 
Favourable outcome 2 2 
Corruption Banner/Umbrella 2 2 
Unfairly/Unfair 2 2 
Offer/Receipt of a benefit 1 1 
Bribe 1 1 
 
‘Government/Public Official’ was mentioned by nine of the 10 participants and it 
was referenced 13 times, indicating that some participants mentioned it more than 
once. Its reference was in the context of giving/obtaining an advantage (Participants 
1 and 10), by way of money (Participants 1, 3, 4 and 7), entertainment (Participants 1 
and 5) or other benefit (Participants 1 and 10) to a public official (Participants 2, 3, 
5, 6, 7 and 10) in order to “achieve favourable outcome in law” (Participant 1); to 
win/award contracts/business (Participants 1, 2 and 3); obtain permits and licences 
(Participant 6); “get utilities switched on, obtain planning permission” or “trying to 
get a public process speeded up” (Participant 10). Participants 1 and 2 described 
corruption as a ‘banner’ or  ‘umbrella’ term for improper performance for personal 
gain. Participants 1 and 7 both mentioned facilitation payments; Participant 1 stated 
they fell under the “corruption banner” and Participant 7 mentioned them in the 
context of paying government officials extra money to go straight to the front of a 
queue when arriving at an airport.  
In relation to corruption outside of the ‘government’ Participants 3 and 5 put it into 
context mentioning ‘collusion’ and ‘price fixing’ by firms or, as Participant 3 put it, 
“fixing benchmark rates within a bank”. Other clear examples given were: “asking 
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for bribes…to get access to hospitals, schools” (Participant 4); “corruption of big 
sporting bodies – FIFA” (Participant 5); “police corruption and potential 
miscarriages of justice” (Participant 6); and to “pay a doctor” (Participant 10). 
Participant 9 added, “I think about situations that in some countries are very relevant; 
it’s something that is within a culture to pay to obtain what you want”.    
Strand II - Bribery v Facilitation Payments 
Participants 1, 4, 7, 9 and 10 made a point of saying that a facilitation payment was 
either a form of bribe or that there was not much difference. Participant 10 stated that 
from “a UK perspective, a facilitation payment is a bribe”, going on to point out that 
“obviously, the US distinguishes between the two”. They explained that “whilst a 
facilitation payment essentially is a small or nominal payment in order to speed up a 
process in relation to when you are actually entitled to the output from that process 
but the exception within the US is quite specific, and it still restricts you obtaining a 
business advantage by making that facilitation payment”. They believed that in their 
organisation, and within most global organisations “they tend not to make the 
distinction between it as it causes too much confusion”.  
With regards to Participant 10’s reference to facilitation payments essentially being a 
small or nominal payment in order to speed up a process, Participant 9 thought that 
“the amount and the reasoning behind it would make the difference”. They explained 
that a facilitation payment was to “speed up a process that will get there in the end 
anyway”. Participants 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 all made reference to the fact that a 
facilitation payment was to ‘speed up’ a process or ‘expedite’ a service, with 
Participant 8 actually calling it a “grease payment”. All participants acknowledged 
that there was already a service on hand or a process in existence that someone 
should be doing. In contrast, as Participant 3 stated “a bribe is where someone is 
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given something of value in order to do something that they shouldn’t do; so an 
improper function”, supported by Participant 8 who stated “a bribe I would see more 
to get someone to do something that they wouldn’t ordinarily do as part of their 
duty”.  
Participants 1, 2, 4, 6 and 7 all made reference to a Public/Government Official when 
providing examples to explain the difference between a bribe and a facilitation 
payment. Participant 4 stated that a facilitation payment was “making a payment to a 
Government Official in order for them to either perform a service or speed up a 
service”. Participant 5 relied on a previous answer given to explain a bribe by saying 
“a bribe can be any advantage, be it from a payment and all those other examples I 
gave, to encourage someone to act improperly”. Participant 5 included “work 
experience” for a son or daughter, or through “entertainment provided” as other 
advantages.  
Strand II – Bribe Paying in the UK  
Government/Public Sector Bribes  
Participants 7, 8, 9 and 10 were not convinced that bribe paying was a common 
practice in the UK, or that if it did occur then it was not as “in your face…like other 
countries” (Participant 9) and probably “fairly limited” (Participant 10). However, 
Participant 7, although not regarding bribery as a big part of UK culture, stated that it 
“probably happened” and mentioned several cases that had been published in the 
media. The first example they provided was the MPs’ expenses payment scandal, but 
when pressed concluded that it was more corruption than bribe paying. They then 
mentioned the case of Munir Patel the first person to be convicted in November 
2011, under the UK Bribery Act 2010. He had been a Magistrates Court Clerk and 
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was taking £500 to avoid putting details of traffic summons on a court database. The 
prosecution believed that Patel had earned at least £20,000 by helping 53 offenders 
(BBC, 2011). Participant 3 stated that they thought it happened where “public 
officials are potentially wined and dined by various lobbying groups”. Participant 10 
advised that in their personal life they had not had “a single situation in the UK” 
although they had a lot of exposure to bribery and corruption in high-risk 
jurisdictions. Participant 1 thought it was “largely in the public sector, in terms of 
winning, being awarded contracts”, and although Participant 2 mentioned bribes to 
public officials they stated that it happened “in all contexts”.     
Commercial Sector Bribes 
Participant 2 felt that bribe paying occurred in the UK when “made from the 
commercial side to private corporations”. Both Participants 3 and 5 mentioned that 
they thought it was common in the construction industry “during the bidding 
process” (Participant 3), particularly where firms were bribing the councils to win 
contracts. Participant 5 mentioned that there were Scottish cases where this had 
happened. Other sectors mentioned were “facilities management services”, “self-
employed building contractors” (Participant 5), and “hospitality industry” 
(Participant 6). Thinking wider than just within the UK, the context of UK firms 
paying bribes abroad was discussed with specific reference to developing countries 
“to obtain and retain business” (Participant 4). Participant 10 advised that they were 
“aware of employees in organisations being attempted to be bribed by clients in 
order for the clients to gain some sort of advantage”. It was put forward that British 
charities, when working abroad, would be exposed to facilitation payments and other 
kinds of bribes (Participant 6).  
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Strand II – Making Facilitation Payments in the UK 
The general consensus was that facilitation payments were not at all common in the 
UK. However, it was felt that the UK was not isolated from bribery activity 
(Participant 2) and although they may not be paid in a formal way “favours are given 
to local council staff to speed up an application” (Participant 3). A couple of the 
participants, whilst having never been exposed to facilitation payments in the UK, 
believed that it must happen at “ports…to offload…cargo” (Participant 2) or “at 
some level underground” (Participant 6). Although they believed it could potentially 
happen, Participant 9 was unable to provide an example.  
Strand II - Background and Culture  
All participants believed that someone’s background and culture shaped their view 
of corruption to varying degrees. When talking about background and culture it was 
said that they were “intertwined” (Participant 5). Background was defined as 
personal experience through parents, schools attended, peer groups and friends. 
Culture was viewed as exposure to the wider environment (Participant 6). 
Upbringing (Participants 8 and 9), education (Participant 4), schooling and parents 
(Participant 6), ethics (Participant 1), social norms and morals (Participant 6), society 
and environment (Participants 6 and 7) will all influence (Participants 6 and 10), 
views of corruption. These factors drive understanding of fairness (Participants 3 and 
5) and set the “barometer” (Participant 5) as to whether things are right or wrong 
(Participants 5 and 6). If culturally certain behaviour is deemed acceptable 
(Participants 8 and 9) or it is the way business is done (Participants 3, 4 and 7) “it’s a 
good chance that you’ll take that forward into your professional life as a way that 
business can take place” (Participant 9). “If this is all that you have seen in your 
country, then why believe that it is wrong?” (Participant 8). It was felt that unless 
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“you are re-educated, or made to adhere to legislation or to behave in a different 
manner, then you are going to continue with that you know and what you have been 
brought up on” (Participant 9).  
There was a distinction between developed and developing countries with some 
examples being provided. Those living in poverty in a developing world, who may 
have witnessed aid coming into the country and being pocketed by a few extremely 
wealthy individuals, would have a strong view on corruption (Participant 5). It was 
felt that in the UK it was known what a bribe was and that it was no longer a 
common practice. In contrast, in the Middle East, it was accepted as part of the 
culture that gifts were provided to clients (Participant 4). One participant advised 
that in Romania it was accepted that bribe paying was just part of normal society and 
it was not viewed as corruption. They gave the example of when a person has to pay 
a bribe to someone simply to use the library, or to a nurse to administer an injection 
to a family member, it became endemic and was part of everyday life (Participant 3). 
If it is the case “that you pay for these types of services or that it is almost expected 
that you give a government official something to grease the wheel or just speed 
something up, then people in these countries may not consider that it is out of the 
ordinary, it is just how things get done” (Participant 7). One participant drew on a 
personal experience where they had interacted with a senior business person in India. 
They had recently moved house and advised that they had made a number of 
unofficial payments to get basic utilities switched on. The senior manager’s 
challenge was raising awareness with his staff because whilst they experienced this 
on a day-to-day basis in their domestic life, it was completely unacceptable when 
working in a global organisation (Participant 7).  
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It was clear from the comments made by the participants that individual background 
and culture does influence and shape the way corruption was viewed. Background 
being upbringing, education and family circle, and culture being society’s norms and 
environmental exposure. If corruption is an everyday event then it becomes part of 
the norm of society and passes without question.   
Strand II - Who is the Worse Offender?  
To understand which party was the worse offender in a bribery transaction, 
participants were given options: giver; receiver; both; neither; unclear, and asked to 
chose. Table 35, outlines the responses.  
Table 35. Strand II. Responses to the question ‘If you consider bribery is wrong, 
which party do you think is the worst offender; the giver, the receiver, both or 
neither?’ 
 Giver Receiver Both Neither Unclear 
Participants 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8 and 9 0 0 X 0 0 
Participants 6, 7 and 10 0 0 0 0 X 
 
Although the majority of the participants initially advised that both parties to a bribe 
transaction were to blame, upon further discussion it became clear that it was 
dependent upon the situation. To determine which party was the worse offender the 
reason for the exchange had to be understood. Participant 7 stated that it was context 
dependent, pointing out that with facilitation payments in some cases it would be the 
giver and in others it would be the receiver. In relation to bribe paying they gave an 
example of where the giver was the worse offence, in the instance of a large 
multinational firm giving a bribe to a government official. Participant 10 advised that 
it was dependent on the circumstances; however, “in the situation of public officials 
who are looking after the public purse and who are making decisions for the good of 
their country, frequently when it’s public officials involved, I would put more blame 
on them”. Participant 3 agreed with this because “the person in power obviously has 
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a greater responsibility to the people who are worse impacted”; however, they did 
say that the “person offering the bribe will typically know they’re doing something 
wrong…”. Participant 3 was reminded of their Romanian example in relation to 
having to pay to go into a library and asked whether both parties were equally at 
fault. They advised that they were not, and when answering this question, their 
thinking was more in the context of “a commercial tendering process”. The “position 
of responsibility” was mentioned by Participant 8 and they indicated ‘both’, adding 
“the giver because they are…orchestrating that illegal activity” and the receiver 
because “they’re in a position of responsibility and without them agreeing to it, the 
actual impact of it and the event of it happening wouldn’t take place”. Another 
participant who indicated ‘both’ was Participant 2; however, they advised that to 
“eradicate it, then potentially punishing the receiver could be more beneficial”. 
Participant 5 came up with an interesting comparison where they explained that they 
had heard lots of views of going for the drug dealer rather than the user; however, 
they felt that in the bribe scenario “both are complicit”. In complete contrast, 
Participant 6 empathised with an African Minister who requested payment from a 
charity whilst being on site at a clean water project. They explained that although 
both parties were in the wrong, they felt that because the Minister did not have much 
money, they could not attribute blame to him for behaving in this manner. 
Participant 8 felt something similar in a facilitation payment scenario. They put the 
emphasis on the person requesting the payment and “a degree of understanding on 
the person paying it…” as they would be “…financially penalised unless they play 
by the rules that the person’s setting”.     
It is evident from the participants’ answers that to apportion blame to a party in a 
bribe transaction or to determine who is the worse offender is context dependant. 
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Where public officials are involved they are viewed as being the worse offender due 
to the level of responsibility they hold, in the context of facilitation payments; 
however, where there is a high value commercial bribe, although both parties are 
viewed as being in the wrong, the giver is the worse offender.    
Strand II – Which is the Most Corrupt Sector? 
Participants were asked whether they thought one sector was more corrupt than 
another with the options being government/public sector; private sector; non-
government organisations and don’t know. Table 36 outlines their responses.  
Table 36. Strand II. The most corrupt sector  
 Government/Public Sector Private Sector 
Non-Government 
Organisations Don’t Know 
Participants 2, 4, 5, 6, 8 X X X - 
Participant 9 X X - - 
Participant 1 X - - - 
Participant 7 - X - - 
Participants 3, 10 - - - X 
 
Participants 2, 4, 5, 6 and 8 all indicated that corruption was likely to be across all 
three sectors. People can sometimes stereotype and this can be dangerous as there is 
“opportunity and the incentive across the board” (Participant 2) with the 
“government and private sector” being “on par with each other and actually some of 
them would be interlinked” (Participant 4). As for NGOs they believed it was 
“definitely happening,” (Participant 4) although there is a lack of awareness of it 
because of the limited transparency. They felt this was due to the very nature of their 
work and the countries they were exposed to. Participant 4 advised that they had read 
that it was not in a charity’s interest to be completely transparent because if they 
divulged what really occurred then people may not contribute. Although it was felt 
that corruption occurred in NGOs the general consensus was that it prevailed in the 
public and private sector. Participant 6, in indicating that it occurred across all 
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sectors, stated that even though the UN undertakes a lot of anti-bribery and 
corruption work “they’re one of the most corrupt organisations”. When subsequently 
directing their answer to the private sector, they advised that they had read stories 
about pharmaceutical companies and telecom organisations being involved in 
corruption.   
Participant 9’s previous experience in the construction sector brought them to the 
conclusion that corruption was worse in the government and public sector. They 
advised that this was where the most scandals occurred involving publically owned 
businesses. When discussed further, they agreed that it could also depend on the 
actual size of the private sector, as a lot of UK construction firms are privately 
owned, so they concluded that corruption occurred in both.  
Participant 1 advised that they thought it was more prevalent in the public sector 
stating, “there’s greater economic rent”. They explained this in the context that there 
are more opportunities through “control over contracts, public funds that can be 
attractive to corruption.” It can also depend on the jurisdiction. As bribery and 
corruption becomes more high profile, due to the involvement of global companies 
wanting to win contracts, this has led to the escalation of “the levels of bribes and the 
values of the contracts involved and overall the whole issue of corruption connecting 
big Western companies with public officials in high risk jurisdictions” (Participant 
10).  
The more that sectors interact with each other the risk of bribery and corruption 
increases, and the desire for the ‘ruthless’ (Participant 7) private sector to expand 
brings them into contact with the government sector and, depending on the 
jurisdiction, the level of corruption. NGOs are not exempt from this exposure; 
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however, due to the nature of their work, it was felt that corruption is worse in the 
other sectors.   
Strand II – Susceptibility of Corruption  
Participants 3 and 9 singled out the construction sector. Participant 3 advised that as 
well as published typologies they would rely on personal experience in reaching this 
conclusion. They explained that whilst working in the construction sector in their 
family business “the person in charge of deciding who would win a tender was taken 
out for golfing days by one of the bidding companies or alleged to have taken 
payments.”  Participant 9 advised that they had come to this conclusion from news 
stories they had read and because “the biggest sort of mandates that you would have 
are in the construction industry.”  
The remaining participants felt to varying degrees that the oil and gas sector or those 
in the extractive industry were more susceptible to corruption because of “the 
awarding and winning of the licences and the impact on the environment” 
(Participant 2). Participant 10, having confirmed that they had come to this 
conclusion with regards to oil and gas because “where they operate are frequently 
very high risk jurisdictions…and also they’re countries where oil and gas reserves 
tend to be owned by public state-owned entities” they then mentioned the 
pharmaceuticals sector advising that it appeared to be “a historical thing about how 
they actually go about persuading doctors and hospitals” and mentioned “they’ve 
had a reputation…of excessive and lavish entertaining”. In relation to the banking 
sector, two participants (Participants 4 and 6) commented on the fact that they felt 
that corruption was less likely due to the fact “it’s probably the most regulated area”. 
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Strand II - Effects of Corruption 
The majority of participants provided three examples of the effects of corruption 
from which the following themes were observed. Four participants (Participants 1, 2, 
3 and 4) mentioned the fact that corruption can undermine the competitiveness of 
markets or limit competition. It undermines trust or reduces respect (Participants 1, 
4, 7 and 9) and “it makes everybody a bit cynical when it comes to the Government 
and any announcements. Even if you look at the expenses scandal…it just 
undermines people’s trust in all kinds of frameworks and organisations” (Participant 
1). “It erodes trust” (Participant 7) and “undermines the rule of law” (Participants 3 
and 5). Other overlapping ‘effects’ mentioned were that it makes things unfair 
(Participant 6) due to there not being a “level playing field” (Participant 3), “deprives 
society” (Participant 5), was “bad for the economy” (Participant 9), and had a 
“detrimental effect on the poor” (Participant 10), especially in places such as Africa 
where governments were taking “a fairly big cut of what should actually be money 
going to the public services” (Participant 10) and it “costs lives” (Participant 4).  
Strand II – The Most Serious Phenomenon in the UK  
Many different factors affect the UK; however, whether one is more serious than 
another is a question that warranted consideration. Participants were asked what they 
thought was the most serious phenomenon in the UK. Table 37 outlines the 
responses.  
Table 37. Strand II. ‘In the UK, what do you think is the most serious phenomenon?’ 
Participant 1 2 3 4 5 
Phenomenon 
Corruption Organised Crime 
Social 
Inequality Crime Total Disharmony 
Participant 6 7 8 9 10 
Phenomenon Housing 
Crisis Immigration Immigration Unemployment Brexit 
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Participant 1 stated that ‘corruption’ was the most serious phenomenon because, 
going back to one of their previous statements, they said, “I think it negatively 
touches every part of our lives all the time”. They explained that by preventing 
corruption we would address all the other social issues as listed. Participant 3’s 
response of  “social inequality” was explained as having a “number of causes,” and 
they stated that corruption was “part of that”, giving examples of embedding elites 
through “favours given, revolving doors,” followed by the example of wealthy 
parents paying for private education, therefore from the child’s perspective, “that 
person obviously has a much better chance in life”. As “healthcare” and “the rule of 
law” were of a better standard in the UK than other places in the world, they felt that 
“fairness and equality” would be “the next big issue to resolve”. 
Participants 5, 7, 8 and 10 discussed Brexit in order to rationalise the phenomenon 
they had decided on. Participant 7 felt that there was a perception by people in the 
UK that immigration was the most serious phenomenon; however, they articulated 
their reasons as to why they felt it was not “out of control” and that “there’s a gap we 
need to close,” in relation to people’s understanding. Participant 8 had a different 
view, believing that it was an issue. They explained that over the last ten or twenty 
years, because of the increase of immigration it had, “had collateral damage in 
relation to housing and ….the NHS”. They went on to discuss the fact that they felt it 
had shaped communities including “people’s views and opinions” and “changed 
certain towns beyond recognition” along with “disharmony in terms of the whole 
country, post Brexit” (Participant 5).  
Participant 2 advised that they thought the most serious issue was “organised crime” 
because they did not think “we do a very good job of actually articulating how it’s 
playing out in this country” and that it appeared in the media in the same way as 
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“binge drinking and the violence in town centres”. Participant 4 concluded with 
“crime” although they also stated “climate change is pretty serious and then 
obviously weak economy”. 
The participants were asked whether they thought corruption was an issue that 
needed tackling. All agreed that it was an issue that needed tackling globally; 
however, Participant 7 did not think it was the top issue in the UK or even in “the top 
three” although they did say that it should always be on the “agenda”. This thinking 
was in contrast to Participant 3 who mentioned the MPs’ expenses scandal, advising 
that they were “personally surprised that it was so endemic”. They went on to say 
that with all the “checks and balances we have in the UK society, that (corruption) 
couldn’t persist but it seems like it could”. They did not believe that corruption could 
ever “be eradicated” in the UK and that it would not “materially reduce” for “at least 
the next hundred years because behaviours are so well entrenched and so 
traditional”. They stated that they had “little confidence in the efficacy of our 
independent bodies to root out corruption”. Participant 8 advised that they thought, 
“a lot of it is around geographies… where the cultures are, but if it’s closely linked 
to greed, which it is, it exists everywhere”.  
Strand II – Tackling Corruption 
The participants were asked what could be undertaken to tackle corruption and what 
they thought was the most effective way in tackling corruption. Four participants 
(Participants 1, 3, 4 and 7) made reference to ‘transparency’. Participant 1 said that 
“a lot of corrupt acts are incentivised” so “making everything as transparent as 
possible, remunerating people properly” would assist. They advised on “paying civil 
servants more” and having “proper checks and balances”. Participant 3 discussed the 
point of publishing earnings and “private interest” for the people who held public 
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office and this should be across the board, not just those in senior positions. This 
should also count for “tendering processes, even if they’re fully private sector”. 
Participant 4 also mentioned this in the context of “knowing what political leaders 
are spending…builds trust”. Participant 7 stated that there was “very little visibility 
into what happens to those public officials that have been involved in …bribery”. 
This was said in the context whereby a corporate is fined for bribery but no one 
knows what happened to the other side.  
Another common theme that was extracted was the term ‘awareness’ with five 
participants (Participants 1, 2, 4, 8 and 9) mentioning this. Corruption could be dealt 
with by “calling it out” (Participant 1) and through the “media” (Participants 2 and 
4). To be effective “it needs to start making the headlines more materially, but also 
in bringing it to life so people fully understand the consequences of it” (Participant 
2). Participant 4 discussed raising awareness of the enforcement actions taken, which 
would act as a deterrent. When asked whether they meant through the media they 
advised “more media, exactly, definitely 100%”. When Participant 8 mentioned 
‘awareness’, they put this in the context of “education and training, awareness”. 
They also mentioned “strong governance, like you need a stick – so legislation, 
regulatory oversight, sanction”. When questioned about governance they were asked 
where the oversight would come from if each country had its own political elite. 
They responded by advising “there needs to be an independent corruption 
commission that has short tenures in place so it doesn’t get embedded within there”. 
Although Participant 9 did not specifically state ‘awareness’, they did mention 
“communication” and that it should be delivered in  “a clear way” to include “what 
corruption is, what bribery is, what are the effects of it with clear numbers and 
situations and what the effects are on the economy”.  
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Other comments made by the participants to tackle corruption included “collective 
actions … everyone needs to come to the table” (Participant 2). Both Participants 5 
and 6 mentioned proactive investigations rather than policing those who are trying to 
do the right thing. This was in the context of the fact that bribes would not be found 
in a company’s gifts and entertainment register. Companies should be doing more 
with big data analysis (Participant 5). Participant 6 said that they did not consider 
that “investigators are very proactive”. They referenced the FBI and the SFO, 
advising that they rely “on companies to do most of the work for them”. They also 
mentioned that there should be similar financial sanctions to those that are in place 
for “terrorist financing”. Participant 7, apart from mentioning ‘transparency,’ also 
stated that “government officials and multinational firm execs and employees” 
should be put in jail. Participant 10 mentioned that “outside the UK…there’s a lot 
more countries, especially western countries, where they need to catch up on the 
OECD requirements”. Examples put forward of progress included the new French 
legislation and India’s effort with new legislation and public officials being 
prosecuted as being positive steps (Participant 10).  
Strand II - Measuring Corruption 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index 
Advantages 
All participants had heard of TI’s CPI with the majority stating that it was some form 
of risk indicator. Participant 1 said that it gave a good indication of those countries 
where “work” was needed to get them to a “kind of standard”. They caveated this 
with the fact that they did not want to say  “western standards, but the standards that 
Transparency International promote.” Two participants (Participants 5 and 10) 
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advised that it was an “industry standard” risk indicator and that it was “a reasonably 
independent measure, through a published methodology” (Participant 3). Participant 
8 said that “it allows people to use it as a basis for assessing country risk…it’s 
refreshed every year…it seems to be globally acceptable” and it could potentially 
“…identify areas for support and help”. 
Disadvantages 
The general consensus of the participants was that there were limitations, 
inaccuracies and the methodology was not clear. Participant 4 advised that “it’s not 
entirely accurate…and some countries aren’t even on it” and Participant 10 
mentioned “obviously there’s inaccuracies from the point of view that they can only 
report on what they know”. Participant 7 asked how accurate was it in relation to 
measuring corruption because it was “based on perception”. They came to the 
conclusion that as it only looked at the public sector, the full picture was missing.  
Countries move down the list as they start to prosecute more for corruption, which 
was potentially a sign that the country was “doing more about it” (Participant 10). If 
used as “an industry standard risk map…people have to appreciate its limitations” 
(Participant 5).  
Participants 1, 3, and 6 all mentioned the methodology, with Participant 1 saying 
“…there are limitations on how those countries have been ranked” as the information 
was gathered by way of survey, interviews and perception and that this presents 
challenges “to get a clear measurement of corruption because it is so opaque” 
Participant 3, when discussing the methodology, had the same view and said that 
“the CPI itself is just built up of other surveys and the underlying 
methodologies…opaque at best” and that because of the lack of transparency with 
 168 
the methodology “…it’s a highly westernised viewpoint of corruption and doesn’t 
necessarily consider cultural factors, for example…where corruption is highly 
culture dependent”. “It’s biased” (Participant 6) because the surveys were completed 
at the “top” of organisations by those who potentially would not have many 
experiences of corruption.  
It “serves a purpose, as long as it’s used in combination with other measures and 
other assessments” (Participant 2) in relation to financial institutions using it within 
their risk assessments; however, “from an everyday person’s perspective, …it might 
actually cause more damage than good” as it could be regarded as “throwing [it] in 
the faces of some countries that are trying very hard to address their issues but it 
doesn’t necessarily show any recognition of that” (Participant 2). 
Both Participants 8 and 9 discussed the reduction of investment in certain countries 
due to where there were ranked. “It could stigmatise countries. It could hold back 
their development investment in their countries” (Participant 8), therefore “it exposes 
these countries to the lack of investment” (Participant 9). 
Summary of Strand II Results 
The participants in Strand II drew on their experiences from their day-to-day roles 
and having highlighted corruption in the ‘government’ discussed it outside of this 
sector along the lines of ‘price fixing’ and corruption in sport. They made a clear 
distinction between a ‘bribe’ and ‘facilitation payments’ advising that from a UK 
legislative perspective a facilitation payment was considered a bribe; however, this 
was not the case in all countries.  
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The participants highlighted the different experiences of corruption in a developed 
and developing country outlining a number of challenges in poorer, (low 
transparency) country; for example, having to change the views of society where 
corruption is considered a necessary evil, the norm. It was also stated that challenges 
exist in countries where there is a culture of gift giving as one would have to 
understand the intention of the ‘giver’.  
All participants had heard of TI CPI with a number advising that it was an ‘industry 
standard’ and ‘globally accepted’ when used in assessing risk; however, the general 
consensus was that there were limitations, inaccuracies and the methodology as to 
how it was compiled was not clear.  
This chapter has reported on the results from Strand II, obtained from 10 face to face 
interviews with Anti-Bribery & Corruption specialists employed within the UK 
financial services sector. The next chapter will report on the results obtained from 
Strand III, the focus groups.  
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Chapter 12 – Strand III Results  
This chapter details the results of the three focus groups. For ease of attributing the 
relevant quotes from each of the groups within the text, they will each receive their 
own designation. FG1 refers to the focus group session held in Hong Kong; FG2 
refers to the India focus group and FG3 refers to the focus group held in Mexico.   
Strand III – The Meaning of Corruption 
Corruption is the “giving [of] some benefit to others to maybe get some advantage 
over certain issues or projects which will result in unfair outcome to others” (FG1). 
It is carried out by “individuals, or groups, using their power or position to their own 
advantage or to an advantage for a group” (FG2). Broadly speaking it is the “illegal 
way to get something that is needed” (FG3) again “using one’s own power in an 
illicit way” (FG3) or “someone who’s got authority” (FG2). It has been agreed that it 
can be made up of “grease payments” (FG2) meaning that it is “greasing the wheel” 
of bureaucracy through the offering of “hospitality” (FG2), “bribery and gift giving” 
(FG2), a “favour or (something of) a monetary value” (FG1), “including money” 
(FG3). A person tries to “influence” (FG2) a decision or process. It can be “the use 
of public funds towards somebody’s personal benefit, and that could mean 
somebody in Government or somebody in a public capacity where they use funds 
that are meant for the public as a whole for their personal use” (FG1).  
Unfortunately, in some countries, “it’s more like a way of life or a way to get 
something and without corruption, you can’t get some stuff” (FG3) especially in 
Mexico. It “affects the fairness of the competition” (FG1). The reason it is hard to 
combat “is that all the officials or the people that we know are corrupt, they are not 
prosecuted” (FG3). It is felt that there is “impunity” (FG3) in some countries; 
therefore it “encourages other people to go and be corrupt because they know that 
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they will get rich” (FG3). Examples of corruption included election funding in the 
US and where an “advanced country” (FG2) like “the US or France” (FG2) were 
using an agent as a facilitator to sell arms to “India or some other country” (FG2). 
This was viewed as corruption at a very high level. There is “on the 
street…corruption” (FG2) in India; however, it is felt that advanced countries have 
“mastered the art of corruption and camouflaging the corruption through other 
smaller ones…they put on a coat and a tie and make it look a more sophisticated 
corruption” (FG2) to the point that through “camouflaging corruption” (FG2) the G8 
or G20 countries were preventing developing countries from exporting certain items.  
Strand III - Culture/Background Shaping Views of Corruption 
Hong Kong  
The Group agreed that personal background shapes the way you view corruption. 
The discussion went down the lines of relationships in China, both in the 
Government and the Private sector, and that relationships were very important. One 
respondent advised that when forming and maintaining relationships “it is very 
common to give some benefits”, highlighting that it was especially prevalent during 
the “festival or some important dates, but they will not regard this as corruption”. 
The attendee who raised this was asked whether they personally thought it was 
corruption and replied “in some sense, I think it is because they can get some 
advantage in some special things; it just occasionally happens”. Expanding on 
cultural friendship, networks or ‘Guanxi’, an example given was that of a big 
electronics company in the 90s in China that established sales channels for 
themselves and other retailers. So that the retailers had enough stock for themselves 
they would establish a close relationship with the sales department in that company 
by giving them some benefits. The attendee regarded this as corruption as one 
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retailer may receive more stock than another retailer and advised that in China it is 
very common to establish such relationships.  
It was considered that background was important, particularly from an Asian 
perspective in the context of relationships that grow over time. The younger 
generation adopt this as a business practice and they realise “…very, very early in 
life that if you don’t fall in line, you basically don’t get enough business or you fall 
out of favour”. This is how it had been for them growing up in Asia. It starts by 
“giving a fiver to a traffic policemen” this grows and becomes the way of thinking 
and the norm of life. It moves on to the point that if you need a building permit, you 
pay a bit more, then if you need electricity connecting, you pay a little more and if 
you want retail supplies you pay a little more. “It’s almost a way of life” (FG1).  
In Hong Kong one of the group had “never felt challenged that I need to be a part of 
something like that”. This was their personal experience and it had not occurred 
when buying a house or applying for a job. The whole Group agreed. An attendee 
felt that historically it had been worse in the villages than in the city of Hong Kong. 
An example given was of their parents travelling to Indonesia and having to put 
money in their passport to give to customs even though they had a proper visa. The 
Group concurred with this example and when asked if they had experienced 
something similar, one attendee advised that this was common in Cambodia today, 
where customs ask for payment. One attendee stated that travel agencies advise that 
when travelling to Indonesia, money should be presented to customs officials along 
with the passport in order to progress, otherwise delays will ensue.  
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India 
It was put to the Group that the South African Prime Minster had said that corruption 
was a western phenomenon and that it did not occur in South Africa. Culture and 
background was discussed with ‘background’ being defined as one’s upbringing, 
education and religion, and ‘culture’ was defined as what happens in a certain 
country, which could also include religion. The Group was asked whether they 
thought ‘culture’ had a bearing on individual perceptions of corruption.    
One attendee considered there was a difference between modern and historic culture 
and that differentiating between the two would result in a lengthy discussion. They 
explained that in today’s environment the word ‘culture’ would mean “existing as 
practice (in India) today”. They gave the example of “tipping off a government 
official” as being corruption, along with “somebody to get an advantage over a long 
queue”. It was the “acceptability in society of such practices would mean culture” 
and “culturally, it is acceptable to many people in this (Indian) society because they 
adopt it and practice it”. They elaborated on this point of ‘acceptability’ and 
‘cultural’ with what they said was a common example, of drivers jumping red lights 
on the roads if they did not see any traffic around, even though there is a law 
enforcement agency and everyone knows it should be stopped. The fact that drivers 
continued to do this led the attendee to conclude “so yes, it is cultural”. 
As attendees agreed on the comment of ‘culture’ and its correlation with 
‘acceptability’ one advised that “it’s okay to give a bribe as long as it’s a few 
hundred pounds”. They added that everyone would continue to do it and that it did 
not matter if the work was done faster, as long as everyone got what they wanted. 
They explained that “society as a whole does not look at it as a crime. Everyone does 
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it, so do I, and that becomes the norm.” They pointed out that it may not be 
acceptable to a western thinker, but in their ‘culture’ it is “acceptable and perfectly 
normal”.  
The discussion broadened to bring in the concept of ‘background’. One of the 
attendees said that “background and culture” were different and had nothing to do 
with each other in their country. They explained that irrespective of parental 
upbringing, schooling and religion, people would follow “the flock” at the point they 
enter society. They advised that whilst everyone, either within their respective 
organisation or their country, was doing it, then people would not mind doing it, 
even though they were taught differently at home and at school. They concluded by 
saying, “so background has no relation to it but culture of the country definitely 
has”. 
Mexico  
The Group agreed that culture and background shapes personal views of corruption 
and that it was about “el que no tranza, no avanza” (he who does not cheat, does not 
get ahead). The phrase is about going forward or moving forward by only paying 
bribes or taking money from someone. It makes life easier. Whilst growing up bribe 
paying is experienced, especially “when you are driving with alcohol”. It was about 
“education” and “family values”. “If you’ve seen small payments or corruption 
going around your normal environment and it’s customary, then it’s deemed as if it’s 
right”. There was agreement with the phrase “el que no tranza, no avanza” and that it 
was attributable to an individual’s perception as to what constitutes corruption, 
which was “dominated from the way we have absorbed from the environment”. 
Bribe paying was “common practice” in Mexico and therefore it could not be 
considered corruption. It was pointed out that “since you were a child you have seen 
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that and it’s correct, everyone does it”. However, it was acknowledged that those 
who then travel to a different country might subsequently view it as corruption.   
The Group had witnessed corruption when they were growing up. An attendee said 
“yes, definitely” and then started to explain that they felt it was also about the people 
being weak. They provided an example of a policeman accusing an individual of 
using a mobile phone whilst driving and taking advantage of the situation by asking 
for money. Rather that the person saying “show me the law or show me where it says 
that I cannot drive” they would simply pay. Another attendee talked about how 
Mexican politicians were perceived to be rich and that working for the government 
would create individual wealth. They mentioned that sometimes people were afraid 
of the police because they will take “your money or …threaten you with higher fines 
or something if you don’t give them money”. When asked whether this was actual 
practice, or merely a perception, they confirmed it “actually happens”.  
One of the Group said that they thought the “Mexican culture was somehow borne 
out of corruption”. They explained that when the Spaniards invaded they did not 
send rule followers and that as they evolved they had created a culture of “getting 
away with things the easy way”. They said that the system was so corrupt that if you 
were not corrupt you could not be part of the system.  
Strand III - Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index 
Attendees from all three groups had heard of the Index. Advantages included the fact 
that small companies could use the index to understand what to expect in another 
country, along with other sources to add to any due diligence conducted (FG1). The 
index could also be used as assist with decision-making as to whether or not to deal 
with certain countries (FG2). The index was used as a parameter in quality assurance 
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checks for government bonds and as such, people would be more conservative with 
their portfolio (FG3). It gave people awareness as to how corrupt a country was, 
which was deemed to be a positive point, as it would deliver a “worldwide 
perspective regarding Mexico” (FG3). Disadvantages were that the methodology was 
unclear to some and therefore they were unable to “vouch for the accuracy” (FG2) of 
the assessment of each country and that “it’s just a comparison index” (FG3), and 
that “not all countries are included” (FG1). It was felt to be a “vicious circle” (FG3) 
due to the fact that if investors relied on the index then they would not invest in a 
low ranking country and that consequently, no one would want to live or set up a 
business there. If the country fails to “promote” (FG3) itself properly then it would 
never move up the rankings. One attendee compared Switzerland against India, 
pointing out the parameters of “the geographical size” being huge, “the market 
conditions and the economic conditions” that “vary completely” advising that the 
index was using the “same kind of yardstick that is used against an industrialised 
western country, may not all be applicable.” They stated that this would be the same 
for any other index.  
It was put to the Mexican Group that the TI CPI ranked their country 123 out of 176 
and they were asked for their thoughts on this. One attendee said, “it’s the real thing, 
it’s happening, it’s normal”. They listed “Veracruz, Quintana Roo, Sonora” and 
stated that it was widely known that the Governors are “looked after by the 
authorities, by police based on corruption…”. An attendee added that, “being 
compared to Laos and Sierra Leone, I think that’s rough” (FG3). India’s response to 
be being ranked 76, apart from them not knowing the methodology, was that they 
could only use their own judgment to assess if things were working better in the UK 
compared to India. They felt that the ranking was “a fair assessment because of the 
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level of corruption in my own perception”. Another attendee advised that they would 
not want to remain at position 76 for long and actually went on to say that they 
would like to be ranked at 15 or 20 in two years time. The subject of TI CPI score 
continued with an attendee saying that India being at 76 and not 130 is due to the 
fact there are some parts of “a good culture”, pointing out that they are taking their 
children “in the right direction”. They thought that it would probably take some time 
to improve the situation and the “world perception that probably the Western 
countries have of India”, but that change was happening. Corruption is a social evil, 
and “the Western world has made more progress than Asia, simply because of being 
more transparent, which is why Transparency International provides a platform to 
look and learn” (FG1).  
Strand III - Impact of Corruption  
Corruption “eats away at the moral framework because the moment it gets into 
schools and it becomes a way of life… it’s incredibly hard to combat… in some 
countries in Asia” (FG1). Inequality was mentioned, due to certain circles of people 
favouring each other, thereby creating a disadvantage to outsiders, which could also 
include one country against another country. Putting people in danger was raised 
with the example of poor materials, fake licences in building projects in China and 
unfair resource allocation in societies, as those who pay more have an advantage, 
resulting in an unfair distribution of already scarce resources. Deterring innovation 
was another example put forward. This is where the highest bidder (bribe payer) 
wins the project, which will not necessarily be the most innovative or entrepreneurial 
company. As the discussion progressed an attendee mentioned “country security”, 
advising that in some Asian countries a revolution is always because of corruption 
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where society cannot take any more and tries to bring down the Government, giving 
Thailand as the example and the violence as the impact.  
In India there are two sides to corruption, the person who demands the bribe (the 
creator) and the giver, the “person who succumbs to it and has to pay it because he 
has no other way” (FG2). When someone needs a birth certificate, which is a non-
digitalised process, the official will ask for a small amount of money “50/100 
rupees” (FG2). An attendee said that they would not “rock the boat or create a 
scene…I’ll pay the 100. I know it’s incorrect. But I have not demanded the money”. 
They justified this by advising that the official was the one who demanded the 
money, there was a queue of people and they “get the job done”. “At least 90% of 
Indians” (FG2) are telling their children not to be “the creator” (FG2). One attendee 
said that “corruption gives rise to poverty”. Although they know it is wrong and they 
tell their children this “due to the prevalent practice, we have to succumb to the 
environment and we continue the practice”. Another example put forward was the 
purchasing of a driving licence by someone who cannot drive and they subsequently 
hit a pedestrian. The “impact is really, really telling” (FG2). In brief the India Group 
appeared to agree that by paying a “miniscule amount and getting it done” did not 
have a big impact; however, there was a bigger impact when considering “arms 
dealing or any other area where you’re compromising on the security of your country 
or something like that”.   
It was put to the Mexican Group that throughout the session they had continually 
mentioned corruption in the police and by government officials. They were asked 
whether they thought it also occurred in the private sector. One attendee confirmed 
that they thought it was indeed in the private sector, providing the example of 
permits in the oil sector saying, “so they are corrupt”. They talked about petrol 
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stations selling petrol without paying taxes and stated, “it’s like the culture to have 
more in an easy way. So it’s a monopoly, they have everything”. The Group was 
asked whether they thought there was corruption on the streets in Mexico. An 
example was put forward of parking a car in the street when going to a concert and 
having to pay 50 to 100 Pesos for the local people to look after it. The parking is 
free; however if payment is not made “they can scratch it”. Asked whether they had 
an example of mid level corruption, they went on to describe the process for getting 
a driving licence. They explained that it was a requirement to take a test; however, at 
present, by placing 100 Pesos between the documents and the application form, the 
test was not necessary and “here’s your driving licence. It’s from the bottom up to 
the top”. Another attendee gave an example that upon going into hospital and 
needing to be “treated correctly or good or faster, you have to pay”. They went on to 
say that if someone was dying outside and was poor, then the service would not be 
fast enough unless payment was made. This also included the need to pay for 
medicines. The Mexican Group discussed more examples of instances of corruption 
and stated that the top three most corrupt sectors in Mexico were construction, 
textiles and the pharmaceutical industries. One attendee advised that in order to win 
a public bid, it would be necessary to know someone within the government, or to 
make a payment in order to win. They stated that it would also be necessary for a 
business’s representative to take a customer out to dinner and to pay for everything 
and “maybe give a gift to a person”. Corruption can breed distrust. One of the 
Mexican attendees said that one way a change might occur was if there was a “strong 
shock to the economy, for instance, corrupt politicians show an impunity so high to 
everyone in the country and it is exposed…may produce a change which triggers the 
change of all the procedures and everything”; however, another attendee disagreed 
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and gave an example of their President and the fact that he had a big house and a lot 
of money. Reference was made to the investigation by the new anti-corruption 
attorneys and the subsequent findings that there were no conflicts of interest, that all 
the money earned had been done so legally, and that the President was innocent. 
They concluded by saying, “so it didn’t trigger anything and it only triggered the 
anger of the Mexican people”.  
Strand III - Measures to Combat Corruption 
When discussing the measures to combat corruption with the Hong Kong Group it 
was mentioned that the countries cited in previous examples e.g. Indonesia and 
Cambodia, with low paid policemen being prone to accept or even ask people to pay 
for certain things, did have laws to varying degrees. However, it was the difficulty of 
the “prosecution of” and “execution of” and these laws. If enforced and carried out 
properly then it was felt that would be an effective way of combating corruption. The 
Group said that there should be more investigations from the top of the government.  
An attendee then advised that many years ago the Government in Hong Kong paid 
high salaries to the civil servants to avoid them participating in corruption, which 
they called the “high salary review”. When clarification of this was sought the 
attendee confirmed that civil servants were paid a high salary that deterred them 
from engaging in corruption because, if caught, they would lose their well-paid job. 
It was pointed out to the Group that within the research survey the measures of 
“increase salaries of government employees” and “increase salaries for police 
officers” were presented; however, the results indicated that a high percentage of the 
respondents thought that these were ineffective measures. One attendee said that 
whilst these measures might not have been effective many years ago, due to 
economic changes, civil servants today wanted a secure, well-paid job, which was 
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more enjoyable than the commercial sector. For the civil servants to keep their job, 
they had to keep “themselves as clean”. The Hong Kong Group felt that this measure 
was effective in combating corruption. It was put to the Indian Group that the 
respondents to the research survey had indicated that to “increase salaries for 
government employees” and to “increase salaries of police officers,” were 
ineffective measures. The Group agreed with this, with one attendee saying “Greed 
has no limits. Even if you increase salaries, they will still want that tip off above”. 
Another attendee advised that the increase in salary would not compensate for the 
amount of money that a person can get through corruption. The same measure was 
put to the Mexico Group and they agreed that increasing police salaries would be a 
good measure because the police in Mexico “are very badly paid”. They could not 
think of a measure for stopping corruption at a higher level because, as they put it 
“the people that’s already in power do not look for more money in a legal way. They 
just want more power, they want more money”. 
In discussing other measures, one of the attendees mentioned the Anti-Corruption 
campaigns in China, where the Leader tries to identify other Leaders with a view of 
prosecuting them; however, it was unclear whether they felt it was effective or not. 
Others felt that there was little that could be done to lower corruption because “there 
are people who are very powerful and very rich and, of course, they can do anything 
just to have whatever they want” (FG3). A Mexican attendee explained that they 
used to be a litigator and when in court against someone who was powerful, that 
person would give money to the court. They stated that nothing could be done about 
that because these people were more powerful and they knew the judges. They said 
that it was complicated and “something cultural”.  
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An Indian NGO called 5th Pillar started a campaign where they produced a zero 
rupee note that could be downloaded from their website and handed over to 
government officials when they asked for unauthorised payments. It says ‘If anyone 
demands Bribe, give this note and report the case’ and ‘I promise to neither accept 
nor give Bribe’ with a picture of Gandhi on it. The Indian Group was asked whether 
they thought this campaign worked. One of the attendees said that this campaign 
would have only reached the “educated masses and those who really want to take 
this seriously”. The Group advised that the campaign was not particularly effective, 
mainly due to a lack of awareness by people. Furthermore the fact that giving the 
note to a government official would be “as good as saying no” which would be 
regarded as an insult and would “infuriate the person”, resulting in an even longer 
delay. 
The Indian Group was asked whether they thought that increasing resources to 
investigate corruption was an effective measure. They indicated that they did not 
think it would be, because society already knows it goes on, including the media, 
government officials and the current-investigating officers. They advised that it was 
not about “investigating and fighting it”, it was about “eliminating the root cause and 
you don’t need to increase the investigating officials for that”. 
An attendee from the Hong Kong Focus Group talked about improvements to 
processes. They did not define which processes specifically, but talked around the 
fact that people did not have the same information about the processes or framework. 
This was similar to the discussion around digitalisation with the India Focus Group. 
They had indicated that the more processes that became digitalised or automated, the 
less corruption there would be, compared to a paper based process. The India Group 
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agreed with this and also advised that they had seen changes in the government, 
which had been trying to address corruption through digitalisation. It was mentioned 
that Mexico City had developed an online database that held details of public 
officials who had been fined and/or debarred due to bribery and corruption 
misconduct. It was felt that this was good from a transparency perspective, as was 
the whistle-blowing hotline in the City, which is run by “a public official, of course” 
(FG3). On the subject of what was termed the transparency portal, it was explained 
that the details of politician’s pay scales salaries could be viewed adding to more 
transparency.  
Strand III - The Worse Offender 
The Indian Group was asked who was the worse offender in a bribe paying 
transaction. They advised that it was the ‘receiver’ because they were the one who 
was initiating and benefiting from the bribe and in most cases the ‘giver’ is forced to 
pay, being disadvantaged on both counts. If the ‘giver’ does not pay they will either 
not have the work done or there may be a delay. They felt that the ‘receiver’ was 
worse; however, the ‘giver’ was responsible but to a lesser extent. One of the 
attendees elaborated further on this by explaining that it depended on the 
circumstances between “need to have” and “greed to have”. They gave the example 
of someone who wants to purchase a piece of land and if the ‘receiver’ creates the 
situation and the ‘giver’ “succumbs to the transaction”, then the ‘receiver’ is worse; 
however, if the ‘giver’ from a greed perspective offers a bribe then they felt that the 
‘giver’ was the worse offender. This was supported by another attendee who 
considered that it was the person who created the situation of bribe paying who was 
the worse offender. This subject only arose in the Indian Focus Group, as the other 
Groups’ conversations did not take this path. This chapter has reported on the results 
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from Strand III, the three focus groups held with financial services professionals in 
Hong Kong, India and Mexico. Key themes have been drawn out of the sessions and 
grouped together or outlined as a variance to common thinking. The next chapter 
will pull together the results from Strands I, II and II to discuss the overall themes, 
and highlight the key findings.  
Summary of Strand III Results 
There was a clear understanding of corruption across the three Focus Groups. There 
was an awareness of the differences between a ‘bribe’ and ‘facilitation payments’. 
Corruption was broken down into two categories, high-level corruption; for example, 
election funding in the US and on the street corruption in India. It was felt that 
“advanced countries” (FG2) had mastered the art of corruption through sophisticated 
corruption.  
Challenges in reducing corruption in low transparency countries included the fact 
that the corrupt officials were not prosecuted, it is felt that they have immunity and 
that to get anything done you have to pay so corruption has become the norm. 
Corruption appears more pervasive in developing countries occurring at border 
checkpoints where you have to pay an official an unpublished fee for a visa and 
having to pay police officer to prevent being issued with a ticket. The police officers 
are the very people who should be upholding the law and if they are corrupt, 
individuals have nowhere to report it.  
Attendees from the three groups had heard of TI CPI with a positive point being that 
it gave people awareness as to how corrupt a country was; however, the 
methodology was unclear and not all countries were included. It was felt that there 
was a vicious circle due to the fact that if investors relied on the index then they are 
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unlikely to invest in low ranking countries, which can have a significant impact on 
economic conditions in such a country.    
This chapter has reported on the results from Strand III, the Focus Groups in Hong 
Kong, India and Mexico. This concludes the reporting of the results across the three 
Strands. The next chapter will discuss the overall findings across the Strands, 
outlining how the research objectives were met.   
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Chapter 13 - Discussion 
Introduction  
The aim of this research was to obtain a better understanding of people’s perception 
of corruption against cultural differences from a small selection of western and non-
western countries. The research also sought to obtain views as to whether corruption 
could be reduced in low transparency countries and to determine whether the use of 
TI’s CPI by the financial services sector was fair and appropriate. The aims of this 
research were achieved through the following objectives;  
1. To examine the similarities and differences in the perception of corruption 
between multiple jurisdictions. 
2.  To outline the challenges in reducing corruption in low transparency 
countries. 
3.  To produce an assessment of the impact of using TI’s CPI within the 
financial services sector.  
In order to evaluate this, the research involved an assessment of opinions, views, and 
perceptions across three strands (anonymous survey, face-to-face interviews and 
focus groups). Individuals’ understanding of corruption was examined and 
discussions where held to examine how corruption affects society through the 
exploration into real life experiences. Using three different strands of research, 
opinions were sought from individuals in a number of countries who had a varied 
degree of exposure to corruption, along with professionals who were closely 
associated with, and had responsibility for, the oversight of anti-bribery and 
corruption strategies in the financial services sector.   
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The data presented within this thesis has provided invaluable insight into 
individuals’ understanding of corruption, their experiences, and on the ground views 
as to how to deal with this phenomenon, drawing on opinions from a broad, diverse, 
sample population across different ages, gender and nationalities. Very little cross-
country research at such a granular level has previously been conducted especially 
drawing on the opinions of the Anti-Bribery & Corruption Specialists; therefore, this 
study will raise awareness by providing examples that demonstrate where corruption 
occurs, and by articulating the challenges cultural differences pose when 
endeavouring to reduce corruption. Unfortunately, through assessment of the 
literature available and analysis of the results of this study, it is clear that corruption 
occurs throughout different levels of society and low-level corruption is the norm for 
many people in a number of non-western countries. Therefore, it appears to be 
accepted as a way of life, although not necessarily agreed with. This is a dilemma 
faced by many when trying to eliminate corruption. 
This chapter discusses the findings of the research, from which eight key themes 
were identified:  
(i) Discrepancies with the definition of corruption - leading to confusion 
across borders and differences in legislation; 
(ii) Influence of background and culture on the understanding of corruption - 
and the various challenges this poses; 
(iii) The impact of TI's CPI being used as a risk assessment tool by financial 
services - the index was not designed for this purpose and such improper 
usage is not without consequence; 
(iv) When assessing people’s honesty it would appear that tolerance levels of 
certain behaviour has remained fairly consistent over time; 
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(v) Corruption still exists in developed countries such as the UK and USA; 
however, it would appear to be in a different form than that which exists 
in less developed countries, for example, India and Pakistan; 
(vi) The Government sector is felt to be the most corrupt sector in society; 
however, in the private sector the extraction industry and construction 
sectors are felt to be the most susceptible to corruption; 
(vii) Whilst there is a broad understanding of corruption globally, those 
encountering it on a daily basis have little option than to conform 
irrespective of local laws; 
(viii) Further research is required in the area of increasing public sector pay and 
that including police officers against whether this reduces corruption due 
to the conflicting opinions in current studies.     
This thesis is an original contribution to the body of knowledge as it has examined 
the similarities and differences in the perception of corruption between multiple 
jurisdictions across a diverse population, including a new sample population in the 
form of Strand II, thus adding to the current literature. It has outlined the challenges 
in reducing corruption in low transparency countries from those that experience it on 
a day-to-day basis, evidencing that low-level corruption in certain countries is the 
norm and almost tolerated. The research has highlighted the conflicting opinions 
covering the area of increasing police officers pay and whether this reduces 
corruption, with the recommendation that this should be explored further.   
Through researching the advantages and disadvantages of TI’s CPI this research will 
further add to the body of knowledge and practice as it has identified that there is a 
lack of understanding of the methodology used when compiling the index and it is 
being misused in the financial services sector. Through this misuse, along with the 
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fact that the Hong Kong Financial Services regulator recommends its use in risk 
assessments, this may impact societies from a financial exclusion perspective, 
potentially reducing foreign investment and slowing down development and growth 
within a country. This is an unintended consequence of the index, which was not 
envisaged when it was set up. The results of the findings of TI’s CPI assessment in 
this study will be used to better inform the financial services industry of the impact 
of using such an index in isolation and hopefully ensure that it is used more 
appropriately in future country risk assessment methodology application.  
Following the assessment of the findings, recommendations as outlined in Chapter 
14 have been made that may drive the direction of future research, along with 
highlighting potential solutions for improvement in attempts to reduce corruption at 
the lower levels of government, subject to a willingness to change and funding being 
available.    
Have We Become More Honest?  
As previously stated the intention of examining the concept of honesty was to 
benchmark participants in Strand I and Strand II against previous honesty 
assessment studies with a view of understanding whether tolerance levels of certain 
behaviour had changed. Participants in Strand I and Strand II were asked to 
consider a number of dishonesty scenarios and indicate the degree to which they felt 
they were ‘justified’. The results of this research were then compared to previous 
studies (Pattie, Seyd & Whiteley, 2004; Whiteley, 2012) to assess whether honesty 
levels had changed over time. The results from Strand I indicated that tolerance 
levels of certain scenarios had changed between 2000 to 2017, for example, the 
tolerance for ‘lying in your own interest’ had decreased in 2011 but then increased in 
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2017, whereas the least tolerated scenario overall remained ‘drunk driving’, although 
there was a steady decline of tolerance for such action over the entire period. The 
rational for the variation in the level of tolerance for the scenarios could not be 
obtained from the Strand I results; however, in Strand II, the participants’ 
responses could be explored further, drawing out the rationale for their thinking. 
Overall the ‘justification’ for undertaking a dishonest scenario had certain factors 
attributed to it. For example, in Strand II all participants indicated that it was 
‘sometimes justified’ to take cannabis. When this was explored further, their 
rationale for it being ‘sometimes justified’ was when cannabis was taken for 
medicinal purposes. Likewise, driving faster than the speed limit was deemed 
sometimes acceptable if it occurred in the circumstance of an emergency. It was 
appreciated that the circumstances would differ depending on the situation and 
accordingly the rationale for certain behaviours would vary. This rationalisation for 
undertaking certain actions could explain why someone might become involved in 
corruption in much the same way as individuals rationalise other crimes, for example 
fraud. If, as mentioned in the literature review, factors affecting corruption in the 
Nigerian police service were low pay, poor recruitment practices, and everyday 
acceptance of bribery, then it is easy to see how an official might rationalise corrupt 
activity. Furthermore, if such activity continues on a regular basis, society can start 
to see this as the norm, and even if they disagree with such behaviour, there may be 
no alternative but to take part. Overall, this study though the sample population was 
considerably smaller in 2017 and from different countries to the original two studies, 
has concluded that tolerance have remained fairly consistent over time, though 
certain behaviours are tolerate more than others which would depend on 
circumstance.  
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Corruption Is Understood By Everyone  
This research has identified that people across jurisdictions generally understood that 
corruption was an umbrella term for a number of offences with behavioural 
differences that result in a gain or advantage for someone, usually a government 
official, to undertake a task that they would otherwise not have carried out. Aligning 
an ‘activity’ (conflict of interest, favouritism, nepotism/cronyism, gift giving etc.) to 
a ‘subject’ (public official, corporate representative) with an ‘outcome’ (a gain for 
the person or another) that has unduly influenced (a breach of duty to act impartially) 
the ‘subject’ will have resulted in having been corrupted or having been involved in 
corruption. When asked what constituted corruption, the offences listed across the 
sample population included ‘fraud’, ‘money laundering’ and ‘tax evasion’ with the 
most common activity being ‘bribery’. With this in mind, and as outlined in the 
literature review, it is easy to understand why the actual definition of corruption has 
caused extensive debate.   
When contrasting ‘bribery’ against ‘facilitation payments’ it was clear that although 
certain legislation, such as the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, carves out 
‘facilitation payments’, the majority of people across the sample population felt that 
such payments were still ‘bribes’. In defining the two, the was a theme when 
articulating ‘bribery’ as the act of giving an ‘advantage’ to someone to do something 
that they would not usually undertake, whereas a ‘facilitation payment’ was usually a 
small sum of money given to an individual, usually a government official, to 
undertake something that they would do anyway, but faster; hence the term ‘speed 
money’ (UNDP, 2008, p. 7) or ‘grease payment’ (Bielgelman & Biegelman, 2010; 
Gray & Kaufman, 1998; Lawler, 2012). The notion that facilitation payments speed 
up a process, was drawn from the answers in Strand I, and in line with the 
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terminology of facilitation payments being ‘grease payments’ outlined in the 
literature review, a number of respondents advised that it was a “payment to grease 
the wheels of action or the process for paperwork” (Respondent 9), or “money to oil 
the political decision process machine” (Respondent 151).  
The fact that there was no significant difference between a ‘bribe’ and a ‘facilitation 
payment’ was evident in both Strand I and Strand II; however, as highlighted by 
the literature review, the US legislation does actually distinguish between the two, 
this was pointed out, particularly by those in the US. All participants in Strand II, 
with some making reference to the fact that these payments were used to expedite 
processes, acknowledged the point that a ‘facilitation payment’ was associated with 
an existing process or service. It was understood in both Strand I and Strand II that 
a facilitation payment was a “small or nominal payment” and that the amount and the 
reasoning behind the payment would make a difference. This was in contrast to a 
‘bribe’, which was defined as the act of giving “something of value in order to do 
something that they shouldn’t do; so an improper function” (Participant 3, Strand 
II). 
When discussing ‘bribery’ it came to light that in certain countries, for example 
South Africa, ‘bribery’ per se was not an actual criminal offence. This revelation 
prompted a review of the South African Prevention and Combatting of Corrupt 
Activities Act 2004. The Act talks about ‘offences in respect of corrupt activities’ 
then breaks down the ‘general offence of corruption’ which includes nefarious 
activities with different parties, for example, public officials, foreign public officials, 
agents; however, there is no mention of ‘bribery’. The nefarious activity is more 
explicit in legislation from some other countries, such as the UK Bribery Act, where 
both ‘active’ and ‘passive’ bribery are mentioned as criminal offences. The concept 
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of having both sides of a bribery transaction covered as a specific offence is similar 
in India where the primary anti-corruption legislation is the Prevention of Corruption 
Act 1998 that criminalises (amongst other acts) the taking and giving of bribes to 
‘public servants’. Producing a single global definition raises challenges if there is 
such vagueness or actions are not articulated clearly. Although from a legalistic 
perspective the UK Bribery Act 2010 appears quite simply, in reality the 
understanding of the Act differs, especially when local practices and cultures are 
taken into consideration. Irrespective of the fact that ‘bribery’ was not a specific 
offence per se in South Africa, this did not prevent the 15 respondents from South 
Africa answering the questions in this study and providing enough detail to enable 
analysis, with examples of a bribe as being “an amount of money offered to someone 
to influence his judgment” (Respondent 129) and “offering a payment to facilitate an 
illegal action” (Respondent 136).  
The majority of anti-corruption legislation across the globe carves out ‘public 
official’, ‘public servant’ or similar for a government representative as being a party 
to a bribery transaction or corruption. The fact that a number of respondents from the 
population in Strand I mentioned the term in some form, with a variation of ‘foreign 
official’, ‘public or government official’ and ‘public servant’ and the majority of 
participants in Strand II mentioned ‘Government/Public Officials’ was not 
surprising. The role and responsibility of the participants in Strand II means that 
they would be more focused and give a higher degree of scrutiny over Public 
Officials within their day-to-day activities and, as previously mentioned, the term 
being carved out in the relevant legislation draws on these individuals. “Corruption 
banner/umbrella” was mentioned in Strand II with the example of ‘facilitation 
payments’ falling under this term. This supported the thinking of the respondents in 
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Strand I when they stated actual offences as examples of corruption. The challenge 
of interviewing those who were in the field of anti-bribery and corruption was that 
their answers tended to become legalistic rather than real scenarios being provided. 
For example, it was stated that corruption was “…the improper performance of 
somebody in a position of authority or responsibility for personal gain” (Participant 
2). When asked what corruption meant to them some of the examples given by those 
in Strand II were more granular than the examples provided by the respondents in 
Strand I. Examples given included: “a favour is provided to a public official, be it in 
a form of work experience, maybe for their son or daughter, through entertainment 
provided and they then perform a public duty improperly in favour of the person 
who gave them the advantage” and “corruption of big sporting bodies – FIFA…” 
(Participant 5, Strand II). 
In Strand III, the Focus Groups from Hong Kong and India both mentioned “giving 
some benefit to others to maybe get some advantage over certain issues or projects” 
and to “influence” a decision or get a favour which may get “an advantage for a 
group which is unfair”. When ‘fairness’ was mentioned by the Focus Group in Hong 
Kong, they elaborated by saying that the “most difference is you affect the fairness 
of the competition”. The Mexican Focus Group discussed the ‘advantage’ aspect of 
corruption advising that it meant, “taking advantage of your position”. Both the 
Indian and Mexican Focus Groups mentioned payments to speed up a service, with 
the Indian Group using the term “grease payments” which was consistent with the 
findings from Strand I and Strand II. The same Focus Group also mentioned that 
‘corruption’ was an umbrella term made up of different behaviours such as “bribery 
and gift giving”. Again this was in line with the literature review. The Hong Kong 
Focus Group did not consider that corruption was aligned only to the government 
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sector. They indicated that corruption occurred in both the government sector and in 
the private sector. The Mexican Group actually indicated that they felt it was a real 
problem in their country and advised that not only was corruption an issue, but that 
those whom they knew were corrupt were “not prosecuted”.  
The ‘giving’ in a corrupt transaction does not have to be ‘money’ although this was 
the most common theme identified in this study. This is not surprising as the image 
of a brown envelope full of cash is synonymous with the act of bribing someone. 
Other key theme words drawn from this study included: benefit, gifts, favours, 
inducement, payment, reward, entertainment, and also ‘work experience’ for a son or 
daughter. The term ‘gifts’ was mentioned across seven of the country categories in 
Strand I and all participants in Strand II indicated that they felt it was corrupt to 
give a gift or money to a public official to obtain public services, with comments 
such as “if it’s not open and transparent…then I would say it’s trying to get an unfair 
advantage” (Participant 1). The activity of gift giving having the perception of being 
corrupt is sometimes said to challenge cultural norms; however, a high number of the 
sample population across different jurisdictions felt that the underlying intention of 
the gift giving is what can make it a corrupt act. It was also felt that any money given 
to a public official that was not a “published fee” and was therefore for personal use, 
was a corrupt act.   
Academics have endeavoured to break down corruption into categories, for example 
Petty Corruption (Starke, Kobis & Brandt, 2016), Business Corruption (Gardiner, 
2009) and Political Corruption (Peters & Welch, 2002). This is potentially helpful 
when gaining an insight into the level of impact corruption has on society, and even 
when endeavouring to build preventative strategies; however, it does not take into 
consideration social norms or local culture within a given country. Social norms and 
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cultural differences can pose challenges in reducing corruption in low transparency 
countries. It is suggested that any definition should describe the specific nefarious 
activities, making it clearer to understand what behaviour constitutes corruption. The 
definition should also include the ‘subject’ of the legislation as being both domestic 
and foreign public officials, along with corporate representatives, unlike the US 
legislation that only focuses on ‘foreign public officials’. This would act in a similar 
manner as predicate offences that are listed in certain anti-money laundering 
legislation and regulation. It should be noted that the term ‘Public Officials’, which 
is outlined in certain corruption legislation, conflicts with anti-money laundering 
legislation and regulation, which refers instead to ‘Politically Exposed Persons’. This 
should be taken into consideration when drafting legislation and regulation as this 
may cause further confusion. The ‘Public Official’ definition is far broader, 
capturing different levels of government employees, not just those in prominent 
positions, who potentially may be involved in low-level corruption, such as those 
registering births or supplying driving licences.    
Background And Culture Shapes The Way We Think   
There is an expanse of literature outlining the differences between western and non-
western cultures; the western cultures typically being rules-based, against the 
majority of the world’s relationship-based cultures. This research covered a fairly 
diverse set of countries examining the similarities and differences in the perception 
of corruption across western and non-western cultures. Although only a small 
sample population was included, it was indisputable that they believed that 
background and culture shaped one’s view of corruption. Although a number of the 
sample population felt that the two were intertwined, it was apparent that it was felt 
that social norms and values play a big part in determining what is right and what is 
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wrong. It has been made clear that where one has an exposure to corruption, 
although it may be considered wrong or neither “lawful nor customary” (Kiltgaard 
1988, p64), if it is common practice it is difficult to remain distant from it. 
Irrespective of one’s background, upbringing, education and family circle, if 
culturally one has to pay to get things done, it becomes the norm or everyday 
inconvenience (Pakes, 2017) thus posing challenges in reducing corruption 
especially in low transparency countries.  This was particularly apparent from 
responses such as “it is the way business is done” (Participants 3, 4 and 7, Strand 
II). If experience suggests that those who are involved in corruption are wealthy and 
untouchable, then individuals may turn to corruption in order to also become 
wealthy. It appears that there is more of a level playing field in developed countries 
and that if there is as much corruption then this is less visible on a day-to-day basis. 
This was evidenced in the study through a high proportion of the sample population 
in the western countries (UK & NI and the USA) indicating ‘not-applicable’ when 
asked whether ‘bribe paying’ or ‘facilitation payments’ were common in their 
country. In contrast, other countries (India and Pakistan) provided clear examples as 
to how ‘bribe paying’ was occurring. Although one of the objectives for this research 
was to outline the challenges in reducing corruption in low transparency countries, if 
corruption in developed countries, which tend to be higher up TI’s CPI, is less 
visible then this poses a different set of challenges that warrants highlighting. The 
factors influencing the levels of corruption included ‘poverty/economy’ and 
‘lack/weak law/regulation/governance’. If western countries have less ‘poverty’ and 
a better ‘economy’ with more robust ‘laws/regulation/governance’ then it would 
appear that there is less corruption affecting the day-to-day lives of the citizens. 
Furthermore, it was clear that the majority of the sample population believed that the 
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sector with the highest scale of corruption was the ‘government/public sector’. It is 
deduced that if there is more government run administration in non-western 
countries, especially that which is less automated, and therefore there is more 
interaction with public officials presenting greater opportunity for corruption.  
In examining the similarities and differences in the perception of corruption between 
multiple jurisdictions, the second objective of this study, it was felt that 
‘relationship’ building was important in Asia with terms such as ‘guanxi’ being 
mentioned. This has a far deeper meaning and cultural implication than the western 
term of ‘old boys’ network’. When forming and maintaining relationships, it was 
stated that it was a common practice to give some form of gift, especially at festivals 
or on certain significant dates. This kind of relationship culture is deep routed in 
business practices and younger individuals are said to realise “very, very early in life 
that if you don’t fall in line, you basically don’t get enough business or you fall out 
of favour” (FG1). The research has highlighted that there was a correlation in India 
between ‘culture’ and ‘acceptability’. In particular, the comment “it is okay to give a 
bribe as long as it’s a few hundred pounds” was worrying, especially when it was 
stated that “society as a whole does not look at it as a crime” (FG2). This presents 
huge challenges in low transparency countries in reducing corruption, especially 
when people think that this may not be acceptable to a western thinker, but in Indian 
culture it is perfectly normal and acceptable behaviour. It was identified that the 
challenges ahead are that, irrespective of how one is influenced by their parents, 
schooling or religion, at the point of entering society people will follow “the flock” 
(FG2) indicating that if it is customary to pay bribes, then people will.  
Mexico mentioned the common term “el que no tranza, no avanza” (FG3) (he who 
does not cheat, does not get ahead). The phrase relates to going forward or moving 
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forward, but is only made possible if you are paying bribes or taking money from 
someone. The Mexican Group freely spoke about their experiences of corruption and 
how they were afraid of the police who would threaten them with higher fines if they 
did not part with their money. This experience stems from childhood and once 
witnessed for years, becomes the norm. They felt that “Mexico culture was somehow 
borne out of corruption” (FG3) and the system was so corrupt that if an individual 
was not corrupt, they simply could not be part of the system. These findings raise 
awareness of the challenges organisations have if they wish to remove corrupt 
behaviour from society.  
It can be seen from some of the comments made that the challenges of reducing 
corruption in low transparency countries are complex. There is a need for greater 
awareness that although corruption may appear to be the norm, it is fundamentally 
wrong; however, even if individuals accept it is wrong, those having to pay cannot 
go about their daily tasks without paying those who are in charge. In some countries 
there is no route to report corruption and therefore no recourse.  
Inappropriate Use Of TI’s CPI 
If corruption cannot be defined, the challenge begins to ebb into the sphere of it 
being impossible to measure. Furthermore, if the lawmakers and policy writers are 
themselves corrupt, whilst holding the reigns of investigation and prosecution, then, 
putting political bias aside and how it can affect media reporting, how best can 
corruption be measured? With its clandestine nature, those who are corrupt will not 
talk about it, and those who pay may fear reprisal if they speak out. As previously 
mentioned, one organisation that has stood at the forefront of raising awareness of 
corruption is TI and for over 20 years it has been producing the CPI; however, there 
are advantages and disadvantages of such an index and how it is used. With the 
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increased focus on the financial services industry to manage financial crime risk, 
such an index is being used to not only raise awareness of corruption risk but is 
being recommended by regulators as a tool to aid consideration of the political 
environment in particular jurisdictions, seemingly without fully understanding the 
implications of doing so. The third objective of this study was to produce an 
assessment of the impact of using TI’s CPI within the financial services sector and 
therefore the sample population was asked whether they had heard of the index. The 
majority of the sample population confirmed that they had heard of TI’s CPI and 
described it as “a better and scientific view to assess the corruption risk that a 
country may pose to a business” (Respondent 103, Strand I). Unfortunately, some 
people also believed that it assisted with anti-money laundering (AML) risk 
assessments because it was allegedly used to “evaluate the AML risk by accepting 
clients from highly corrupted countries. It affects the customer acceptance policy” 
(Respondent 160, Strand I). It has also been said that it “provides … the overall 
rating of the country with regard to corruption status and anti-money laundering 
regulations so that when you are completing your checks on the routing of funds on a 
transaction you are aware of certain risk” (Respondent 60, Strand I). Though 
bribery and corruption are amongst other offences for money laundering (Hicks, 
2012) in some countries, TI’s CPI does not take into consideration any aspect of 
money laundering. These comments raise questions as to how the CPI is being used 
and the impact it has on customers and countries. Further research is needed to fully 
understand how such indices are used in the financial services sector and the 
implications of doing so inappropriately. As outlined in the literature review, the CPI 
is an index comprised of multiple surveys, which outlines the perception of 
corruption in the public sector in those countries, listed; however, the same data 
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points of reference are not used to score each country and not all countries are 
included. Caution should be taken if it is being used in the financial services sector 
as a parameter in customer acceptance policies. The general view of the Anti-Bribery 
& Corruption specialists (Strand II) was that the CPI had both limitations and 
inaccuracies and furthermore, the methodology was not clear. A common point 
raised related to the questionable accuracy and lack of reliability of the index being 
used as an aid to measure corruption when it was based purely on perceptions. 
Several individuals mentioned that as the index was focused only on the public 
sector the full picture of the perception of corruption across the countries was 
missing. Because of the lack of transparency with the methodology “…it’s a highly 
westernised viewpoint of corruption and doesn’t necessarily consider cultural 
factors” (Participant 3, Strand II). The lack of transparency statement around the 
methodology was mentioned. TI does publish details of its source data along with a 
brief explanation of the methodology as to how it achieves the country scores and 
rankings; however, the assessment is not consistent across all the countries in the 
Index. An attendee from the Mexico Focus Group advised that it created a “vicious 
circle”; if investors and organisations relied on the index and refrained from 
investing in low transparency countries, this would have a detrimental impact on the 
development of those countries. The same attendee advised that it might not be 
applicable to use the “same kind of yardstick that is used against an industrialised 
Western country”. The India Focus Group felt that the 2016 TI CPI score for India 
was a fair reflection and that it would take some time to improve the “world’s 
perception that probably the Western countries have of India”. TI has gone to great 
lengths over the years in endeavouring to provide a benchmark on corruption and 
produce a useable index whilst striving to raise awareness of corruption across the 
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globe. However, if the CPI is used in the wrong context then there could be 
devastating impact on both individuals and entire societies, particularly when 
financial services regulators are advising that it should be used to assess risk. To 
understand financial crime risk it should be assessed holistically and the 
measurement of corruption, or the measurement of the perception of corruption, is 
just one element for potential consideration.  Other indices exist that can 
complement TI’s CPI when forming risk assessments, for example, FATF country 
reports, Thomson Reuters Country Checker, Basel AML Index and the World 
Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators, along with TI’s other data sets which 
include the Bribe Payers’ Index and the Global Corruption Barometer.    
Who Is To Blame?  
Although the majority of respondents (75%) in Strand I indicated that both the 
‘receiver’ and the ‘giver’ were equally at fault in a bribery transaction, those in 
Strand II, whilst initially agreeing with this philosophy, concluded after further 
discussion that the reason behind the exchange had to be understood, and that it 
would depend upon the circumstances. In a situation where a representative from a 
multinational corporation offers a bribe to a government official to win a contract it 
was considered that the multinational representative was the worse offender. 
However, where a government official abused their position, such as requesting an 
unauthorised fee to register a birth, then the worse offender was deemed to be the 
‘receiver’, ergo the government official. The discussions drew out the fact that in 
order to reduce corruption then punishment of the receiver would be more 
appropriate. The level of responsibility held by the parties involved was a 
contributing factor to the apportionment of the blame, especially in the context of 
facilitation payments, where the ‘giver’ may require medical supplies and would not 
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be able to obtain these if they did not pay their way. Within Strand III it emerged in 
India that there were two motivational categories, “need to have” and “greed to 
have” in determining the worse offender. The example given was that of the  ‘giver’ 
who wishes to purchase a piece of land, offers a bribe to a ‘receiver’ who succumbs 
to this, and in such a scenario, the ‘giver’ was the worse offender. It was concluded 
that the worse offender was the individual who created the situation of paying the 
bribe.  
Corruption Affects All Of Society 
When TI’s CPI is used in a manner that guides the direction of investment and 
customer acceptance within the financial services sector, then it must be fair to say 
that the ‘perception’ of corruption will have a detrimental economic effect on 
development and growth in low transparency countries. Some financial services use 
TI’s CPI and have a minimum score as a threshold for undertaking business with 
customers located in countries beneath this threshold. Where the index had errors, as 
highlighted in the literature review, this is unlikely to have been taken into 
consideration and could have potentially resulted in some form of social exclusion, 
the extent of which cannot easily be assessed. 
This research has identified that the majority of the sample population felt that the 
sector most susceptible to corruption was the ‘government & public administration’. 
This in turn led them to indicate that corruption had a ‘major effect’ on ‘government 
efficiency’ and ‘political/legal life’. With such a view from the majority that the 
streams of corruption run through the government sector, it is understandable how 
corruption has the highest combined effect (major effect + same effect) on ‘a 
nation’s development’, which the government has a responsibility over and thus 
brings with it a combined effect (major effect + same effect) on ‘trust in the 
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government’.  The respondents in Strand I of this research highlighted these 
categories in this order. They chose these over the ‘effect’ on ‘society’s ruling 
values/ethics, economic/trade activity, society’s customs and manners and 
healthcare’. Those in Strand II felt that corruption took away the “level playing 
field” (Participant 3), which, to a number of them, was “unfair” (Participant 6). 
‘Inequality’ was mentioned in Strand II and Strand III due to certain circles of 
people favouring each other over outsiders. The practice of what has been termed 
“revolving doors” (Participant 3, Strand II) was put forward, this being a person’s 
movement of employment between positions within public office and the private or 
voluntary sector, in either direction, where an individual uses their prior experience 
and network to unfairly benefit their new employer (TI, 2010). This favouring one 
person over another undermines people’s trust in all kinds of frameworks and 
organisations.  
Five theme words (categories) were identified in Strand I: Government, Both 
Public/Private Sector, Sport, Health and Police. A number of respondents from all 
countries indicated that bribe paying was a practice within the ‘government’. The 
highest percentage to state this came from South Africa (69%, n=9) and the answers 
from South Africa carried the most detail as to how this was conducted, for example: 
“bribing staff members of the Department of Home Affairs to issue identity and/or 
travel documents to non-qualifying individuals, national of foreign countries” 
(Respondent 125, Strand I). The same respondent advised of paying customs 
officials to stop them searching cargo. Another respondent (Respondent 133, Strand 
I) wrote: “Our president takes bribes. All government officials from traffic cops to 
tender fraud”. The theme of government corruption was also mentioned by two 
respondents who shared their views on their home country, despite being employed 
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in another. One was employed in the UK & NI; however, they originated from 
Kazakhstan. They advised that although they had not encountered corruption in the 
UK, it was widespread in Kazakhstan. They went on to say that “It happens with 
government tenders, road control police, people 'buy' driving licenses, or 
construction permits without necessary surveying procedures. In state healthcare 
system, to be able to get analysis faster, people are encouraged to pay the hospital 
staff in charge” (Respondent 171, Strand I). The other respondent who was from a 
different country to that in which they were employed stated that in Egypt “it is 
normal practice in government offices and giving gifts to some companies officials 
to secure a good employment or to close business deals” (Respondent 36, Strand I).  
Those who mentioned the police advised that bribes were paid “to avoid traffic 
fines” (Respondent 52, Strand I), with a respondent from South Africa listing 
offences that you can get away with being “speeding, over the alcohol limit etc.” 
(Respondent 143, Strand I). Unfortunately, more information could not be obtained 
as to how this actually occurs and it was therefore unclear as to whether the police 
officer simply takes the money and allows the person to go on their way. If this was 
indeed the case then the police themselves are not only taking bribes, a potential 
offence itself, but also aiding and abetting other criminal offences, which in turn will 
obviously breed distrust and resentment. There is also the potential impact that, if 
allowed to continue driving whilst under the influence of alcohol, the driver may 
have an accident and injure or kill someone: an effect that is hard to measure.   
Other themes emanating from Strand I were that corruption occurred in the Health 
Sector and in Sport, it was said that it occurred “…in cricket when Pakistan were 
only playing a finals match, someone paid the Pakistani team enough money for 
them to loose the match!” (Respondent 119, Strand I). It also occurred in football 
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“between the football teams, referees and the Cyprus Football Association” 
(Respondent 156, Strand I). From these limited responses, it is difficult to assess the 
impact that corruption has on sport. However, as it becomes more widely reported in 
the media and research uncovers more instances of this occurring, this again brings 
about a lack of trust. Ultimately, unless top sports people, who may be role models 
for future generations, are prosecuted and banned from their sport, it can send a 
message that this is acceptable behaviour, which in turn will fuel bribe paying and 
corruption in the industry.  
Though the majority of participants in Strand I and Strand II indicated that there 
was corruption in the government, when asked which sectors they felt were the most 
susceptible to corruption in the private sector the majority indicated the extraction 
sector (Oil & Gas, Mining) and the construction sector. The rationale for the 
extraction sector being the most susceptible to corruption was obtained from the 
participants in Strand II who advised that this was due to the fact that they required 
licenses to extract resources from reserves that are state-owned. As for those who 
believed it was the construction sector, they advised that this was because of the 
huge projects at stake so they would want to win tenders with one participant 
advising that they had formed this opinion from personal experience. They gave the 
example of the person responsible for awarding the contract being taken out for 
golfing days and allegedly taking money from the bidding companies (Participant 3, 
Strand II) 
A Multitude of Measures Are Required To Tackle Corruption 
The majority of the sample population felt that corruption was an issue that needed 
to be tackled. In Strand I over half of the respondents felt that this could be 
achieved through ‘prosecution/punishment/penalty’: which as previously outlined 
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poses challenges in reducing corruption in low transparency countries. Along the 
same lines, when given the list of 18 preventative measures, over half of Strand I 
indicated that the ‘highly effective’ measure in the prevention of corruption was the 
‘prosecution of high profile individuals’, which is commensurate to the findings in a 
previous study (Baldock, 2016). ‘Education’ was the second most popular theme 
word, with comments such as “values-based education” (Respondent 136, Strand I). 
As anything to do with corruption lacks transparency, it was not surprising that the 
promotion of transparency, especially at the higher levels in governments, came out 
of this research, along with reference to transparency with regards to offshore 
investments and banking as well as publishing public officials earnings and private 
interest. Reference to increasing salaries or at least providing those in roles that were 
susceptible to corruption with liveable salaries was mentioned by a number of 
respondents. It was felt that paying civil servants more would assist in preventing 
corruption and, as previously reported, the Hong Kong Focus Group gave the 
example of low paid policemen in Indonesia and Cambodia being prone to accept or 
even ask people to pay for certain things. However, they felt that because civil 
servants in Hong Kong were in well-paid jobs they would not commit acts of 
corruption because if they did, and were caught, they would subsequently be out of 
work. Those in Mexico (Strand III) felt that increasing police remuneration would 
be a good measure because they currently received a low salary; however, this 
conflicted with the thinking in India (Strand III) because, as one attendee put it, 
“greed has no limits”. The concept around raising public sector pay to prevent 
corruption is an area that warrants further research. Both the literature review and 
results of this research have highlighted that whilst such measures are believed to 
have worked in Hong Kong and Singapore, this contrasts with the Ghanaian study 
 208 
(Foltz & Opoku-Agyemang, 2015) and the evidence from China (Gong & Wu, 2012) 
where it was concluded that increasing public sector salary did not decrease 
corruption.   
A high proportion of Strand I believed it was ‘everyone’s’ responsibility to fight 
corruption. Interestingly, the country category that had the highest percentage of 
respondents to indicate this was India, which goes some way to negate the belief that 
corruption is a western phenomenon, as has been mentioned before. The theme of 
raising awareness through the media cut across Strand I and II, as it was felt that 
this would bring it to life so people fully understood the consequences of corruption. 
The point that there should be proactive investigation rather than policing those who 
are doing the right thing was mentioned from those in Strand II. This was 
mentioned in the context that bribes would not be found in the gift and entertainment 
register of an organisation and yet the amount of effort involved in getting people to 
record every client dinner or thank you token they received was disproportionate. It 
was put forward that the use of big data analysis should be considered in an effort to 
combat corruption. Staying with the theme of data, in Strand III there was a 
discussion, particularly in India, that if more processes were digitalised or 
automated, then there would be less corruption. Indeed the group stated that they had 
seen changes in the Indian government, which had been trying to address corruption 
through digitalisation. From a ‘petty corruption’ perspective, corruption that is 
conducted by low-level public officials, for example, when applying for a driving 
licence or renewing a passport, if undertaken online without human interaction, the 
opportunity for corruption is removed. It was suggested in Strand II that the reason 
facilitation payments were not a practice in the UK was due to the lack of day-to-day 
interaction between the public and government officials, therefore removing the 
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opportunity of corruption. Everything from obtaining a passport, submitting a 
building application, and even sitting the theory test for a driving licence in the UK 
is undertaken online. Consideration should be given to the digitalisation of certain 
government administration tasks in countries where the public regularly has contact 
with government officials. This consideration is supported by the Hong Kong Focus 
Group who discussed improvements to processes, and the Indian Focus Group who 
stated that it was not simply about investigating corruption it was also about 
“eliminating the root cause and you don’t need to increase the investigating officials 
for that”. 
This chapter has discussed the high level findings of this research having examined 
the similarities and difference in the perception of corruption between multiple 
jurisdictions, it has outlined the challenges in reducing corruption in low 
transparency countries and produced an assessment of the impact of using TI’s CPI 
in the financial services sector by referring back to the results and cross-referencing 
to the literature review where appropriate. The next chapter offers a number of 
recommendations for consideration.    
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Chapter 14 – Research Recommendations  
Five high level recommendations have been drawn out of this research. Additionally; 
it is considered that publication of all or part of this study would add to the body of 
knowledge on corruption, raising awareness of the findings and enabling others to 
understand that corruption does not distinguish between western and non-western 
countries. It may lurk in the shadows of developed countries whilst being the norm 
in non-developed societies but wherever it exists it can have a global impact. 
The recommendations are as follows:  
• Each country should adopt the global definition of corruption in line with the 
OECD’s definition.  
A global definition, which is supported by explanatory notes, or guidance 
documents similar to that which supports the UK Bribery Act 2010, would allow 
legislation to be aligned. The definition and guidance documents should outline 
the relevant underlying offences (unlawful behaviours) that constitute corruption. 
A single definition would aid understanding and assist with enforcing the law 
along with potentially making prosecution easier. The OECD should be 
encouraged to continue their engagement with non-member states through their 
“Enhanced Engagement” programmes along with the work by other agencies; for 
example, the country evaluations by FATF.  
• Increasing academic research within developing countries to fully understand 
their values, norms and cultures to establish whether there are countries that 
do not have a western influence yet have no corruption.  
This may be of interest to organisations similar to TI or future students. If 
through further research it is identified that there are developing countries with 
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no western influence combined with no corruption then a better understanding of 
how this was achieved will assist law and policy makers in forming anti-
corruption strategies along with devising workable preventative measures.    
• The raising of awareness in the financial services sector of the limitations and 
methodology of TI’s CPI and ensure full comprehension of the impact of its 
application in any customer risk assessment processes.  
The researcher will take this recommendation forward. Through their position as 
the co-chair of the International Chamber of Commerce, Financial Crime Policy 
and Risk Committee and their membership of the Wolfsberg Trade Finance 
Working Group, they can table this as an action for consideration of producing 
an industry paper for issuance by the relevant Group, which will be available to 
the financial services sector.     
• Increasing support for further research to understand the benefits of 
digitalisation of government services such as the issuance of building 
permits, driving licences etc. If clear advantages are identified, then 
development of this approach should be considered on a global scale.  
It appears reasonable to suggest that through the digitalisation of certain 
government services and processes thereby removing government official 
engagement with the general public on a day-to-day basis will reduce low-level 
corruption. TI or similar organisation could undertake this piece of research, as 
they have the global footprint making such research achievable.   
• Conducting additional research to understand the effect of increasing public 
sector pay including police officers on the extent of reducing government 
official corruption.  
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Previous studies to date have delivered conflicting results. It is recommended that 
either a research group or future students collate the current literature on this subject 
and draw up proposals for further research to target this subject within the realms of 
corruption research. 
 
Although three of the five recommendations are centred on further research being 
required with the suggestion that TI is the appropriate organisation there are a 
number of other organisations who are equipped to undertake such research; for 
example, Global Witness or Integrity Action. The findings and recommendations 
from this research will be shared with the three organisations for their consideration 
of future research assignments and where possible the researcher will endeavour to 
assist and contribute further.   
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Chapter 15 – Conclusion  
It could be said that in the same way that the British went around the world 
plundering resources and gaining wealth through violence in the early days, the 
western countries are doing the same thing today through corruption, but in a non-
violent manner, as evidenced by the numerous examples of western companies 
bribing resource rich non-western countries. It has been said that globalisation 
presents challenges to any global governance leaving legitimate businesses and 
states, along with organised criminals and terrorists to exploit the gaps. It has been 
suggested that globalisation is the modern day colonialism (Pakes, 2013).  
Although mentioned in the literature review that corruption was being viewed 
through a western lens, this research has clearly established that people from both 
western and non-western countries are fully aware that corruption occurs in both the 
public and private sector and across different industries. Furthermore, they clearly 
understand what actions and behaviour constitutes this phenomenon, there are 
potentially more similarities than differences of the perception of corruption across 
multiple jurisdictions. Aligning legislation is key; however, without a single body for 
oversight, individual opinions will continue to conflict whist academics grapple with 
defining corruption. It is evident that in some countries, primarily non-western ones, 
corrupt behaviour affects all walks of life on a daily basis to the point that in some 
cases it has become the norm, to the extent of it being tolerated. Many in society 
cannot go about their daily lives without taking part in some form of corrupt 
behaviour and if there is no one to report it to, or if those to whom you should be 
able to report it are corrupt themselves, individuals alone have little hope. This is 
truly a challenge in low transparency countries. Although it is widely understood that 
there are different cultures and backgrounds across the globe, moral judgement and 
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behaviour does not appear to vary much between societies. The understanding of 
doing the right thing appears to be ingrained in the majority. Nevertheless, due to a 
number of variables the opportunity and rationalisation of carrying out corrupt 
behaviour exists across different levels of society. These variables can be anything 
from low pay, poor recruitment, lack of education and peer pressure to outright 
greed. The feeling of distrust and despair is evident, even in a small sample 
population, not just due to the fact that some of the population have to pay simply to 
get by in their everyday lives, but because those who are known to be corrupt are not 
prosecuted.  
Anti-corruption strategies need a number of elements that include awareness training 
at all levels of society, statements of adherence to legislation and enforcement of the 
law, with a robust prosecution process and more convincing punishment for those 
who do not comply. It is easy to outline this but in reality there are a number of 
challenges in eliminating corrupt behaviour and only through a concerted effort by 
everyone across society, including law makers and policy writers, will there be any 
chance of achieving this. It is suggested that to combat corruption, one place to start 
is with the processes in which low-level government officials interact with the 
general public and through the digitalisation of some of the simple tasks. It is 
suggested that by removing such government interaction on a daily basis removes 
the opportunity for corruption.      
The intention of TI as an organisation is to raise awareness of corruption across the 
globe and is made up of 100 chapters. This has been achieved through an annual 
exercise of measuring the perception of corruption in the public sector in one of the 
largest country coverage and best-known indices, the CPI. The non-government 
organisation works with governments, corporations and citizen groups through its 
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country projects and awareness sessions, attempting to stop the abuse of power, 
bribery and secret deals. The effort by so many is commendable and has certainly 
drawn the attention of academics, policy groups, think tanks and industry sectors. 
Any criticism identified in this research is directed at those who are inappropriately 
utilising the CPI and is not directed at TI itself. This study has highlighted the 
financial services sector’s broad lack of understanding of the methodology that 
underpins the CPI. Consequently, the potential impact of using the index 
inappropriately has not been adequately assessed but it can be deduced that if the 
CPI is used for investment decisions then low transparency countries will be 
impacted. More research and awareness should be carried out either by TI; other 
groups or academics in understanding how the index can be better used and it should 
not be left to regulators to stipulate its use without fully understating its composite 
and the impact it may have.   
This was a unique piece of research. No other study to date has obtained the opinions 
and views of a section within the financial services sector that is charged with the 
responsibility of building anti-bribery and corruption strategies; drawing up 
commercial policies and procedures; and advising and supporting such an influential 
sector that is in a position to support society. The opinions and views obtained from 
the Anti-Bribery & Corruption specialists were analysed against 173 responses from 
an anonymous global survey and the outcome of three focus groups (Hong Kong, 
India, Mexico).  Though this research has obtained data from a small sample 
population, it is still global in nature and has highlighted that although the definition 
of corruption has caused much debate, the understanding of corrupt behaviour and 
what constitutes corruption is known by the majority of society, whether from a 
western or non-western country. The study has evidenced that corruption is 
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perceived to exist in developed countries; for example, the US and the UK and is 
experienced on a sometimes-daily basis in countries like India, Pakistan and Mexico. 
The difference of corrupt acts between developed and developing countries is clear; 
however, the feeling of distrust and being let down is universal. To successfully 
reduce all levels of corruption; multi-faceted strategies are required with a strong 
willingness to change from those appointed to oversee the growth and development 
of society, preventative measures have to be robust enough and be applied across 
society if they are to be effective. The recommendations from the study alone will 
not rid society of corruption; however, it is hoped that by raising awareness of the 
findings, more targeted work and further research can be undertaken to support the 
quest in the fight against corruption.   
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Chapter 16 – Personal Reflection 
Whilst reflecting on my experience of the Professional Doctorate it must be 
understood that I have been on a 12-year academic journey with Portsmouth 
University and a relationship that I hope will continue upon completion of my 
studies. Having served in the Royal Navy, I have always had affection for 
Portsmouth and was therefore honored to attend the University, resulting in the 
concluding phase of being accepted on this Professional Doctorate course. I have 
been with Portsmouth University longer than I have been with any other organisation 
through my career and other studies. It has a place in my heart and always will.  
 
Corruption touches society in ways that one can only imagine, especially if one is in 
full time employment in a democratic, developed country with a robust legal system. 
In studying corruption through my MSc and Professional Doctorate, it has 
highlighted to me that no matter what people think about low level corrupt behavior, 
or how it impacts them, if it is present in their day to day life and they wish to get on, 
then they have to conform and pay their way. With this in mind, I would like to draw 
the reader to the plight of the uneducated and the poor. This is a part of society that 
corruption potentially affects the most and where I feel more work and research 
needs to be undertaken to raise awareness and ideally, in the long term, enable them 
to access services that we take for granted; for example; education and healthcare. 
Stories of people only being treated at a hospital if they have enough money to pay 
their way, in a society where there is free healthcare is atrocious. In a consolidated 
effort, the good in the world need to stand together and put a stop to this.  
 
Upon completion of my MSc dissertation on corruption, I wanted to pursue this 
subject further, envisaging that I would in some way make a difference. The 
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Professional Doctorate has opened my eyes to the complexity of corruption and the 
wealth of literature that has been written on the subject. The experience has taught 
me that any piece of research should be focused and if the vision is to endeavour to 
change ‘something’, then that ‘something’ should be small. I now realise that one 
piece of research cannot change the world; not that I was of the illusion I could 
change the world.  
 
There has never been a time when I was going to give up, but there have been times 
when I wondered how I was ever going to finish. The journey has been one of highs 
and lows, especially near deadlines when competing priorities exist and in the 
beginning of the data collection phase where things were not progressing inline with 
the initial plan. There have been moments of frustration and despair, asking myself 
why I even commenced the course; however, the sense of achievement to get to the 
‘reflection’ stage is overwhelming. It is fair to say that this journey has been made 
easier with all the support the University has offered, with a personal thank you to 
Professor Mark Button, who has been on my journey since the beginning, and Chris 
Lewis who has supported my doctorate studies.  
 
I do feel that utilising a paid transcription service saved me an immense amount of 
time and the cost against reward was worth every penny. I would definitely utilise 
such a service again. Finding little things that make the research easier is useful as it 
means one can concentrate on enhancing the output. 
 
My next aim is to consider publishing all or part of my Professional Doctorate 
research. This is a key objective, as it will build on my MSc dissertation, which was 
published in January 2016. As for further research, it is with some desire that I will 
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hopefully team up with other academics with a view of opening up the subject of 
corruption, ideally resulting in making some difference to the plight of the poor.   
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Appendix 1 – Survey Questions 
1. Are you a male or female? 
Male or Female 
2. Which category below includes your age?  
Up to 25, 26 - 35, 36-45, 46-55, 56 - 65, 66 plus  
3. Location of current Employment  
UK, USA, Nigeria, Dubai, Mexico and Hong Kong etc. (this will be a dropdown list 
of the countries across the globe). 
4. How long have you worked in Compliance? 
1 – 3 years, 3 – 6 years, 6 – 9 years, 9 – 12 years, 12 – 15 years, over 15 years (I do 
not work in Compliance). 
5. What sector are you in? (List of Sectors e.g. Financial Services, Oil & Gas, 
Telecoms and Betting & Gaming, other). 
6. The definition of corruption has caused much debate. Write down three 
examples of what you would regard as corruption. 
1- 
2-  
3-  
7. Please write down how you would define a ‘bribe’.  
Free Text Box 
8. Please write down how you would define ‘facilitation payment’. 
Free Text Box 
9. If bribe paying is a practice in your country, in what context does this 
happen? 
  Text box to prove answer, Not Applicable, Prefer not to Say.  
10. If having to make facilitation payments is a practice in your country, in 
what context does this happen?  
Text box to prove answer, Not Applicable, Prefer not to Say. 
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11. Consider the following statement on a scale of 1 – 6 (1 being strongly 
disagree – 6 being strongly agree, with a ‘Don’t know’ option). Personal 
background shapes your view of corruption.  
12. Consider the following statement on a scale of 1 to 6 (1 being strongly 
disagree – 6 being strongly agree, with a ‘Don’t know’ option). Culture shapes 
your view of corruption.  
13. If you consider bribery is wrong, which party do you think is the worse 
offender? 
Giver, Receiver, Equal, Don’t know 
14. Write down the three most important factors, which in your view, influence 
levels of corruption. 
1-  
2- 
3-   
15. Consider the following and please indicate if you think they are justified or 
not.  
Claiming government benefits to which you are not entitled; Buying something 
which you know is stolen; Taking Cannabis; Keeping money that you have found in 
the street; Lying in your own interests; Having an affair when you are married; 
Having sex under the legal age of consent; Failing to report accidental damage 
you’ve done to a parked vehicle; Throwing away litter in a public place; Driving 
under the influence of alcohol; Avoiding a fare on public transport; Cheating on 
taxes if you have a chance; Driving faster than the speed limit; Making up things on 
a job application; Paying a Border Control Officer to advance to the front of the 
queue; Paying a Government Official to utilise a free service for example; to enter a 
library;  A businessman bribing a public official to secure a contract which ensures 
viability and jobs of his company with is in difficult circumstances; Bribing a traffic 
police officer to avoid delays and a larger fine for a non-existent speeding offence; 
Giving a gift to a Government Official during a tendering process.  
Response categories;  
1 - Always Justified, 2 – Sometime Justified, 3 – Rarely Justified, 4 – Never 
Justified, 5 – Don’t know.  
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16. On a scale of 1 to 6 (1 being not corrupt to 6 being very corrupt), please rate 
the following sectors.  
Government/Public Sector, Private Sector, Non-Governmental Organizations / Non-
Profit Organizations 
17. Consider the following on a scale of 1 to 6 (1 being not corruption to 6 being 
corruption) Giving a gift or money to a Public Official to obtain public services 
is corruption.  
18. Globally, which of the following do you consider to be the most susceptible 
to bribery and corruption? Please rank your response, with 1 being the least 
susceptible and 6 being the most susceptible, ‘Don’t know’. 
Mining; Oil and Gas; Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Hunting, Banking and 
Financial Services; Government and Public Administration; Construction; 
Manufacturing; Consumer Retail; Technology; Healthcare.  
19. What do you think is the effect of corruption on the following? 
Answer Options: No Effect; Limited Effect; Some Effect; Major Effect; Don’t know 
Category Options: Economic/Trade activity; Education/Profession; A Nation’s 
Development; Political/Legal Life; Government Efficiency; Society’s Ruling 
Values/Ethics; Society’s Customs and Manners; Health; Trust in Government; 
Private/Family/Tribal Life.  
20. Please rank the following according to the seriousness of each issue within 
your country (1 being the least serious to 6 being the most serious). 
Unemployment; Healthcare Provision; Economy; Education; Climate Change; 
Crime; Corruption  
21. Do you consider corruption is an issue that needs to be tackled? Yes, No, 
Don’t Know.  
21a If yes; please outline your view as to what can be best done to tackle corruption 
 Text Box to provide answer 
22. There are different measures to help fight corruption. Please rate how 
effective you consider each of the following proposals; 
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Options: Highly Ineffective; Ineffective; Neither; Effective; Highly Effective. Don’t 
know. 
Category Options: National Anti-Corruption Hotline; Legal protection for 
whistleblower; Vigorous media investigation of corruption; Tougher legislation 
enabling more prosecutions and harsher sentences for corruption; Increased 
commitment by political and business leaders to fight corruption and fraud; Schools 
placing more emphasis on moral values; Religious community placing greater 
emphasis on promoting moral values in everyday life; A media campaign to raise 
public awareness of the extent and cost of corruption; More resources to investigate 
and prosecute corruption cases; A single independent agency dedicated to fighting 
corruption; Increase salaries for police officers; Increase salaries for government 
employees; Greater internal financial controls and internal audits of government 
spending; Greater transparency of government tendering procedures; Disclosure by 
top government officials of their financial interests; More research on the causes, 
nature and effect of corruption; Regular anti-corruption conferences that bring 
together all sectors and stakeholder; Prosecution of high profile individuals  
23. Are you aware of Transparency International’s Corruption Perception 
Index? 
 Yes/No 
(If yes, the following questions will appear) 
23a. Do you use Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index in your 
organisation?  Yes/No/Don’t Know/Prefer not to say.  
23b What do you think are the advantages of using this index? 
Free Text Box 
23c. What do you think are the disadvantages of using this index?  
Free Text Box 
23d. Do you use any other indices? 
Yes/No/Don’t Know/Prefer not to say. 
24. Who is the most responsible for fighting corruption?  
Everybody/National Government/International Community/Commercial 
Sector/Other… 
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If you wish to take part in a focus group to be held in a mutually agreed 
location in your country, you can either leave an email address below or give 
your details to the Association/Forum/Committee representative who issued this 
survey on my behalf. I must bring to your attention that by leaving your email 
address you will be removing the anonymity this survey has provided.  
Text Box for email address. Many thanks for taking the time in completing this 
survey. 
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Appendix 2 – Strand II Semi-structured Interview Design 
Semi – Structured Interview for representatives in the Anti – Bribery and 
Corruption field within the Financial Services Sector 
Introduction, setting the scene by explaining the purpose of the interview, the ethics 
involving the interview, in that they can leave at anytime, they are not obliged to 
answer any of the questions and if they divulge something that is a criminal offence I 
am obliged to report it to the relevant authorities. Following analysis of the semi-
structured interviews I can confirm that your details will not be included in the final 
thesis.  
The interviewee will be asked to acknowledge and sign the consent form. 
1 – Please give a bit of background to your organization to include some of the 
countries it has a presence in and your day-to day responsibilities.  
2 –The definition of corruption has caused much debate. Can you please give three 
examples of what you would regard as corruption? 
3 – How would you describe the difference between a bribe and facilitation 
payments? 
4 – If bribe paying is a practice in your country, in what context does this happen?  
5 – If having to make facilitation payments is a practice in your country, in what 
context does this happen?  
6 – Do you believe that someone’s personal background shapes their view of 
corruption?  
If yes – why?  
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7 – Do you believe that someone’s culture shapes their view of corruption? 
If yes  - why?  
8 - If you consider bribery is wrong, which party do you think is the worse offender?  
Options – Giver, Receiver, both, neither – Why?  
9 – What are the three most important factors, which in your view, influence levels 
of corruption.  
10 – In my online survey I ask respondents to indicate whether certain scenarios are 
justified or not to varying degrees. The list I will show you now is adapted from my 
online survey. I will go through each one and ask whether you think the scenario is 
‘sometimes justified’ or ‘never justified’. At the end I will then go back and ask for 
your rationale to certain scenarios to obtain a better understanding of your thinking.  
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 Sometimes Justified Never Justified 
 
Claiming government 
benefits to which you are 
not entitled 
Ο  Ο  
Buying something which 
you know is stolen Ο  Ο  
Taking Cannabis Ο  Ο  
Keeping money that you 
found in the street Ο  Ο  
Lying in your own 
interests Ο  Ο  
Having an affair when you 
are married Ο  Ο  
Having sex under the legal 
age of consent Ο  Ο  
Failing to report accidental 
damage you have caused 
to a parked vehicle 
Ο  Ο  
Throwing away litter in a 
public place 
¡ ¡ 
Driving under the 
influence of alcohol Ο  Ο  
Avoiding a fare on public 
transport Ο  Ο  
Cheating on taxes if you 
have a chance Ο  Ο  
Driving faster than the 
speed limit Ο  Ο  
Making up things on a job 
application Ο  Ο  
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Paying a Border Control 
Officer to advance to the 
front of the queue 
 
Ο  
 
Ο  
Paying a Government 
Official to utilise a free 
service, for example: to 
enter a library 
 
Ο  
 
Ο  
A businessman bribing a 
public official to secure a 
contract which ensures 
viability and jobs within 
his company which is in 
difficult circumstances 
 
Ο  
 
Ο  
Bribing a traffic police 
officer to avoid delays and 
a larger fine for a non-
existent speeding offence 
Ο  Ο  
Giving a gift to a 
Government Official 
during a tendering process 
Ο  Ο  
 
11 – Do you consider one sector being more corrupt over the other with regards to 
Government/Public Sector, Private Sector, Non-Government Organisation?  
12 – Do you consider giving a gift or money to a public official to obtain public 
services to be corrupt or not?  
13 – Globally, do you consider any one sector over the other being more susceptible 
to corruption for example Mining, Oil and GAS, Agriculture, Banking and Financial 
Services?  
14 – What effects do you think corruption has on your country or other countries?  
15 – What do you think is the most serious social phenomenon in your country for 
example climate change, weak economy, crime, unemployment?  
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16 – Do you think Corruption is an issue that needs tackling?  
If yes - Please outline what you think can be undertaken to tackle corruption.  
17- There are different ways to fight corruption. What do you think is the most 
effective way to tackle corruption?  
18 – Have you heard of Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index?  
If yes – does your organization use TI’s CPI and if so what do you think are the 
advantages and disadvantages of using such indices?  
19 - Is there anything further you would like to add to this interview?  
Thank you for taking part in this interview.  
Graham Baldock 
  
 243 
Appendix 3 – Focus Group Debate Structure 
 
The focus group will consist of between 8 – 12 participants and will be in four 
sections lasting an hour in total, covering the results of the analysis from the 
questions in the anonymous survey on what is corruption, culture/background, 
TI’s CPI and effectiveness of the measures in combating corruption. The final 
questions will be determined upon analysis of the survey responses; however, to 
give some indication of the proposed structure, a sample of the details to be 
discussed is in included below. At no time will the participants be asked to 
divulge the details of their organization, should this be volunteered the session 
will be stopped and the details deleted from the data.  
Participants will be advised that, if they volunteer to take part in the focus group 
and during the session admit that they have previously engaged in a serious 
criminal act for which they have not yet been sanctioned, the researcher would 
have to report this to the relevant authorities. The researcher is not seeking 
information from the participants on non-sanctioned criminal behaviours they 
may have been involved in. 
What is Corruption?  
A constant cause for debate, corruption has a number of elements to it. What 
does corruption mean to you?  
Culture/Background 
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‘Previous research across Europe, Middle East and Africa indicated that the 
majority of respondents (32 out of 36) believed that their personal background 
and culture shaped the way they viewed corruption’.  
The results of this survey in relation to the two questions on culture will be put to 
the focus group participants who will be asked to comment and discuss.  
Transparency International Corruption Perception Index  
TI’s CPI 2014 ranked the UK 14, USA 17 and Nigeria 136 out of a ranking of 
174. 
What do you think the advantages of the use of the Corruption Perception Index 
might be? Having analysed the advantages outlined in the survey, the focus group 
will be advised of the outcome and asked to comment.   
What do you think the disadvantages of the use of the Corruption Perception 
Index might be? Having analysed the disadvantages outlined in the survey, the 
focus group will be advised of the outcome and asked to comment 
Measures in Combating Corruption 
In the researcher’s previous research on the perception of corruption across 
Europe, Middle East and Africa the one measure that the majority of the 
participants (17 out of 36) thought to be the ‘highly effective’ was the 
‘prosecution of high profile individuals’. This was the second most effective 
measure chosen by the sample population of the UK Madison Group. “More 
resources to investigate and prosecute corruption cases’ was regarded as the most 
“highly effective”.  The focus group will be asked whether they think this is 
achievable in their country. The results of the analysis undertaken for the survey 
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in this research will be articulated to the focus group and they will be asked to 
provide comments on it.   
In the researcher’s previous small-scale studies the measures thought to be the 
most “ineffective” and “highly ineffective” were “increased salaries of 
government employees” and “Increasing salaries of police officers”.  This 
structure will be replicated once full analysis has been made on the responses in 
relation to the section within the survey on the effectiveness of measures to 
prevent corruption and the group will be asked to provide their views.   
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Appendix 5 - Ethical Consent Amendment 
        
  
    
     Ethics-
fhss@port.ac.uk 
6th May 2016 
Dear Graham  
Study Title: The Application of Western Norms in relation to Corruption: a cross 
jurisdiction comparison. 
Ethics Committee 
reference: 
14/15:61 – substantial amendment 
 
Thank you for submitting your documents for ethical review.  The Ethics Committee 
was content to grant a favourable ethical opinion of the above research on the basis 
described in the application form, protocol and supporting documentation, revised in 
the light of any conditions set, subject to the general conditions set out in the 
attached document.  
There is no need to submit any further evidence to the Ethics Committee; the 
favourable opinion has been granted with the assumption of compliance 
The favourable opinion of the EC does not grant permission or approval to undertake 
the research.  Management permission or approval must be obtained from any host 
organisation, including University of Portsmouth, prior to the start of the study.   
Documents reviewed 
The documents reviewed by The Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences Ethics 
Committee.  
Document    Version    Date    
Interview Consent Form 1 16/04/2016 
Notice of Substantial Amendment Form 1 16/04/2016 
Participant Information Sheet 2 16/04/2016 
Semi-Structured Information Sheet 1 16/04/2016 
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Statement of compliance  
The Committee is constituted in accordance with the Governance Arrangements set 
out by the University of Portsmouth   
After ethical review 
Reporting and other requirements 
The enclosed document acts as a reminder that research should be conducted with 
integrity and gives detailed guidance on reporting requirements for studies with a 
favourable opinion, including: 
• Notifying substantial amendments 
• Notification of serious breaches of the protocol 
• Progress reports 
• Notifying the end of the study 
Feedback 
You are invited to give your view of the service that you have received from the 
Faculty Ethics Committee.  If you wish to make your views known please contact 
the administrator ethics-fhss@port.ac.uk 
   Please quote this number on all correspondence – 14/15:61 
Yours sincerely and wishing you every success in your research 
***************** 
Chair 
Dr Jane Winstone 
Email: ethics-fhss@port.ac.uk 
 
Enclosures: 
 
“After ethical review – guidance for researchers” 
Appendix 1 
After ethical review – guidance for researchers 
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This document sets out important guidance for researchers with a favourable opinion 
from a University of Portsmouth Ethics Committee. Please read the guidance 
carefully. A failure to follow the guidance could lead to the committee reviewing and 
possibly revoking its opinion on the research.  
It is assumed that the research will commence within 3 months of the date of the 
favourable ethical opinion or the start date stated in the application, whichever is the 
latest. 
The research must not commence until the researcher has obtained any necessary 
management permissions or approvals – this is particularly pertinent in cases of 
research hosted by external organisations. The appropriate head of department 
should be aware of a member of staff’s research plans.    
If it is proposed to extend the duration of the study beyond that stated in the 
application, the Ethics Committee must be informed. 
If the research extends beyond a year then an annual progress report must be 
submitted to the Ethics Committee. 
When the study has been completed the Ethics Committee must be notified. 
Any proposed substantial amendments must be submitted to the Ethics Committee 
for review. A substantial amendment is any amendment to the terms of the 
application for ethical review, or to the protocol or other supporting documentation 
approved by the Committee that is likely to affect to a significant degree:  
(a) the safety or physical or mental integrity of participants  
(b) the scientific value of the study 
(c) the conduct or management of the study. 
A substantial amendment should not be implemented until a favourable ethical 
opinion has been given by the Committee. 
Researchers are reminded of the University’s commitments as stated in the 
Concordat to Support Research Integrity  viz: 
• maintaining the highest standards of rigour and integrity in all aspects of 
research 
• ensuring that research is conducted according to appropriate ethical, legal and 
professional frameworks, obligations and standards 
• supporting a research environment that is underpinned by a culture of 
integrity and based on good governance, best practice and support for the 
development of researchers 
• using transparent, robust and fair processes to deal with allegations of 
research misconduct should they arise 
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• working together to strengthen the integrity of research and to reviewing 
progress regularly and openly	
In ensuring that it meets these commitments the University has adopted the UKRIO 
Code of Practice for Research.  Any breach of this code may be considered as 
misconduct and may be investigated following the University Procedure for the 
Investigation of Allegations of Misconduct in Research. 
Researchers are advised to use the UKRIO checklist as a simple guide to integrity. 
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NOTICE OF SUBSTANTIAL AMENDMENT 
Please use this form to notify the Ethics Committee of substantial amendments to all research. 
The form should be completed by the Principal Investigator using language comprehensible to a lay 
person. 
 
Full title of study: The Application of Western Norms in relation to Corruption: a cross 
jurisdiction comparison. 
Name of Ethics Committee: Portsmouth University Faculty Ethics Committee 
Reference number: 14/15: 61 
Date study commenced: July 2015 
Amendment number and date: 1  - 16th April 2016 
 
Details of Principal Investigator: 
Title Forename/Initials Surname Mr Graham Baldock 
Work Address HSBC Group, Level 24, 8 Canada Square, London 
PostCode E14 5HQ 
Email graham.baldock@hsbc.com, gjbaldock@aol.com 
 
Telephone 0207 992 5066 – mobile 07973 82 52 62 
Fax 
 
Type of amendment 
(a) Amendment to information previously given in the application form 
Yes  
If yes, please submit the revised application form with a new version number and date, highlighting 
changes using MS Word Track Changes.  
(b) Amendment to the protocol 
No change 
If yes, please submit the revised protocol with a new version number and date, highlighting changes 
using MS Word Track Changes. 
(c) Amendment to the information sheet(s) and consent form(s) for participants, or to any other 
supporting 
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documentation for the study. 
Yes – participation invitation has been updated to include interviewing participants, a new consent form 
has been produced that will be used at the commencement of the interview stage. A list of interview 
questions has been drawn up for consideration. 
If yes, please submit the revised documentation with a new version number and date, highlighting 
changes using MS Word Track Changes. 
 
 
 
Summary of changes 
Briefly summarise the main changes proposed in this amendment. Explain the purpose of the changes 
and their 
significance for the study. 
If the amendment significantly alters the research design or methodology, or could otherwise affect the 
scientific value of the study, supporting scientific information should be given (or enclosed separately). 
Indicate whether or not additional scientific critique has been obtained. 
This Notice of Substantial Change Amendment – Form is being submitted for ethical consideration and 
if thought fit subsequent approval to enable the research to include the interviewing of individuals.  
 
Any other relevant information 
Applicants may indicate any specific issues relating to the amendment, on which the opinion of a 
reviewing body is sought. 
 
List of enclosed documents 
Research participation sheet 
Interview Consent form         
  
Interview Question Proforma 
 
Declaration by Principal Investigator 
1. I confirm that the information in this form is accurate to the best of my knowledge and I take full 
responsibility 
for it. 
 
2. I consider that it would be reasonable for the proposed amendment to be implemented. 
 255 
Date of submission:......16th April 2016 
Signature:....... ................................ 
 
Declaration by supervisor / manager (delete as appropriate) 
I support this substantial amendment. 
Signature: .........Mark Button............................................ 
Print Name: Mark Button 
Post: Professor 
Organisation: University of Portsmouth 
Date: (16th April 2016) 
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Appendix 6 - Tables 
 
Integrity Indicators 
The online survey asked respondents to justify to varying degrees a set of scenario. 
This Appendix details the breakdown of the number of respondents per country and 
how they responded for each of the scenarios.    
Claiming government benefits to which you are not entitled 
 Cyprus 
N=? 
(%) 
India 
N=? 
(%) 
Pakistan 
N=? 
(%) 
South 
Africa 
N=? 
(%) 
UAE 
N=? 
(%) 
UK & NI 
N=? 
(%) 
USA 
N=? 
(%) 
Other 
N=? 
(%) 
Total 
plus % of 
pop. 
N=? 
(%) 
Always 
Justified 
0 0 1 
(1) 
0 0 0 0 0 1 
(2) 
Sometimes 
Justified 
0 4 
(2) 
3 
(2) 
1 
(1) 
0 0 2 
(1) 
2 
(1) 
12 
(7) 
Rarely 
Justified 
4 
(2) 
5 
(3) 
3 
(2) 
3 
(2) 
3 
(2) 
7 
(4) 
1 
(1) 
5 
(3) 
31 
(18) 
Never 
Justified 
15 
(9) 
19 
(11) 
7 
(4) 
11 
(6) 
8 
(5) 
14 
(8) 
32 
(18) 
23 
(13) 
129 
(75) 
Total 19 (11) 
28 
(16) 
14 
(8) 
15 
(9) 
11 
(6) 
21 
(12) 
35 
(20) 
30 
(17) 
173 
(100) 
 
75% (n=129) of the respondents indicated that ‘claiming government benefits to 
which you are not entitled’ was ‘never justified’ and 18% (n=31) indicated that it 
was ‘rarely justified’. The one respondent who indicated that it was ‘always 
justified’ came from Pakistan. The 12 respondents who indicated that it was 
‘sometimes justified’ came from India (2%, n=4), Pakistan (2%, n=3), South Africa 
(1%, n=1), USA (1%, n=2) and Other Countries (1%, n=2).  
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Buying something that you know is stolen 
 Cyprus 
N=? 
(%) 
India 
N=? 
(%) 
Pakistan 
N=? 
(%) 
South 
Africa 
N=? 
(%) 
UAE 
N=? 
(%) 
UK & NI 
N=? 
(%) 
USA 
N=? 
(%) 
Other 
N=? 
(%) 
Total 
plus %  
of pop. 
N=? 
(%) 
 
Always 
Justified 
0 1 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
0 0 0 0 0 2 
(1) 
Sometimes 
Justified 
0 0 2 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
0 0 5 
(3) 
Rarely 
Justified 
4 
(2) 
5 
(3) 
2 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
5 
(3) 
8 
(5) 
1 
(1) 
27 
(16) 
Never 
Justified 
15 
(9) 
22 
(13) 
9 
(5) 
13 
(8) 
9 
(5) 
15 
(9) 
27 
(16) 
29 
(17) 
138 
(80) 
Total 
19 
(11) 
28 
(16) 
14 
(8) 
15 
(9) 
11 
(6) 
21 
(12) 
35 
(20) 
30 
(17) 
173 
(100) 
 
The majority of the respondents indicated that Buying something that you know is 
stolen’ was either ‘never justified’ (80%, n=138) or ‘rarely justified’ (16%, n=27). 
‘The 1% (n=2) of respondents who indicated ‘always justified’ were from India and 
Pakistan. The five respondents who indicated ‘sometimes justified’ were from 
Pakistan (1%, n=2), South Africa (1%, n=1), UAE (1%, n=1) and the UK & NI (1%, 
n=1).  
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Taking Cannabis 
 Cyprus 
N=? 
(%) 
India 
N=? 
(%) 
Pakistan 
N=? 
(%) 
South 
Africa 
N=? 
(%) 
UAE 
N=? 
(%) 
UK & 
NI 
N=? 
(%) 
USA 
N=? 
(%) 
Other 
N=? 
(%) 
Total 
plus % of 
pop. 
N=? 
(%) 
 
Always 
Justified 
0 0 2 
(1) 
2 
(1) 
0 1 
(1) 
3 
(2) 
0 8 
(5) 
Sometimes 
Justified 
7 
(4) 
4 
(2) 
0 5 
(3) 
2 
(1) 
8 
(5) 
11 
(6) 
8 
(5) 
45 
(26) 
Rarely 
Justified 
3 
(2) 
4 
(2) 
4 
(2) 
5 
(3) 
4 
(2) 
7 
(4) 
6 
(3) 
5 
(3) 
38 
(22) 
Never 
Justified 
9 
(5) 
20 
(12) 
8 
(5) 
3 
(2) 
5 
(3) 
5 
(3) 
15 
(9) 
17 
(10) 
82 
(47) 
Total 
19 
(11) 
28 
(16) 
14 
(8) 
15 
(9) 
11 
(6) 
21 
(12) 
35 
(20) 
30 
(17) 
173 
(100) 
 
The majority of the respondents (47%, n=82) indicated that ‘taking cannabis’ was 
‘never justified’. More respondents indicated that it was ‘sometimes justified’ (26%, 
n=45) than ‘rarely justified’ (22%, n=38). The split for ‘sometimes justified’ was 
across all groups of countries except Pakistan. There were eight responses indicating 
that it was ‘always justified’ this split was across four countries.  
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Keeping money that you have found in the street 
 Cyprus 
N=? 
(%) 
India 
N=? 
(%) 
Pakistan 
N=? 
(%) 
South 
Africa 
N=? 
(%) 
UAE 
N=? 
(%) 
UK & NI 
N=? 
(%) 
USA 
N=? 
(%) 
Other 
N=? 
(%) 
Total plus 
% of pop. 
N=? 
(%) 
 
Always 
Justified 
0 2 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
2 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
0 2 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
8 
(5) 
Sometimes 
Justified 
5 
(3) 
8 
(5) 
1 
(1) 
7 
(4) 
3 
(2) 
10 
(6) 
15 
(9) 
10 
(6) 
59 
(34) 
Rarely 
Justified 
4 
(2) 
4 
(2) 
7 
(4) 
5 
(3) 
3 
(2) 
4 
(2) 
9 
(5) 
4 
(2) 
40 
(23) 
Never 
Justified 
10 
(6) 
14 
(8) 
5 
(3) 
2 
(1) 
4 
(2) 
7 
(4) 
9 
(5) 
15 
(9) 
66 
(38) 
Total 19 (11) 
28 
(16) 
14 
(8) 
15 
(9) 
11 
(6) 
21 
(12) 
35 
(20) 
30 
(17) 
173 
(100) 
 
The majority of respondents (38%, n=66), indicated that it was ‘never justified’ to 
‘keep money found in the street’, with a split across the countries. More respondents 
indicated that it was ‘sometimes justified’ (34%, n=59) compared to ‘rarely justified’ 
(23%, n=40). Again there was a split across all countries for both categories. For 
‘always justified’ (5%, n=8) there were two countries that did not indicate this 
category, those being Cyprus and UK & NI.   
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Lying in your own interest 
 Cyprus 
N=? 
(%) 
India 
N=? 
(%) 
Pakistan 
N=? 
(%) 
South 
Africa 
N=? 
(%) 
UAE 
N=? 
(%) 
UK & NI 
N=? 
(%) 
USA 
N=? 
(%) 
Other 
N=? 
(%) 
Total 
plus % 
of pop. 
N=? 
(%) 
 
Always 
Justified 
0 0 2 
(1) 
0 0 1 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
5 
(3) 
Sometimes 
Justified 
5 
(3) 
8 
(5) 
4 
(2) 
0 2 
(1) 
6 
(3) 
10 
(6) 
9 
(5) 
44 
(25) 
Rarely 
Justified 
8 
(5) 
11 
(6) 
4 
(2) 
8 
(5) 
4 
(2) 
7 
(4) 
8 
(5) 
7 
(4) 
57 
(33) 
Never 
Justified 
6 
(3) 
9 
(5) 
4 
(2) 
7 
(4) 
5 
(3) 
7 
(4) 
16 
(9) 
13 
(8) 
67 
(39) 
Total 19 (11) 
28 
(16) 
14 
(8) 
15 
(9) 
11 
(6) 
21 
(12) 
35 
(20) 
30 
(17) 
173 
(100) 
 
39% (n=67) of respondents across all countries indicated that ‘lying in your own 
interest’ was ‘never justified’. Again receiving responses from all countries, 33%  
(n=57) indicated that it was ‘rarely justified’.  25% (n=44) of respondents indicated 
that it was ‘sometimes justified’ across the countries, except South Africa. 3% (n=5) 
of respondents indicated that it was ‘always justified’. They were from Pakistan, 
UAE, UK & NI, USA and Other.   
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Having an affair when you are married 
 Cyprus 
N=? 
(%) 
India 
N=? 
(%) 
Pakistan 
N=? 
(%) 
South 
Africa 
N=? 
(%) 
UAE 
N=? 
(%) 
UK & NI 
N=? 
(%) 
USA 
N=? 
(%) 
Other 
N=? 
(%) 
Total 
plus %  
of pop. 
N=? 
(%) 
 
Always 
Justified 
1 
(1) 
0 1 
(1) 
0 0 0 0 0 2 
(1) 
Sometimes 
Justified 
1 
(1) 
5 
(3) 
0 1 
(1) 
4 
(2) 
4 
(2) 
0 1 
(1) 
16 
(9) 
Rarely 
Justified 
6 
(3) 
7 
(4) 
1 
(1) 
2 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
8 
(5) 
5 
(3) 
9 
(5) 
39 
(22) 
Never 
Justified 
11 
(6) 
16 
(9) 
12 
(7) 
12 
(7) 
6 
(3) 
9 
(5) 
30 
(17) 
20 
(12) 
116 
(67) 
 Total 19 (11) 
28 
(16) 
14 
(8) 
15 
(9) 
11 
(6) 
21 
(12) 
35 
(20) 
30 
(17) 
173 
(100) 
 
With a split across all countries, 67% (n=116) of respondents indicated that ‘having 
an affair when you are married’ was ‘never justified’ and 22% (n=39) indicated 
‘rarely justified’ across all countries. No one from Pakistan or USA indicated 
‘sometimes justified’ (9%, n=16) and only one respondent from both Cyprus and 
Pakistan (1%, n=2) indicated ‘always justified’. 
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Having sex under the legal age of consent 
 Cyprus 
N=? 
(%) 
India 
N=? 
(%) 
Pakistan 
N=? 
(%) 
South 
Africa 
N=? 
(%) 
UAE 
N=? 
(%) 
UK & NI 
N=? 
(%) 
USA 
N=? 
(%) 
Other 
N=? 
(%) 
Total 
plus % 
of pop. 
N=? 
(%) 
 
Always 
Justified 
0 
 
3 
(2) 
1 
(1) 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
2 
(1) 
6 
(3) 
Sometimes 
Justified 
5 
(3) 
5 
(3) 
0 
 
1 
(1) 
5 
(3) 
7 
(4) 
2 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
26 
(15) 
Rarely 
Justified 
5 
(3) 
5 
(3) 
1 
(1) 
0 1 
(1) 
4 
(2) 
11 
(6) 
7 
(4) 
34 
(20) 
Never 
Justified 
9 
(5) 
15 
(9) 
12 
(7) 
14 
(8) 
5 
(3) 
10 
(6) 
22 
(13) 
20 
(12) 
107 
(62) 
Total 19 (11) 
28 
(16) 
14 
(8) 
15 
(9) 
11 
(6) 
21 
(12) 
35 
(20) 
30 
(17) 
173 
(100) 
 
Receiving responses from all country categories, 62% (n=107) indicated that ‘having 
sex under the legal age of consent’ was ‘never justified’. 20% (n=34) indicated that it 
was ‘rarely justified’ across all the countries, except South Africa. 15% (n=26) 
indicated that it was ‘sometimes justified’ across the countries, except Pakistan. 
Respondents in India (2%, n=3), Pakistan (1%, n=1) and the Other category (1%, 
n=2) felt that it was ‘always justified’.  
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Failing to report accidental damage you've done to a parked vehicle 
 Cyprus 
N=? 
(%) 
India 
N=? 
(%) 
Pakistan 
N=? 
(%) 
South 
Africa 
N=? 
(%) 
UAE 
N=? 
(%) 
UK & NI 
N=? 
(%) 
USA 
N=? 
(%) 
Other 
N=? 
(%) 
Total 
plus %  
of pop. 
N=? 
(%) 
 
Always 
Justified 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sometimes 
Justified 
1 
(1) 
6 
(3) 
5 
(3) 
0 3 
(2) 
2 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
19 
(11) 
Rarely 
Justified 
3 
(2) 
7 
(4) 
3 
(2) 
1 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
5 
(3) 
10 
(6) 
9 
(5) 
39 
(22) 
Never 
Justified 
15 
(9) 
15 
(9) 
6 
(3) 
14 
(8) 
7 
(4) 
14 
(8) 
24 
(14) 
20 
(12) 
115 
(66) 
Total 19 (11) 
28 
(16) 
14 
(8) 
15 
(9) 
11 
(6) 
21 
(12) 
35 
(20) 
30 
(17) 
173 
(100) 
 
The majority of respondents indicated ‘failing to report accidental damage you've 
done to a parked vehicle’ was ‘never justified’ (66%, n=115) across all country 
categories. 22% (n=39) indicated ‘rarely justified’. No one from South Africa 
indicated ‘sometimes justified’ (11%, n=19). No one from any of the country 
categories indicated that it was ‘always justified’.  
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Throwing away litter in a public place 
 Cyprus 
N=? 
(%) 
India 
N=? 
(%) 
Pakistan 
N=? 
(%) 
South 
Africa 
N=? 
(%) 
UAE 
N=? 
(%) 
UK & NI 
N=? 
(%) 
USA 
N=? 
(%) 
Other 
N=? 
(%) 
Total 
plus %  
of pop. 
N=? 
(%) 
 
Always 
Justified 
0 1 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
0 0 1 
(1) 
0 4 
(2) 
Sometimes 
Justified 
0 3 
(2) 
2 
(1) 
0 1 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
0 0 7 
(4) 
Rarely 
Justified 
3 
(2) 
4 
(2) 
2 
(1) 
2 
(1) 
4 
(2) 
4 
(2) 
9 
(5) 
10 
(6) 
38 
(22) 
Never 
Justified 
16 
(9) 
20 
(12) 
9 
(5) 
12 
(7) 
6 
(3) 
16 
(9) 
25 
(14) 
20 
(12) 
124 
(72) 
 Total 19 (11) 
28 
(16) 
14 
(8) 
15 
(9) 
11 
(6) 
21 
(12) 
35 
(20) 
30 
(17) 
173 
(100) 
 
The majority of the respondents (72%, n=124) indicated that ‘throwing away litter in 
a public place’ was ‘never justified’ and this was split across all country categories. 
22% (n=38) indicated that it was ‘rarely justified’. No one in Cyprus, South Africa, 
USA or the Other category felt that it was ‘sometimes justified’ (4%, n=7). No one 
in Cyprus, UAE, UK & NI or the Other category indicated that it was ‘always 
justified’ (2%, n=4).  
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Driving under the influence of alcohol 
 Cyprus 
N=? 
(%) 
India 
N=? 
(%) 
Pakistan 
N=? 
(%) 
South 
Africa 
N=? 
(%) 
UAE 
N=? 
(%) 
UK & NI 
N=? 
(%) 
USA 
N=? 
(%) 
Other 
N=? 
(%) 
Total 
plus %  
of pop. 
N=? 
(%) 
 
Always 
Justified 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sometimes 
Justified 
0 1 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
0 1 
(1) 
0 0 4 
(2) 
Rarely 
Justified 
3 
(2) 
4 
(2) 
1 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
4 
(2) 
3 
(2) 
3 
(2) 
6 
(3) 
25 
(14) 
Never 
Justified 
16 
(9) 
23 
(13) 
12 
(7) 
13 
(8) 
7 
(4) 
17 
(10) 
32 
(18) 
24 
(14) 
144 
(83) 
 Total 
19 
(11) 
28 
(16) 
14 
(8) 
15 
(9) 
11 
(6) 
21 
(12) 
35 
(20) 
30 
(17) 
173 
(100) 
 
The majority of respondents (83%, n=144) indicated that ‘driving under the 
influence of alcohol’ was ‘never justified’ with responses spread across all countries. 
14% (n=25) indicated ‘rarely justified’, again across all countries. No one in Cyprus, 
UAE, USA or Other category indicated that it was ‘sometimes justified’ (2%, n=4). 
No one in any of the countries categories indicated that it was ‘always justified’.  
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Avoiding a fare on public transport 
 Cyprus 
N=? 
(%) 
India 
N=? 
(%) 
Pakistan 
N=? 
(%) 
South 
Africa 
N=? 
(%) 
UAE 
N=? 
(%) 
UK & NI 
N=? 
(%) 
USA 
N=? 
(%) 
Other 
N=? 
(%) 
Total 
plus % 
of pop. 
N=? 
(%) 
 
Always 
Justified 
0 0 1 
(1) 
0 0 0 0 0 1 
(1) 
Sometimes 
Justified 
1 
(1) 
2 
(1) 
3 
(2) 
2 
(1) 
0 1 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
2 
(1) 
12 
(7) 
Rarely 
Justified 
10 
(6) 
3 
(2) 
1 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
4 
(2) 
8 
(5) 
13 
(8) 
5 
(3) 
45 
(26) 
Never 
Justified 
8 
(5) 
23 
(13) 
9 
(5) 
12 
(7) 
7 
(4) 
12 
(7) 
21 
(12) 
23 
(13) 
115 
(66) 
 Total 19 (11) 
28 
(16) 
14 
(8) 
15 
(9) 
11 
(6) 
21 
(12) 
35 
(20) 
30 
(17) 
173 
(100) 
 
The majority of the respondents, spread across all countries, indicated ‘never 
justified’ (66%, n=115). ‘Rarely justified’, which had at least one response from all 
the countries, received 26% (n=45) of responses. No one from the UAE felt that it 
‘sometimes justified’ (7%, n=12). Only one person from Pakistan felt that it was 
‘always justified’ (1%, n=1).  
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Cheating on taxes if you have a chance 
 Cyprus 
N=? 
(%) 
India 
N=? 
(%) 
Pakistan 
N=? 
(%) 
South 
Africa 
N=? 
(%) 
UAE 
N=? 
(%) 
UK & 
NI 
N=? 
(%) 
USA 
N=? 
(%) 
Other 
N=? 
(%) 
Total 
plus % of 
pop. 
N=? 
(%) 
 
Always 
Justified 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sometimes 
Justified 
0 2 
(1) 
2 
(1) 
0 0 1 
(1) 
0 0 5 
(3) 
Rarely 
Justified 
3 
(2) 
6 
(3) 
2 
(1) 
3 
(2) 
2 
(1) 
5 
(3) 
5 
(3) 
9 
(5) 
35 
(20) 
Never 
Justified 
16 
(9) 
20 
(12) 
10 
(6) 
12 
(7) 
9 
(5) 
15 
(9) 
30 
(17) 
21 
(12) 
133 
(77) 
 Total 
19 
(11) 
28 
(16) 
14 
(8) 
15 
(9) 
11 
(6) 
21 
(12) 
35 
(20) 
30 
(17) 
173 
(100) 
 
The majority of the respondents, spread across all countries, indicated ‘never 
justified’ (77%, n=133). ‘Rarely justified’, which was also spread across all the 
countries, received 20% (n=35) of the responses. No one in Cyprus, South Africa, 
UAE, USA or the Other category indicated ‘sometimes justified’ (3%, n=5). No one 
from any of the countries indicated ‘always justified’.   
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Driving faster than the speed limit 
 Cyprus 
N=? 
(%) 
India 
N=? 
(%) 
Pakistan 
N=? 
(%) 
South 
Africa 
N=? 
(%) 
UAE 
N=? 
(%) 
UK & NI 
N=? 
(%) 
USA 
N=? 
(%) 
Other 
N=? 
(%) 
Total 
plus % 
of pop. 
N=? 
(%) 
 
Always 
Justified 
0 0 0 1 
(1) 
0 0 0 0 1 
(1) 
Sometimes 
Justified 
3 
(2) 
5 
(3) 
5 
(3) 
6 
(3) 
3 
(2) 
9 
(5) 
12 
(7) 
8 
(5) 
51 
(29) 
Rarely 
Justified 
10 
(6) 
10 
(6) 
7 
(4) 
7 
(4) 
7 
(4) 
9 
(5) 
15 
(9) 
15 
(9) 
80 
(46) 
Never 
Justified 
6 
(3) 
13 
(8) 
2 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
3 
(2) 
8 
(5) 
7 
(4) 
41 
(24) 
Total 
19 
(11) 
28 
(16) 
14 
(8) 
15 
(9) 
11 
(6) 
21 
(12) 
35 
(20) 
30 
(17) 
173 
(100) 
 
A total of 51 (29%) respondents indicated that this was ‘sometimes justified’. These 
results were spread across all countries; however, a higher percentage of respondents 
felt that it was ‘rarely justified’ (46%, n=80), with a lower percentage (24%, n=41) 
indicting ‘never justified’. Only one (1%) respondent (Respondent 141), who was 
from South Africa, indicated ‘always justified’.   
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Making up something on a job application 
 Cyprus India Pakistan South 
Africa 
UAE UK & NI  USA Other Total 
plus % of 
pop.  
Always 
Justified 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sometimes 
Justified 
3 
(2) 
4 
(2) 
4 
(2) 
0 0 0 0 2 
(1) 
13 
(8) 
Rarely 
Justified 
5 
(3) 
4 
(2) 
3 
(2) 
3 
(2) 
2 
(1) 
5 
(3) 
7 
(4) 
7 
(4) 
36 
(21) 
Never 
Justified 
11 
(6) 
20 
(12) 
7 
(4) 
12 
(7) 
9 
(5) 
16 
(9) 
28 
(16) 
21 
(12) 
124 
(72) 
 Total 19 (11) 
28 
(16) 
14 
(8) 
15 
(9) 
11 
(6) 
21 
(12) 
35 
(20) 
30 
(17) 
173 
(100) 
 
The majority of the respondents across all country categories indicated that ‘making 
something up on a job application’ was ‘never justified’ (72%, n=124). 21% (n=36) 
indicated that it was ‘rarely justified’, again with a cross-country spread. No one in 
South Africa, UAE, UK & NI or the USA indicated that it was ‘sometimes justified’ 
(8%, n=13). No one in any of the countries indicated that it was ‘always justified’.  
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Paying a Border Control Officer to advance to the front of the queue 
 
Cyprus  India  Pakistan  South Africa  UAE  UK & NI  USA  Other  
Total 
plus % of 
pop.  
Always 
Justified 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sometimes 
Justified 
0 1 
(1) 
3 
(2) 
0 0 2 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
8 
(5) 
Rarely 
Justified 
2 
(1) 
6 
(3) 
2 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
3 
(2) 
2 
(1) 
4 
(2) 
4 
(2) 
24 
(14) 
Never 
Justified 
17 
(10) 
21 
(12) 
9 
(5) 
14 
(8) 
8 
(5) 
17 
(10) 
30 
(17) 
25 
(14) 
141 
(82) 
 Total 
19 
(11) 
28 
(16) 
14 
(8) 
15 
(9) 
11 
(6) 
21 
(12) 
35 
(20) 
30 
(17) 
173 
(100) 
 
The majority of respondents indicated that it was ‘never justified’ (82%, n=141), 
with a spread across all countries. 14% (n=24) indicated that it was ‘rarely justified’ 
again across all countries. No one from Cyprus, South Africa or the UAE indicated 
that it was ‘sometimes justified’ (5%, n=8). No one from any of the countries 
indicated that it was ‘always justified’.  
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Paying a Government Official to utilise a free service for example; to enter a 
library 
 Cyprus 
N=? 
(%) 
India 
N=? 
(%) 
Pakistan 
N=? 
(%) 
South 
Africa 
N=? 
(%) 
UAE 
N=? 
(%) 
UK & NI 
N=? 
(%) 
USA 
N=? 
(%) 
Other 
N=? 
(%) 
Total 
plus %  
of pop. 
N=? 
(%) 
 
Always 
Justified 
0 0 1 
(1) 
0 0 0 0 0 1 
(1) 
Sometimes 
Justified 
0 3 
(2) 
2 
(1) 
0 0 1 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
2 
(1) 
9 
(5) 
Rarely 
Justified 
1 
(1) 
5 
(3) 
5 
(3) 
0 2 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
3 
(2) 
4 
(2) 
21 
(12) 
Never 
Justified 
18 
(10) 
20 
(12) 
6 
(3) 
15 
(9) 
9 
(5) 
19 
(11) 
31 
(18) 
24 
(14) 
142 
(82) 
 Total 
19 
(11) 
28 
(16) 
14 
(8) 
15 
(9) 
11 
(6) 
21 
(12) 
35 
(20) 
30 
(17) 
173 
(100) 
 
The majority of the respondents indicated that it was ‘never justified’ (82%, n=142), 
with a spread across all countries. 12% (n=21) respondents indicated that it was 
‘rarely justified’ across all countries, except South Africa. No one from Cyprus, 
South Africa or the UAE indicated that it was ‘sometimes justified’ (5%, n=9). Only 
one respondent, who was in Pakistan, indicated that it was ‘always justified’.  
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A businessman bribing a public official to secure a contract which ensures 
viability and jobs within his company which is in difficult circumstances 
 Cyprus 
N=? 
(%) 
India 
N=? 
(%) 
Pakistan 
N=? 
(%) 
South 
Africa 
N=? 
(%) 
UAE 
N=? 
(%) 
UK & NI 
N=? 
(%) 
USA 
N=? 
(%) 
Other 
N=? 
(%) 
Total 
plus %  
of pop. 
N=? 
(%) 
 
Always 
Justified 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sometimes 
Justified 
0 1 
(1) 
4 
(2) 
0 1 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
0 0 7 
(4) 
Rarely 
Justified 
3 
(2) 
7 
(4) 
2 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
6 
(3) 
4 
(2) 
25 
(14) 
Never 
Justified 
16 
(9) 
20 
(12) 
8 
(5) 
14 
(8) 
9 
(5) 
19 
(11) 
29 
(17) 
26 
(15) 
141 
(82) 
 Total 
19 
(11) 
28 
(16) 
14 
(8) 
15 
(9) 
11 
(6) 
21 
(12) 
35 
(20) 
30 
(17) 
173 
(100) 
 
The majority of the respondents indicated that it was ‘never justified’ (82%, n=141), 
with a spread across all countries. 14% (n=25) respondents indicated that it was 
‘rarely justified’, across all countries. No one from Cyprus, South Africa, USA or the 
Other category indicated that it was ‘sometimes justified’ (4%, n=7). No one from 
any of the countries indicated that it was ‘always justified’.  
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Bribing a traffic police officer to avoid delays and a larger fine for a  
non-existent speeding offence 
 Cyprus 
N=? 
(%) 
India 
N=? 
(%) 
Pakistan 
N=? 
(%) 
South 
Africa 
N=? 
(%) 
UAE 
N=? 
(%) 
UK & NI 
N=? 
(%) 
USA 
N=? 
(%) 
Other 
N=? 
(%) 
Total 
plus % 
of pop. 
N=? 
(%) 
 
Always 
Justified 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
Sometimes 
Justified 
0 3 
(2) 
2 
(1) 
0 0 2 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
9 
(5) 
Rarely 
Justified 
3 
(2) 
3 
(2) 
4 
(2) 
0 3 
(2) 
3 
(2) 
3 
(2) 
4 
(2) 
23 
(13) 
Never 
Justified 
16 
(9) 
22 
(13) 
8 
(5) 
15 
(9) 
8 
(5) 
16 
(9) 
31 
(18) 
24 
(14) 
140 
(81) 
 Total 
19 
(11) 
28 
(16) 
14 
(8) 
15 
(9) 
11 
(6) 
21 
(12) 
35 
(20) 
30 
(17) 
173 
(100) 
 
The majority of the respondents indicated that it was ‘never justified’ (81%, n=140) 
and this was spread across all countries. No one from South Africa indicated that it 
was ‘rarely justified’ (13%, n=23). No one from Cyprus, South Africa or the UAE 
indicated that it was ‘sometimes justified’ (5%, n=9). Only one respondent from the 
Other category indicated that it was ‘always justified’.   
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Giving a gift to a Government Official during a tendering process 
 Cyprus 
N=? 
(%) 
India 
N=? 
(%) 
Pakistan 
N=? 
(%) 
South 
Africa 
N=? 
(%) 
UAE 
N=? 
(%) 
UK & 
NI 
N=? 
(%) 
USA 
N=? 
(%) 
Other 
N=? 
(%) 
Total plus 
% of pop. 
N=? 
(%) 
 
Always 
Justified 
0 1 
(1) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
(1) 
Sometimes 
Justified 
0 1 
(1) 
2 
(1) 
0 1 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
0 0 5 
(3) 
Rarely 
Justified 
2 
(1) 
4 
(2) 
1 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
2 
(1) 
2 
(1) 
4 
(2) 
5 
(3) 
21 
(12) 
Never 
Justified 
17 
(10) 
22 
(13) 
11 
(6) 
14 
(8) 
8 
(5) 
18 
(10) 
31 
(18) 
25 
(14) 
146 
(84) 
 Total 19 
(11) 
28 
(16) 
14 
(8) 
15 
(9) 
11 
(6) 
21 
(12) 
35 
(20) 
30 
(17) 
173 
(100) 
 
The majority of the respondents indicated that it was ‘never justified’ (84%, n=146), 
with a spread across all countries. 12% (n=21) indicated ‘rarely justified’, with a 
spread across all countries. No one from Cyprus, South Africa, USA or the Other 
category indicated that it was ‘sometimes justified’ (3%, n=5). Only one respondent 
(1%) from India indicated that it was ‘always justified’.  
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Always Justified  - A Country/Gender Analysis 
A cross-country comparison against gender was conducted for those scenarios that 
were considered ‘always justified’. The below table outlines the number of responses 
and gender split for each country across the 13 scenarios where ‘always justified’ 
was received. 
Strand I. The number, gender and country for the ‘always justified’ scenarios 
‘Always Justified’ Cyprus India  Pakistan South 
Africa 
UAE UK & NI USA Other  Total 
Claiming 
Government 
Benefits to which 
you are not entitled 
0 0 1x M 0 0 0 0 0 1x M 
Buying something 
that you know is 
stolen 
0 1x M 1x F 0 0 0 0 0 1x M 
1x F 
Taking Cannabis 0 0 2x F 2x M 0 1x F 2xM 
1x F 
0 4x M 
4x F 
Keeping money that 
you found in the 
street 
0 1x M 
1x F 
1x F 1x M 1x M 0 1x M 
1x F 
1x F 4x M 
4x F 
Lying in your own 
interest  
0 0 1xF 
1xM 
0 0 1x M 1x M 1xF 3x M 
2x F 
Having an affair 
when you are 
married 
1x M 0 1x F 0 0 0 0 0 1x M 
1x F 
Having sex under 
the legal age of 
consent 
0 2x F 
1x M 
1x F 0 0 0 0 2x F 1x M 
5x F 
Throwing away 
litter in a public 
place 
0 1x M 1x F 1x F 0 0 1x F 0 1x M 
3x F 
Avoiding a fare on 
public transport 
0 0 1x F 0 0 0 0 0 1x F 
Driving faster than 
the speed limit 
0 0 0 1x M 0 0 0 0 1x M 
Paying a 
Government Official 
to utilise a free 
service for example; 
to enter a library 
0 0 1x M 0 0 0 0 0 1xM 
Bribing a traffic 
police officer to 
avoid delays and a 
larger fine for a non-
existent speeding 
offence 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1x F 1x F 
Giving a gift to a 
Government Official 
during a tendering 
process 
0 1x M 0 0 0 0 0 0 1x M 
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Analysis of the breakdown of the respondents per country who indicated ‘always 
justified’ revealed that:  
• Cyprus - one male respondent across one scenario. 
• India - eight respondents across five scenarios. One male and one female felt 
that two of the scenarios were ‘always justified’. The remaining respondents, 
which consisted of three males and one female, indicated one scenario each. 
• Pakistan - three respondents across 10 scenarios. One male indicated three 
scenarios, one female indicated seven scenarios and one female indicated two 
scenarios.  
• South Africa - three respondents across four scenarios. One male indicated 
three scenarios and one male and one female indicated one scenario each. 
• UAE - one male across one scenario. 
• UK & NI - two respondents, one male and one female across two scenarios. 
• USA - seven respondents across four scenarios (four males and three females. 
One male and one female indicated the same scenario. Two males and one 
female indicated the same scenario, and one male and one female chose 
different scenarios.  
• Other - four female respondents across four scenarios. Two females chose the 
same scenario.  
 
Scale of Corruption across the Government/Public Sector, Private Sector and 
Non - Govt./ Non-Profit Organisation Sector - a cross country category 
breakdown (1 being not at all corrupt to 6 being very corrupt) 
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      Strand I. Scale of corruption in the Government/Public Sector 
 Cyprus 
N=? 
(%) 
India 
N=? 
(%) 
Pakistan 
N=? 
(%) 
South 
Africa 
N=? 
(%) 
UAE 
N=? 
(%) 
UK & 
NI N=? 
(%) 
USA 
N=? 
(%) 
Other 
N=? 
(%) 
Total 
plus % 
of pop. 
N=? 
(%) 
 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 (1) 0 
1 
(1) 
2 0 0 0 0 0 5 (3) 
4 
(2) 0 
9 
(5) 
3 0 0 0 0 2 (1) 
3 
(2) 
5 
(3) 
1 
(1) 
11 
(6) 
4 2 (1) 
8 
(5) 
2 
(1) 
2 
(1) 0 
5 
(3) 
6 
(3) 
7 
(4) 
32 
(18) 
5 6 (3) 
7 
(4) 
5 
(3) 
8 
(5) 
4 
(2) 
3 
(2) 
11 
(6) 
7 
(4) 
51 
(29) 
6 11 (6) 
13 
(8) 
7 
(4) 
5 
(3) 
5 
(3) 
5 
(3) 
8 
(5) 
15 
(9) 
69 
(40) 
Total 19 (11) 
28 
(16) 
14 
(8) 
15 
(9) 
11 
(6) 
21 
(12) 
35 
(20) 
30 
(17) 
173 
(100) 
 
Strand I. Scale of corruption in the Private Sector 
 Cyprus 
N=? 
(%) 
India 
N=? 
(%) 
Pakistan 
N=? 
(%) 
South 
Africa 
N=? 
(%) 
UAE 
N=? 
(%) 
UK & NI 
N=? 
(%) 
USA 
N=? 
(%) 
Other 
N=? 
(%) 
Total 
plus % 
of pop. 
N=? 
(%) 
 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 (1) 0 
1 
(1) 
2 0 9 (5) 
2 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
3 
(2) 
8 
(5) 
3 
(2) 
5 
(3) 
31 
(18) 
3 6 (3) 
9 
(5) 
2 
(1) 
2 
(1) 
5 
(3) 
3 
(2) 
12 
(7) 
7 
(4) 
46 
(27) 
4 7 (4) 
8 
(5) 
6 
(3) 
8 
(5) 0 
5 
(3) 
10 
(6) 
7 
(4) 
51 
(29) 
5 4 (2) 
2 
(1) 
2 
(1) 
2 
(1) 
3 
(2) 
2 
(1) 
5 
(3) 
8 
(5) 
28 
(16) 
6 2 (1) 0 
2 
(1) 
2 
(1) 0 
3 
(2) 
4 
(2) 
3 
(2) 
16 
(9) 
Total 19 (11) 
28 
(16) 
14 
(8) 
15 
(9) 
11 
(6) 
21 
(12) 
35 
(20) 
30 
(17) 
173 
(100) 
 
Strand I. Scale of corruption in the Non - Govt./ Non-Profit Organisation Sector 
 Cyprus 
N=? 
(%) 
India 
N=? 
(%) 
Pakistan 
N=? 
(%) 
South 
Africa 
N=? 
(%) 
UAE 
N=? 
(%) 
UK & NI 
N=? 
(%) 
USA 
N=? 
(%) 
Other 
N=? 
(%) 
Total 
plus % 
of pop. 
N=? 
(%) 
 
1 2 (1) 
0 0 2 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
0 7 
(4) 
2 1 (1) 
3 
(2) 
0 4 
(2) 
1 
(1) 
7 
(4) 
5 
(3) 
8 
(5) 
29 
(17) 
3 4 (2) 
9 
(5) 
3 
(2) 
6 
(3) 
5 
(3) 
8 
(5) 
11 
(6) 
12 
(7) 
58 
(34) 
4 6 (3) 
9 
(5) 
4 
(2) 
1 
(1) 
3 
(2) 
2 
(1) 
8 
(5) 
7 
(4) 
40 
(23) 
5 4 (2) 
4 
(2) 
5 
(3) 
1 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
9 
(5) 
3 
(2) 
28 
(16) 
6 2 (1) 
3 
(2) 
2 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
0 2 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
0 11 
(6) 
Total 19 (11) 
28 
(16) 
14 
(8) 
15 
(9) 
11 
(6) 
21 
(12) 
35 
(20) 
30 
(17) 
173 
(100) 
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Strand I. How corrupt is the following? ‘Giving a gift or money to a Public                                             
Official to obtain public services' 
 Cyprus 
N=? 
(%) 
India 
N=? 
(%) 
Pakistan 
N=? 
(%) 
South 
Africa 
N=? 
(%) 
UAE 
N=? 
(%) 
UK & NI 
N=? 
(%) 
USA 
N=? 
(%) 
Other 
N=? 
(%) 
Total 
plus % 
of pop. 
N=? 
(%) 
 
1 0  
0 0 0 1      
(1) 
0 0 0 1          
(1) 
2 0 1      (1) 
1       
(1) 
0 0 0 0 0 2         
(1) 
3 1       (1) 
1       
(1) 
0 0 0 2         
(1) 
0 1       
(1) 
5          
(3) 
4 0 1      (1) 
4        
(2) 
1        
(1) 
0 1       
(1) 
3      
(2) 
2       
(1) 
12     
(7) 
5 3       (2) 
3      
(2) 
2        
(1) 
5      
(3) 
2       
(1) 
4        
(2) 
4       
(2) 
5       
(3) 
28   
(16) 
6 15  (9) 
12  
(7) 
7           
(4) 
9      
(5) 
8       
(5) 
12  
(7) 
28 
(16) 
15  
(9) 
106  
(61) 
Blank 0 10  (6) 
0 0 0 2         
(1) 
0 7     
(4) 
19       
(11) 
Total 19  (11) 
28  
(16) 
14           
(8) 
15  
(9) 
11  
(6) 
21  
(12) 
35 
(20) 
30 
(17) 
173  
(100) 
 
A country breakdown of the susceptibility of certain sectors to corruption on a 
scale of 1 – 6 (1 being not susceptible to 6 being highly susceptible) 
Mining 
 
 Cyprus 
N=? 
(%) 
India 
N=? 
(%) 
Pakistan 
N=? 
(%) 
South 
Africa 
N=? 
(%) 
UAE 
N=? 
(%) 
UK & NI 
N=? 
(%) 
USA 
N=? 
(%) 
Other 
N=? 
(%) 
Total 
plus % 
of pop. 
N=? 
(%) 
 
1 0 1 (1) 0 0 
1 
(1) 0 
1 
(1) 0 
3 
(2) 
2 2 (1) 0 
1 
(1) 0 
1 
(1) 
2 
(1) 
3 
(2) 
1 
(1) 
10 
(6) 
3 2 (1) 
4 
(2) 
2 
(1) 0 
3 
(2) 
1 
(1) 
6 
(3) 
2 
(1) 
20 
(12) 
4 7 (4) 
6 
(3) 
4 
(2) 
4 
(2) 
2 
(1) 
3 
(2) 
2 
(1) 
7 
(4) 
35 
(20) 
5 5 (3) 
5 
(3) 
6 
(3) 
5 
(3) 
1 
(1) 
7 
(4) 
10 
(6) 
4 
(2) 
43 
(25) 
6 3 (2) 
11 
(6) 
1 
(1) 
6 
(3) 
3 
(2) 
7 
(4) 
13 
(8) 
16 
(9) 
60 
(35) 
Blanks 0 1 (1) 0 0 0 
1 
(1) 0 0 
2 
(1) 
Total 19 (11) 
28 
(16) 
14 
(8) 
15 
(9) 
11 
(6) 
21 
(12) 
35 
(20) 
30 
(17) 
173 
(100) 
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Oil & Gas 
 Cyprus 
N=? 
(%) 
India 
N=? 
(%) 
Pakistan 
N=? 
(%) 
South 
Africa 
N=? 
(%) 
UAE 
N=? 
(%) 
UK & NI 
N=? 
(%) 
USA 
N=? 
(%) 
Other 
N=? 
(%) 
Total 
plus % 
of pop. 
N=? 
(%) 
 
1 0 1 (1) 
0 0 0 0 1 
(1) 
0 2 
(1) 
2 0 0 0 0 0 1 (1) 
0 1 
(1) 
2 
(1) 
3 2 (1) 
2 
(1) 
2 
(1) 
0 4 
(2) 
1 
(1) 
4 
(2) 
1 
(1) 
16 
(9) 
4 3 (2) 
6 
(3) 
3 
(2) 
2 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
2 
(1) 
3 
(2) 
21 
(12) 
5 5 (3) 
6 
(3) 
5 
(3) 
5 
(3) 
4 
(2) 
8 
(5) 
11 
(6) 
5 
(3) 
49 
(28) 
6 9 (5) 
12 
(7) 
4 
(2) 
8 
(5) 
2 
(1) 
10 
(6) 
17 
(10) 
20 
(12) 
82 
(47) 
Blanks 0 1 (1) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
(1) 
Total 19 (11) 
28 
(16) 
14 
(8) 
15 
(9) 
11 
(6) 
21 
(12) 
35 
(20) 
30 
(17) 
173 
(100) 
 
Agriculture 
 Cyprus 
N=? 
(%) 
India 
N=? 
(%) 
Pakistan 
N=? 
(%) 
South 
Africa 
N=? 
(%) 
UAE 
N=? 
(%) 
UK & NI 
N=? 
(%) 
USA 
N=? 
(%) 
Other 
N=? 
(%) 
Total 
plus % 
of pop. 
N=? 
(%) 
 
1 1 (1) 
2 
(1) 
0 0 1 
(1) 
3 
(2) 
3 
(2) 
1 
(1) 
11 
(6) 
2 3 (2) 
4 
(2) 
1 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
3 
(2) 
4 
(2) 
3 
(2) 
4 
(2) 
23 
(13) 
3 5 (3) 
6 
(3) 
2 
(1) 
7 
(4) 
3 
(2) 
6 
(3) 
9 
(5) 
4 
(2) 
42 
(24) 
4 4 (2) 
5 
(3) 
6 
(3) 
4 
(2) 
2 
(1) 
3 
(2) 
10 
(6) 
8 
(5) 
42 
(24) 
5 5 (3) 
8 
(5) 
5 
(3) 
2 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
3 
(2) 
5 
(3) 
6 
(3) 
35 
(20) 
6 1 (1) 
2 
(1) 
0 1 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
2 
(1) 
5 
(3) 
7 
(4) 
19 
(11) 
Blank 0 1 (1) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
(1) 
Total 19 (11) 
28 
(16) 
14 
(8) 
15 
(9) 
11 
(6) 
21 
(12) 
35 
(20) 
30 
(17) 
173 
(100) 
 
Forestry 
 Cyprus 
N=? 
(%) 
India 
N=? 
(%) 
Pakistan 
N=? 
(%) 
South 
Africa 
N=? 
(%) 
UAE 
N=? 
(%) 
UK & NI 
N=? 
(%) 
USA 
N=? 
(%) 
Other 
N=? 
(%) 
Total 
plus % 
of pop. 
N=? 
(%) 
 
1 2 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
0 0 0 1 
(1) 
3 
(2) 
0 7 
(4) 
2 3 
(2) 
1 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
0 4 
(2) 
8 
(5) 
4 
(2) 
22 
(13) 
3 6 
(3) 
5 
(3) 
1 
(1) 
6 
(3) 
3 
(2) 
2 
(1) 
8 
(5) 
8 
(5) 
39 
(23) 
4 4 
(2) 
7 
(4) 
2 
(1) 
5 
(3) 
2 
(1) 
7 
(4) 
4 
(2) 
4 
(2) 
35 
(20) 
5 2 
(1) 
8 
(5) 
7 
(4) 
1 
(1) 
2 
(1) 
4 
(2) 
7 
(4) 
4 
(2) 
35 
(20) 
6 2 
(1) 
5 
(3) 
3 
(2) 
2 
(1) 
4 
(2) 
3 
(2) 
5 
(3) 
10 
(6) 
34 
(20) 
Blanks 0 1 
(1) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
(1) 
Total 19 
(11) 
28 
(16) 
14 
(8) 
15 
(9) 
11 
(6) 
21 
(12) 
35 
(20) 
30 
(17) 
173 
(100) 
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Fishing & Hunting 
 Cyprus 
N=? 
(%) 
India 
N=? 
(%) 
Pakistan 
N=? 
(%) 
South 
Africa 
N=? 
(%) 
UAE 
N=? 
(%) 
UK&NI 
N=? 
(%) 
USA 
N=? 
(%) 
Other 
N=? 
(%) 
Total 
plus % of 
pop. 
N=? 
(%) 
 
1 2 (1) 
1 
(1) 
0 0 1 
(1) 
0 3 
(2) 
1 
(1) 
8 
(5) 
2 2 (1) 
4 
(2) 
1 
(1) 
2 
(1) 
3 
(2) 
5 
(3) 
9 
(5) 
5 
(3) 
31 
(18) 
3 7 (4) 
8 
(5) 
4 
(2) 
4 
(2) 
1 
(1) 
7 
(4) 
12 
(7) 
8 
(5) 
51 
(29) 
4 4 (2) 
5 
(3) 
1 
(1) 
3 
(2) 
3 
(2) 
3 
(2) 
2 
(1) 
7 
(4) 
28 
(16) 
5 1 (1) 
6 
(3) 
5 
(3) 
4 
(2) 
1 
(1) 
5 
(3) 
4 
(2) 
5 
(3) 
31 
(18) 
6 3 (2) 
3 
(2) 
3 
(2) 
2 
(1) 
2 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
5 
(3) 
4 
(2) 
23 
(13) 
Blanks 0 1 (1) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
(1) 
Total 19 (11) 
28 
(16) 
14 
(8) 
15 
(9) 
11 
(6) 
21 
(12) 
35 
(20) 
30 
(17) 
173 
(100) 
 
Banking & Financial Services 
 Cyprus 
N=? 
(%) 
India 
N=? 
(%) 
Pakistan 
N=? 
(%) 
South 
Africa 
N=? 
(%) 
UAE 
N=? 
(%) 
UK&NI 
N=? 
(%) 
USA 
N=? 
(%) 
Other 
N=? 
(%) 
Total 
plus % of 
pop. 
N=? 
(%) 
 
1 0 1 (1) 
1 
(1) 
0 0 2 
(1) 
3 
(2) 
0 7 
(4) 
2 0 6 (3) 
3 
(2) 
1 
(1) 
3 
(2) 
4 
(2) 
2 
(1) 
5 
(3) 
24 
(14) 
3 1 (1) 
5 
(3) 
1 
(1) 
0 2 
(1) 
2 
(1) 
8 
(5) 
4 
(2) 
23 
(13) 
4 3 (2) 
9 
(5) 
1 
(1) 
5 
(3) 
3 
(2) 
4 
(2) 
8 
(5) 
7 
(4) 
40 
(23) 
5 4 (2) 
4 
(2) 
4 
(2) 
6 
(3) 
3 
(2) 
4 
(2) 
6 
(3) 
6 
(3) 
37 
(21) 
6 11 (6) 
2 
(1) 
4 
(2) 
3 
(2) 
0 5 
(3) 
8 
(5) 
8 
(5) 
41 
(24) 
Blanks 0 1(1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 1(1) 
Total 19 (11) 
28 
(16) 
14 
(8) 
15 
(9) 
11 
(6) 
21 
(12) 
35 
(20) 
30 
(17) 
173 
(100) 
 
Government & Public Administration 
 Cyprus 
N=? 
(%) 
India 
N=? 
(%) 
Pakistan 
N=? 
(%) 
South 
Africa 
N=? 
(%) 
UAE 
N=? 
(%) 
UK&NI 
N=? 
(%) 
USA 
N=? 
(%) 
Other 
N=? 
(%) 
Total plus 
% of pop. 
N=? 
(%) 
 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 0 0 0 0 0 2 (1) 
4 
(2) 
0 6 
(3) 
3 0 3 (2) 
0 0 0 2 
(1) 
0 2 
(1) 
7 
(4) 
4 2 (1) 
3 
(2) 
2 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
0 2 
(1) 
3 
(2) 
1 
(1) 
14 
(8) 
5 4 (2) 
8 
(5) 
2 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
3 
(2) 
8 
(5) 
12 
(7) 
7 
(4) 
45 
(26) 
6 13 (8) 
13 
(8) 
10 
(6) 
13 
(8) 
8 
(5) 
7 
(4) 
16 
(9) 
20 
(12) 
100 
(58) 
Blanks 0 1 (1) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
(1) 
Total 19 (11) 
28 
(16) 
14 
(8) 
15 
(9) 
11 
(6) 
21 
(12) 
35 
(20) 
30 
(17) 
173 
(100) 
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Construction 
 Cyprus 
N=? 
(%) 
India 
N=? 
(%) 
Pakistan 
N=? 
(%) 
South 
Africa 
N=? 
(%) 
UAE 
N=? 
(%) 
UK&NI 
N=? 
(%) 
USA 
N=? 
(%) 
Other 
N=? 
(%) 
Total plus 
% of pop. 
N=? 
(%) 
 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 (1) 
0 1 
(1) 
2 1 (1) 
0 0 0 0 3 
(2) 
1 
(1) 
0 5 
(3) 
3 2 (1) 
6 
(3) 
2 
(1) 
0 1 
(1) 
0 1 
(1) 
2 
(1) 
14 
(8) 
4 4 (2) 
6 
(3) 
1 
(1) 
5 
(3) 
1 
(1) 
5 
(3) 
6 
(3) 
3 
(2) 
31 
(18) 
5 2 (1) 
4 
(2) 
7 
(4) 
4 
(2) 
4 
(2) 
5 
(3) 
15 
(9) 
8 
(5) 
49 
(28) 
6 10 (6) 
11 
(6) 
4 
(2) 
6 
(3) 
5 
(3) 
8 
(5) 
11 
(6) 
17 
(10) 
72 
(42) 
Blanks 0 1 (1) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1(1) 
Total 19 (11) 
28 
(16) 
14 
(8) 
15 
(9) 
11 
(6) 
21 
(12) 
35 
(20) 
30 
(17) 
173 
(100) 
 
Manufacturing 
 Cyprus 
N=? 
(%) 
India 
N=? 
(%) 
Pakistan 
N=? 
(%) 
South 
Africa 
N=? 
(%) 
UAE 
N=? 
(%) 
UK&NI 
N=? 
(%) 
USA 
N=? 
(%) 
Other 
N=? 
(%) 
Total plus 
% of pop. 
N=? 
(%) 
 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1(1)  1(1) 
2 1 (1) 
1 
(1) 
0 2 
(1) 
0 7 
(4) 
8 
(5) 
3 
(2) 
22 
(13) 
3 6 (3) 
10 
(6) 
2 
(1) 
3 
(2) 
4 
(2) 
3 
(2) 
6 
(3) 
8 
(5) 
42 
(24) 
4 5 (3) 
7 
(4) 
2 
(1) 
5 
(3) 
4 
(2) 
5 
(3) 
12 
(7) 
13 
(8) 
53 
(31) 
5 6 (3) 
4 
(2) 
8 
(5) 
5 
(3) 
3 
(2) 
3 
(2) 
5 
(3) 
4 
(2) 
38 
(22) 
6 1 (1) 
5 
(3) 
2 
(1) 
0 0 3 
(2) 
3 
(2) 
2 
(1) 
16 
(9) 
Blanks 0 1 (1) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
(1) 
Total 19 (11) 
28 
(16) 
14 
(8) 
15 
(9) 
11 
(6) 
21 
(12) 
35 
(20) 
30 
(17) 
173 
(100) 
 
Consumer Retail 
 Cyprus 
N=? 
(%) 
India 
N=? 
(%) 
Pakistan 
N=? 
(%) 
South 
Africa 
N=? 
(%) 
UAE 
N=? 
(%) 
UK&N
I 
N=? 
(%) 
USA 
N=? 
(%) 
Other 
N=? 
(%) 
Total plus 
% of pop. 
N=? 
(%) 
 
1 1 (1) 
2 
(1) 
0 0 2 
(1) 
3 
(2) 
1 
(1) 
0 9 
(5) 
2 4 (2) 
4 
(2) 
0 4 
(2) 
3 
(2) 
7 
(4) 
12 
(7) 
5 
(3) 
39 
(23) 
3 5 (3) 
6 
(3) 
4 
(2) 
3 
(2) 
4 
(2) 
4 
(2) 
9 
(5) 
10 
(6) 
45 
(26) 
4 6 (3) 
10 
(6) 
2 
(1) 
5 
(3) 
1 
(1) 
3 
(2) 
8 
(5) 
8 
(5) 
43 
(25) 
5 2 (1) 
3 
(2) 
4 
(2) 
2 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
2 
(1) 
4 
(2) 
6 
(3) 
24 
(14) 
6 1 (1) 
2 
(1) 
4 
(2) 
1 
(1) 
 2 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
12 
(7) 
Blanks 0 1 (1) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
(1) 
Total 19 (11) 
28 
(16) 
14 
(8) 
15 
(9) 
11 
(6) 
21 
(12) 
35 
(20) 
30 
(17) 
173 
(100) 
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Technology 
 Cyprus 
N=? 
(%) 
India 
N=? 
(%) 
Pakistan 
N=? 
(%) 
South 
Africa 
N=? 
(%) 
UAE 
N=? 
(%) 
UK&NI 
N=? 
(%) 
USA 
N=? 
(%) 
Other 
N=? 
(%) 
Total plus 
% of pop. 
N=? 
(%) 
 
1 0 2  (1) 
0 0 0 3  
(2) 
2  
(1) 
0 7  
(4) 
2 2  (1) 
5  
(3) 
3  
(2) 
2  
(1) 
4  
(2) 
5  
(3) 
13  
(8) 
7  
(4) 
41  
(24) 
3 6  (3) 
13  
(8) 
3  
(2) 
7  
(4) 
3  
(2) 
6  
(3) 
4  
(2) 
9  
(5) 
51  
(29) 
4 7  (4) 
1  
(1) 
2  
(1) 
2  
(1) 
3  
(2) 
4  
(2) 
7  
(4) 
4  
(2) 
30  
(17) 
5 2  (1) 
4  
(2) 
3  
(2) 
2  
(1) 
1  
(1) 
1  
(1) 
5  
(3) 
7  
(4) 
25  
(14) 
6 2  (1) 
2  
(1) 
3  
(2) 
2  
(1) 
0 2  
(1) 
4  
(2) 
3  
(2) 
18  
(10) 
Blanks 0 1  (1) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1  
(1) 
Total 19 (11) 
28 
(16) 
14 
(8) 
15 
(9) 
11 
(6) 
21 
(12) 
35 
(20) 
30 
(17) 
173 
(100) 
 
Healthcare 
 Cyprus 
N=? 
(%) 
India 
N=? 
(%) 
Pakistan 
N=? 
(%) 
South 
Africa 
N=? 
(%) 
UAE 
N=? 
(%) 
UK&NI 
N=? 
(%) 
USA 
N=? 
(%) 
Other 
N=? 
(%) 
Total plus 
% of pop. 
N=? 
(%) 
 
1 0 0 0 0 1 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
3 
(2) 
1 
(1) 
6 
(3) 
2 0 4 
(2) 
0 0 0 3 
(2) 
7 
(4) 
3 
(2) 
17 
(10) 
3 0 8 
(5) 
0 0 4 
(2) 
0 0 5 
(3) 
17 
(10) 
4 0 3 
(2) 
0 0 4 
(2) 
2 
(1) 
8 
(5) 
4 
(2) 
21 
(12) 
5 0 5 
(3) 
0 0 0 3 
(2) 
5 
(3) 
6 
(3) 
19 
(11) 
6 1 
(1) 
4 
(2) 
0 0 2 
(1) 
3 
(2) 
6 
(3) 
8 
(5) 
24 
(14) 
Blanks 18 
(10) 
4 
(2) 
14 
(8) 
15 
(9) 
0 9 
(5) 
6 
(3) 
3 
(2) 
69 
(40) 
Total 19 
(11) 
28 
(16) 
14 
(8) 
15 
(9) 
11 
(6) 
21 
(12) 
35 
(20) 
30 
(17) 
173 
(100) 
 
Effects of Corruption 
Government Efficiency 
 Cyprus 
N=? 
(%) 
India 
N=? 
(%) 
Pakistan 
N=? 
(%) 
South 
Africa 
N=? 
(%) 
UAE 
N=? 
(%) 
UK&N
I 
N=? 
(%) 
USA 
N=? 
(%) 
Other 
N=? 
(%) 
Total plus 
% of pop. 
N=? 
(%) 
 
Major Effect 16 (9) 
22 
(13) 
14 
(8) 
13 
(8) 
10 
(6) 
19 
(11) 
27 
(16) 
27 
(16) 
148 
(86) 
Some Effect 3 (2) 
4 
(2) 
0 1 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
2 
(1) 
7 
(4) 
1 
(1) 
19 
(11) 
Limited 
Effect 
0 1 
(1) 
0 0 0 0 0 1 
(1) 
2 
(1) 
No Effect 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 (1) 
1 
(1) 
Don't know 0 1 (1) 
0 1 
(1) 
0 0 1 
(1) 
0 3 
(2) 
Total 19 (11) 
28 
(16) 
14 
(8) 
15 
(9) 
11 
(6) 
21 
(12) 
35 
(20) 
30 
(17) 
173 
(100) 
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Political / Legal Life 
 Cyprus 
N=? 
(%) 
India 
N=? 
(%) 
Pakistan 
N=? 
(%) 
South 
Africa 
N=? 
(%) 
UAE 
N=? 
(%) 
UK&NI 
N=? 
(%) 
USA 
N=? 
(%) 
Other 
N=? 
(%) 
Total 
plus % of 
pop. 
N=? 
(%) 
 
Major 
Effect 
18 
(10) 
21 
(12) 
13 
(8) 
12 
(7) 
10 
(6) 
20 
(12) 
28 
(16) 
23 
(13) 
145 
(84) 
Some 
Effect 
1 
(1) 
4 
(2) 
0 2 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
7 
(4) 
5 
(3) 
21 
(12) 
Limited 
Effect 
0 1 
(1 
1 
(1) 
0 0 0 0 1 
(1) 
3 
(2) 
No 
Effect 
0 1 
(1) 
0 0 0 0 0 1 
(1) 
2 
(1) 
Don't 
know 
0 1 
(1) 
0 1 
(1) 
0 0 0 0 2 
(1) 
Total 19 (11) 
28 
(16) 
14 
(8) 
15 
(9) 
11 
(6) 
21 
(12) 
35 
(20) 
30 
(17) 
173 
(100) 
 
 
A Nation's Development 
 Cyprus 
N=? 
(%) 
India 
N=? 
(%) 
Pakistan 
N=? 
(%) 
South 
Africa 
N=? 
(%) 
UAE 
N=? 
(%) 
UK&NI 
N=? 
(%) 
USA 
N=? 
(%) 
Other 
N=? 
(%) 
Total 
plus %  
of pop. 
N=? 
(%) 
 
Major 
Effect 
18 
(10) 
21 
(12) 
14 
(8) 
14 
(8) 
10 
(6) 
19 
(11) 
24 
(14) 
22 
(13) 
142 
(82) 
Some 
Effect 
1 
(1) 
6 
(3) 
0 0 1 
(1) 
2 
(1) 
10 
(6) 
7 
(4) 
27 
(16) 
Limited 
Effect 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
(1) 
0 1 
(1) 
No 
Effect 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
Don't 
know 
0 1 
(1) 
0 1 
(1) 
0 0 0 0 2 
(1) 
Total 19 (11) 
28 
(16) 
14 
(8) 
15 
(9) 
11 
(6) 
21 
(12) 
35 
(20) 
30 
(17) 
173 
(100) 
 
 
Trust in Government 
 Cyprus 
N=? 
(%) 
India 
N=? 
(%) 
Pakistan 
N=? 
(%) 
South 
Africa 
N=? 
(%) 
UAE 
N=? 
(%) 
UK&N
I 
N=? 
(%) 
USA 
N=? 
(%) 
Other 
N=? 
(%) 
Total 
plus %  
of pop. 
N=? 
(%) 
 
Major 
Effect 
18 
(10) 
19 
(11) 
13 
(8) 
12 
(7) 
10 
(6) 
20 
(12) 
25 
(14) 
24 
(14) 
141 
(82) 
Some 
Effect 
1 
(1) 
6 
(3) 
1 
(1) 
2 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
9 
(5) 
4 
(2) 
25 
(14) 
Limited 
Effect 
0 2 
(1) 
0 0 0 0 1 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
4 
(2) 
No 
Effect 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
Don't 
know 
0 1 
(1) 
0 1 
(1) 
0 0 0 0 2 
(1) 
Total 19 (11) 
28 
(16) 
14 
(8) 
15 
(9) 
11 
(6) 
21 
(12) 
35 
(20) 
30 
(17) 
173 
(100) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 284 
Society's Ruling Values / Ethics 
 Cyprus 
N=? 
(%) 
India 
N=? 
(%) 
Pakistan 
N=? 
(%) 
South 
Africa 
N=? 
(%) 
UAE 
N=? 
(%) 
UK&NI 
N=? 
(%) 
USA 
N=? 
(%) 
Other 
N=? 
(%) 
Total 
plus % 
of pop. 
N=? 
(%) 
 
Major 
Effect 
16 
(9) 
17 
(10) 
11 
(6) 
12 
(7) 
9 
(5) 
18 
(10) 
23 
(13) 
25 
(14) 
131 
(76) 
Some 
Effect 
3 
(2) 
9 
(5) 
3 
(2) 
3 
(2) 
2 
(1) 
3 
(2) 
10 
(6) 
2 
(1) 
35 
(20) 
Limited 
Effect 
0 1 
(1) 
0 0 0 0 2 
(1) 
2 
(1) 
5 
(3) 
No 
Effect 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
Don't 
know 
0 1 
(1) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
(1) 
Total 19 
(11) 
28 
(16) 
14 
(8) 
15 
(9) 
11 
(6) 
21 
(12) 
35 
(20) 
30 
(17) 
173 
(100) 
 
 
 
 
Economic / Trade activity 
 Cyprus 
N=? 
(%) 
India 
N=? 
(%) 
Pakistan 
N=? 
(%) 
South 
Africa 
N=? 
(%) 
UAE 
N=? 
(%) 
UK&N
I 
N=? 
(%) 
USA 
N=? 
(%) 
Other 
N=? 
(%) 
Total 
plus % 
of pop. 
N=? 
(%) 
 
Major 
Effect 
16 
(9) 
17 
(10) 
10 
(6) 
13 
(8) 
8 
(5) 
14 
(8) 
20 
(12) 
21 
(12) 
119 
(69) 
Some 
Effect 
3 
(2) 
8 
(5) 
3 
(2) 
2 
(1) 
2 
(1) 
5 
(3) 
13 
(8) 
7 
(4) 
43 
(25) 
Limited 
Effect 
0 2 
(1) 
0 0 1 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
2 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
7 
(4) 
No 
Effect 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
Don't 
know 
0 1 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
0 0 1 
(1) 
0 0 3 
(2) 
Total 19 (11) 
28 
(16) 
14 
(8) 
15 
(9) 
11 
(6) 
21 
(12) 
35 
(20) 
30 
(17) 
173 
(100) 
 
 
Society's Customs and Manners 
 Cyprus 
N=? 
(%) 
India 
N=? 
(%) 
Pakistan 
N=? 
(%) 
South 
Africa 
N=? 
(%) 
UAE 
N=? 
(%) 
UK&NI 
N=? 
(%) 
USA 
N=? 
(%) 
Other 
N=? 
(%) 
Total 
plus % 
of pop. 
N=? 
(%) 
 
Major 
Effect 
14 
(8) 
13 
(8) 
9 
(5) 
7 
(4) 
8 
(5) 
17 
(10) 
18 
(10) 
19 
(11) 
105 
(61) 
Some 
Effect 
4 
(2) 
9 
(5) 
4 
(2) 
7 
(4) 
2 
(1) 
4 
(2) 
11 
(6) 
7 
(4) 
48 
(28) 
Limited 
Effect 
1 
(1) 
5 
(3) 
1 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
0 6 
(3) 
3 
(2) 
18 
(10) 
No 
Effect 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
Don't 
know 
0 1 
(1) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
(1) 
Total 19 (11) 
28 
(16) 
14 
(8) 
15 
(9) 
11 
(6) 
21 
(12) 
35 
(20) 
30 
(17) 
173 
(100) 
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Healthcare 
 Cyprus 
N=? 
(%) 
India 
N=? 
(%) 
Pakistan 
N=? 
(%) 
South 
Africa 
N=? 
(%) 
UAE 
N=? 
(%) 
UK&NI 
N=? 
(%) 
USA 
N=? 
(%) 
Other 
N=? 
(%) 
Total 
plus % 
of pop. 
N=? 
(%) 
 
Major 
Effect 
14 
(8) 
8 
(5) 
10 
(6) 
6 
(3) 
4 
(2) 
8 
(5) 
11 
(6) 
11 
(6) 
72 
(42) 
Some 
Effect 
5 
(3) 
13 
(8) 
3 
(2) 
9 
(5) 
3 
(2) 
5 
(3) 
13 
(8) 
9 
(5) 
60 
(35) 
Limited 
Effect 
0 4 
(2) 
1 
(1) 
0 1 
(1) 
8 
(5) 
11 
(6) 
8 
(5) 
33 
(19) 
No 
Effect 
0 2 
(1) 
0 0 3 
(2) 
0 0 2 
(1) 
7 
(4) 
Don't 
know 
0 1 
(1) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
(1) 
Total 19 (11) 
28 
(16) 
14 
(8) 
15 
(9) 
11 
(6) 
21 
(12) 
35 
(20) 
30 
(17) 
173 
(100) 
 
 
 
Private / Family / Tribal Life 
 Cyprus 
N=? 
(%) 
India 
N=? 
(%) 
Pakistan 
N=? 
(%) 
South 
Africa 
N=? 
(%) 
UAE 
N=? 
(%) 
UK&NI 
N=? 
(%) 
USA 
N=? 
(%) 
Other 
N=? 
(%) 
Total 
plus % 
of pop. 
N=? 
(%) 
 
Major 
Effect 
8 
(5) 
9 
(5) 
8 
(5) 
3 
(2) 
1 
(1) 
7 
(4) 
7 
(4) 
14 
(8) 
57 
(33) 
Some 
Effect 
11 
(6) 
11 
(6) 
3 
(2) 
10 
(6) 
7 
(4) 
10 
(6) 
15 
(9) 
9 
(5) 
76 
(44) 
Limited 
Effect 
0 7 
(4) 
3 
(2) 
2 
(1) 
2 
(1) 
4 
(2) 
10 
(6) 
4 
(2) 
32 
(18) 
No 
Effect 
0 0 0 0 1 
(1) 
0 2 
(1) 
3 
(2) 
6 
(3) 
Don't 
know 
0 1 
(1) 
0 0 0 0 1 
(1) 
0 2 
(1) 
Total 19 (11) 
28 
(16) 
14 
(8) 
15 
(9) 
11 
(6) 
21 
(12) 
35 
(20) 
30 
(17) 
173 
(100) 
 
 
 
Education Profession 
 Cyprus 
N=? 
(%) 
India 
N=? 
(%) 
Pakistan 
N=? 
(%) 
South 
Africa 
N=? 
(%) 
UAE 
N=? 
(%) 
UK&NI 
N=? 
(%) 
USA 
N=? 
(%) 
Other 
N=? 
(%) 
Total 
plus % 
of pop. 
N=? 
(%) 
 
Major 
Effect 
7 
(4) 
13 
(8) 
6 
(3) 
5 
(3) 
4 
(2) 
6 
(3) 
11 
(6) 
13 
(8) 
65 
(38) 
Some 
Effect 
12 
(7) 
12 
(7) 
8 
(5) 
8 
(5) 
5 
(3) 
6 
(3) 
20 
(12) 
15 
(9) 
86 
(50) 
Limited 
Effect 
0 2 
(1) 
0 2 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
7 
(4) 
4 
(2) 
1 
(1) 
17 
(10) 
No 
Effect 
0 0 0 0 1 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
0 1 
(1) 
3 
(2) 
Don't 
know 
0 1 
(1) 
0 0 0 1 
(1) 
0 0 2 
(1) 
Total 19 (11) 
28 
(16) 
14 
(8) 
15 
(9) 
11 
(6) 
21 
(12) 
35 
(20) 
30 
(17) 
173 
(100) 
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Seriousness of different issues (1 being the least to 6 being the most serious) 
 
Unemployment  
 Cyprus 
N=? 
(%) 
India 
N=? 
(%) 
Pakistan 
N=? 
(%) 
South 
Africa 
N=? 
(%) 
UAE 
N=? 
(%) 
UK&NI 
N=? 
(%) 
USA 
N=? 
(%) 
Other 
N=? 
(%) 
Total 
plus % 
of pop. 
N=? 
(%) 
 
1 0 0 1 (1) 
0 1 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
0 1 
(1) 
4 
(2) 
2 0 2 (1) 
0 0 0 5 
(3) 
4 
(2) 
5 
(3) 
16 
(9) 
3 0 4 (2) 
1 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
3 
(2) 
4 
(2) 
9 
(5) 
3 
(2) 
24 
(14) 
4 2 (1) 
8 
(5) 
0 0 1 
(1) 
5 
(3) 
8 
(5) 
6 
(3) 
30 
(17) 
5 7 (4) 
3 
(2) 
2 
(1) 
4 
(2) 
3 
(2) 
4 
(2) 
6 
(3) 
7 
(4) 
36 
(21) 
6 10 (6) 
11 
(6) 
10 
(6) 
10 
(6) 
3 
(2) 
2 
(1) 
8 
(5) 
8 
(5) 
62 
(36) 
Blanks 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 19 (11) 
28 
(16) 
14 
(8) 
15 
(9) 
11 
(6) 
21 
(12) 
35 
(20) 
30 
(17) 
173 
(100) 
 
Healthcare Provision 
 Cyprus 
N=? 
(%) 
India 
N=? 
(%) 
Pakistan 
N=? 
(%) 
South 
Africa 
N=? 
(%) 
UAE 
N=? 
(%) 
UK&NI 
N=? 
(%) 
USA 
N=? 
(%) 
Other 
N=? 
(%) 
Total 
plus % 
of pop. 
N=? 
(%) 
 
1 0 0 1 (1) 
0 1 
(1) 
0 0 1 
(1) 
3 
(2) 
2 1 (1) 
2 
(1) 
0 2 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
4 
(2) 
2 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
13 
(8) 
3 0 5 (3) 
0 0 2 
(1) 
5 
(3) 
8 
(5) 
6 
(3) 
26 
(15) 
4 3 (2) 
9 
(5) 
0 3 
(2) 
4 
(2) 
4 
(2) 
4 
(2) 
8 
(5) 
35 
(20) 
5 5 (3) 
3 
(2) 
3 
(2) 
4 
(2) 
3 
(2) 
4 
(2) 
12 
(7) 
8 
(5) 
42 
(24) 
6 10 (6) 
9 
(5) 
10 
(6) 
6 
(3) 
0 4 
(2) 
9 
(5) 
6 
(3) 
54 
(31) 
Blanks 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 19 (11) 
28 
(16) 
14 
(8) 
15 
(9) 
11 
(6) 
21 
(12) 
35 
(20) 
30 
(17) 
173 
(100) 
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Economy 
 Cyprus 
N=? 
(%) 
India 
N=? 
(%) 
Pakistan 
N=? 
(%) 
South 
Africa 
N=? 
(%) 
UAE 
N=? 
(%) 
UK&NI 
N=? 
(%) 
USA 
N=? 
(%) 
Other 
N=? 
(%) 
Total 
plus % 
of pop. 
N=? 
(%) 
 
1 0 0 1 (1) 
0 1 
(1) 
0 0 2 
(1) 
4 
(2) 
2 0 2 (1) 
1 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
0 6 
(3) 
3 
(2) 
1 
(1) 
14 
(8) 
3 2 (1) 
4 
(2) 
0 1 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
3 
(2) 
4 
(2) 
16 
(9) 
4 2 (1) 
9 
(5) 
1 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
5 
(3) 
6 
(3) 
26 
(15) 
5 7 (4) 
7 
(4) 
4 
(2) 
6 
(3) 
5 
(3) 
9 
(5) 
13 
(8) 
6 
(3) 
57 
(33) 
6 8 (5) 
6 
(3) 
7 
(4) 
6 
(3) 
3 
(2) 
4 
(2) 
11 
(6) 
11 
(6) 
56 
(32) 
Blanks 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 19 (11) 
28 
(16) 
14 
(8) 
15 
(9) 
11 
(6) 
21 
(12) 
35 
(20) 
30 
(17) 
173 
(100) 
 
 
Education 
 Cyprus 
N=? 
(%) 
India 
N=? 
(%) 
Pakistan 
N=? 
(%) 
South 
Africa 
N=? 
(%) 
UAE 
N=? 
(%) 
UK&NI 
N=? 
(%) 
USA 
N=? 
(%) 
Other 
N=? 
(%) 
Total 
plus % 
of pop. 
N=? 
(%) 
 
1 1 (1) 
0 1 
(1) 
0 1 
(1) 
0 1 
(1) 
2 
(1) 
6 
(3) 
2 0 4 (2) 
0 1 
(1) 
2 
(1) 
3 
(2) 
3 
(2) 
2 
(1) 
15 
(9) 
3 4 (2) 
3 
(2) 
0 3 
(2) 
2 
(1) 
5 
(3) 
5 
(3) 
1 
(1) 
23 
(13) 
4 5 (3) 
8 
(5) 
1 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
4 
(2) 
4 
(2) 
8 
(5) 
5 
(3) 
36 
(21) 
5 5 (3) 
4 
(2) 
1 
(1) 
2 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
5 
(3) 
13 
(8) 
9 
(5) 
40 
(23) 
6 4 (2) 
9 
(5) 
11 
(6) 
8 
(5) 
1 
(1) 
4 
(2) 
5 
(3) 
11 
(6) 
53 
(31) 
Blanks 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 19 (11) 
28 
(16) 
14 
(8) 
15 
(9) 
11 
(6) 
21 
(12) 
35 
(20) 
30 
(17) 
173 
(100) 
 
Climate Change 
 Cyprus 
N=? 
(%) 
India 
N=? 
(%) 
Pakistan 
N=? 
(%) 
South 
Africa 
N=? 
(%) 
UAE 
N=? 
(%) 
UK&NI 
N=? 
(%) 
USA 
N=? 
(%) 
Other 
N=? 
(%) 
Total 
plus % 
of pop. 
N=? 
(%) 
 
1 2 (1) 
1 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
2 
(1) 
2 
(1) 
2 
(1) 
3 
(2) 
2 
(1) 
15 
(9) 
2 5 (3) 
4 
(2) 
2 
(1) 
4 
(2) 
1 
(1) 
4 
(2) 
1 
(1) 
10 
(6) 
31 
(18) 
3 5 (3) 
5 
(3) 
1 
(1) 
3 
(2) 
4 
(2) 
3 
(2) 
7 
(4) 
2 
(1) 
30 
(17) 
4 4 (2) 
6 
(3) 
2 
(1) 
3 
(2) 
2 
(1) 
6 
(3) 
5 
(3) 
8 
(5) 
36 
(21) 
5 2 (1) 
5 
(3) 
5 
(3) 
2 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
5 
(3) 
12 
(7) 
4 
(2) 
36 
(21) 
6 1 (1) 
7 
(4) 
3 
(2) 
1 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
7 
(4) 
4 
(2) 
25 
(14) 
Blanks 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 19 (11) 
28 
(16) 
14 
(8) 
15 
(9) 
11 
(6) 
21 
(12) 
35 
(20) 
30 
(17) 
173 
(100) 
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Crime 
 Cyprus 
N=? 
(%) 
India 
N=? 
(%) 
Pakistan 
N=? 
(%) 
South 
Africa 
N=? 
(%) 
UAE 
N=? 
(%) 
UK&NI 
N=? 
(%) 
USA 
N=? 
(%) 
Other 
N=? 
(%) 
Total 
plus % 
of pop. 
N=? 
(%) 
 
1 0 0 1 (1) 
0 3 
(2) 
0 0 2 
(1) 
6 
(3) 
2 0 1 (1) 
0 0 1 
(1) 
7 
(4) 
3 
(2) 
3 
(2) 
15 
(9) 
3 3 (2) 
3 
(2) 
0 0 1 
(1) 
3 
(2) 
7 
(4) 
5 
(3) 
22 
(13) 
4 2 (1) 
8 
(5) 
1 
(1) 
2 
(1) 
0 4 
(2) 
11 
(6) 
3 
(2) 
31 
(18) 
5 6 (3) 
1 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
4 
(2) 
4 
(2) 
2 
(1) 
4 
(2) 
7 
(4) 
29 
(17) 
6 8 (5) 
15 
(9) 
11 
(6) 
9 
(5) 
2 
(1) 
5 
(3) 
10 
(6) 
10 
(6) 
70 
(40) 
Blanks 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 19 (11) 
28 
(16) 
14 
(8) 
15 
(9) 
11 
(6) 
21 
(12) 
35 
(20) 
30 
(17) 
173 
(100) 
 
Corruption 
 Cyprus 
N=? 
(%) 
India 
N=? 
(%) 
Pakistan 
N=? 
(%) 
South 
Africa 
N=? 
(%) 
UAE 
N=? 
(%) 
UK&NI 
N=? 
(%) 
USA 
N=? 
(%) 
Other 
N=? 
(%) 
Total 
plus % 
of pop. 
N=? 
(%) 
 
1 0 0 0 0 1 (1) 
0 1 
(1) 
2 
(1) 
4 
(2) 
2 0 2 (1) 
0 0 0 3 
(2) 
3 
(2) 
3 
(2) 
11 
(6) 
3 0 3 (2) 
0 0 2 
(1) 
6 
(3) 
6 
(3) 
1 
(1) 
18 
(10) 
4 0 3 (2) 
0 0 3 
(2) 
0 6 
(3) 
5 
(3) 
17 
(10) 
5 0 5 (3) 
0 0 1 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
5 
(3) 
2 
(1) 
14 
(8) 
6 1 (1) 
12 
(7) 
0 0 4 
(2) 
2 
(1) 
8 
(5) 
14 
(8) 
41 
(24) 
Blanks 18 (10) 
3 
(2) 
14 
(8) 
15 
(9) 
0 9 
(5) 
6 
(3) 
3 
(2) 
68 
(39) 
Total 19 (11) 
28 
(16) 
14 
(8) 
15 
(9) 
11 
(6) 
21 
(12) 
35 
(20) 
30 
(17) 
173 
(100) 
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Preventative Measures 
National Anti-Corruption Hotline 
 Cyprus 
N=? 
(%) 
India 
N=? 
(%) 
Pakistan 
N=? 
(%) 
South 
Africa 
N=? 
(%) 
UAE 
N=? 
(%) 
UK&NI 
N=? 
(%) 
USA 
N=? 
(%) 
Other 
N=? 
(%) 
Total 
plus % 
of pop. 
N=? 
(%) 
 
Highly 
Effective 
4 
(2) 
4 
(2) 
3 
(2) 
0 0 1 
(1) 
2 
(1) 
3 
(2) 
17 
(10) 
Effective 10 
(6) 
6 
(3) 
3 
(2) 
6 
(3) 
4 
(2) 
6 
(3) 
16 
(9) 
11 
(6) 
62 
(36) 
Neither 
Effective 
Nor 
Ineffective 
2 
(1) 
11 
(7) 
4 
(2) 
2 
(1) 
4 
(2) 
11 
(6) 
11 
(6) 
9 
(6) 
54 
(31) 
Ineffective 1 
(1) 
4 
(2) 
3 
(2) 
5 
(3) 
3 
(2) 
2 
(1) 
4 
(2) 
6 
(3) 
28 
(16) 
Highly 
Ineffective 
2 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
2 
(1) 
0 1 
(1) 
0 1 
(1) 
8 
(5) 
Blanks 0 2 
(1) 
0 0 0 0 2 
(1) 
0 4 
(2) 
Total 19 
(11) 
28 
(16) 
14 
(8) 
15 
(9) 
11 
(6) 
21 
(12) 
35 
(20) 
30 
(17) 
173 
(100) 
 
Legal Protection for Whistle-blowers 
 Cyprus 
N=? 
(%) 
India 
N=? 
(%) 
Pakistan 
N=? 
(%) 
South 
Africa 
N=? 
(%) 
UAE 
N=? 
(%) 
UK&NI 
N=? 
(%) 
USA 
N=? 
(%) 
Other 
N=? 
(%) 
Total 
plus % 
of pop. 
N=? 
(%) 
 
Highly 
Effective 
10 
(6) 
4 
(2) 
4 
(2) 
4 
(2) 
5 
(3) 
2 
(1) 
10 
(6) 
8 
(5) 
47 
(27) 
Effective 6 
(3) 
10 
(6) 
3 
(2) 
6 
(3) 
4 
(2) 
18 
(10) 
20 
(12) 
15 
(9) 
82 
(47) 
Neither 
Effective 
Nor 
Ineffective 
0 8 
(4) 
4 
(2) 
2 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
0 2 
(1) 
3 
(2) 
20 
(11) 
Ineffective 1 
(1) 
3 
(2) 
1 
(1) 
3 
(2) 
1 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
3 
(2) 
14 
(8) 
Highly 
Ineffective 
2 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
2 
(1) 
0 0 0 0 1 
(1) 
6 
(3) 
Blanks 0 2 
(1) 
0 0 0 0 2 
(1) 
0 4 
(2) 
Total 19 
(11) 
28 
(16) 
14 
(8) 
15 
(9) 
11 
(6) 
21 
(12) 
35 
(20) 
30 
(17) 
173 
(100) 
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Vigorous media investigation of corruption 
 Cyprus 
N=? 
(%) 
India 
N=? 
(%) 
Pakistan 
N=? 
(%) 
South 
Africa 
N=? 
(%) 
UAE 
N=? 
(%) 
UK&NI 
N=? 
(%) 
USA 
N=? 
(%) 
Other 
N=? 
(%) 
Total 
plus % 
of pop. 
N=? 
(%) 
 
Highly 
Effective 
7 
(4) 
5 
(3) 
6 
(3) 
7 
(4) 
3 
(2) 
8 
(5) 
13 
(8) 
16 
(9) 
65 
(38) 
Effective 10 
(6) 
11 
(6) 
4 
(2) 
4 
(2) 
7 
(4) 
13 
(8) 
18 
(10) 
9 
(5) 
76 
(44) 
Neither 
Effective 
Nor 
Ineffective 
1 
(1) 
7 
(4) 
3 
(2) 
2 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
0 1 
(1) 
3 
(2) 
18 
(11) 
Ineffective 0 2 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
2 
(1) 
0 0 1 
(1) 
2 
(1) 
8 
(5) 
Highly 
Ineffective 
1 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
(1) 
Blanks 0 2 
(1) 
0 0 0 0 2 
(1) 
0 4 
(2) 
Total 19 
(11) 
28 
(16) 
14 
(8) 
15 
(9) 
11 
(6) 
21 
(12) 
35 
(20) 
30 
(17) 
173 
(100) 
 
Tougher legislation enabling more prosecutions and harsher sentences for 
corruption 
 Cyprus 
N=? 
(%) 
India 
N=? 
(%) 
Pakistan 
N=? 
(%) 
South 
Africa 
N=? 
(%) 
UAE 
N=? 
(%) 
UK&NI 
N=? 
(%) 
USA 
N=? 
(%) 
Other 
N=? 
(%) 
Total 
plus % 
of pop. 
N=? 
(%) 
 
Highly 
Effective 
12 
(7) 
7 
(4) 
10 
(6) 
9 
(5) 
8 
(5) 
12 
(7) 
16 
(9) 
19 
(11) 
93 
(54) 
Effective 5 
(3) 
11 
(6) 
0 4 
(2) 
2 
(1) 
8 
(5) 
11 
(6) 
7 
(4) 
48 
(28) 
Neither 
Effective 
Nor 
Ineffective 
1 
(1) 
5 
(3) 
1 
(1) 
0 1 
(1) 
0 4 
(2) 
2 
(1) 
14 
(8) 
Ineffective 0 2 
(1) 
2 
(1) 
2 
(1) 
0 1 
(1) 
2 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
10 
(6) 
Highly 
Ineffective 
1 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
0 0 0 0 1 
(1) 
4 
(2) 
Blanks 0 2 
(1) 
0 0 0 0 2 
(1) 
0 4 
(2) 
Total 19 
(11) 
28 
(16) 
14 
(8) 
15 
(9) 
11 
(6) 
21 
(12) 
35 
(20) 
30 
(17) 
173 
(100) 
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Increased commitment by political and business leaders to fight corruption 
and fraud 
 Cyprus 
N=? 
(%) 
India 
N=? 
(%) 
Pakistan 
N=? 
(%) 
South 
Africa 
N=? 
(%) 
UAE 
N=? 
(%) 
UK&NI 
N=? 
(%) 
USA 
N=? 
(%) 
Other 
N=? 
(%) 
Total 
plus % 
of pop. 
N=? 
(%) 
 
Highly 
Effective 
10 
(6) 
6 
(3) 
8 
(5) 
8 
(5) 
5 
(3) 
9 
(5) 
11 
(6) 
14 
(8) 
71 
(41) 
Effective 3 
(2) 
9 
(5) 
6 
(3) 
5 
(3) 
3 
(2) 
11 
(6) 
17 
(10) 
11 
(6) 
65 
(38) 
Neither 
Effective 
Nor 
Ineffective 
1 
(1) 
6 
(3) 
0 1 
(1) 
0 0 4 
(2) 
2 
(1) 
14 
(8) 
Ineffective 3 
(2) 
4 
(2) 
0 1 
(1) 
2 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
2 
(1) 
14 
(8) 
Highly 
Ineffective 
2 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
0 0 1 
(1) 
0 0 1 
(1) 
5 
(3) 
Blanks 0 2 
(1) 
0 0 0 0 2 
(1) 
0 4 
(2) 
Total 19 
(11) 
28 
(16) 
14 
(8) 
15 
(9) 
11(6) 21 
(12) 
35 
(20) 
30 
(17) 
173 
(100) 
 
Schools placing more emphasis on moral values 
 Cyprus 
N=? 
(%) 
India 
N=? 
(%) 
Pakistan 
N=? 
(%) 
South 
Africa 
N=? 
(%) 
UAE 
N=? 
(%) 
UK&NI 
N=? 
(%) 
USA 
N=? 
(%) 
Other 
N=? 
(%) 
Total 
plus % 
of pop. 
N=? 
(%) 
 
Highly 
Effective 
7 
(4) 
9 
(5) 
8 
(5) 
4 
(2) 
5 
(3) 
5 
(3) 
12 
(7) 
12 
(7) 
62 
(36) 
Effective 8 
(5) 
9 
(5) 
4 
(2) 
9 
(5) 
2 
(1) 
12 
(7) 
12 
(7) 
13 
(8) 
69 
(40) 
Neither 
Effective 
Nor 
Ineffective 
1 
(1) 
4 
(2) 
2 
(1) 
0 3 
(2) 
4 
(2) 
6 
(4) 
5 
(3) 
25 
(14) 
Ineffective 2 
(1) 
2 
(1) 
0 1 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
0 3 
(2) 
0 9 
(5) 
Highly 
Ineffective 
1 
(1) 
2 
(1) 
0 1 
(1) 
0 0 0 0 4 
(2) 
Blanks 0 2 
(1) 
0 0 0 0 2 
(1) 
0 4 
(2) 
Total 19 
(11) 
28 
(16) 
14 
(8) 
15 
(9) 
11 
(6) 
21 
(12) 
35 
(20) 
30 
(17) 
173 
(100) 
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Religious community placing greater emphasis on promoting moral values in 
everyday life 
 Cyprus 
N=? 
(%) 
India 
N=? 
(%) 
Pakistan 
N=? 
(%) 
South 
Africa 
N=? 
(%) 
UAE 
N=? 
(%) 
UK&NI 
N=? 
(%) 
USA 
N=? 
(%) 
Other 
N=? 
(%) 
Total 
plus % 
of pop. 
N=? 
(%) 
 
Highly 
Effective 
5 
(3) 
7 
(4) 
6 
(3) 
2 
(1) 
3 
(2) 
6 
(3) 
11 
(6) 
7 
(4) 
47 
(27) 
Effective 3 
(2) 
8 
(5) 
7 
(4) 
8 
(5) 
3 
(2) 
5 
(3) 
12 
(7) 
9 
(5) 
55 
(32) 
Neither 
Effective 
Nor 
Ineffective 
6 
(3) 
6 
(3) 
0 3 
(2) 
2 
(1) 
6 
(3) 
6 
(3) 
12 
(7) 
41 
(24) 
Ineffective 2 
(1) 
3 
(2) 
0 0 1 
(1) 
2 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
0 9 
(5) 
Highly 
Ineffective 
3 
(2) 
2 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
2 
(1) 
2 
(1) 
2 
(1) 
3 
(2) 
2 
(1) 
17 
(10) 
Blanks 0 2 
(1) 
0 0 0 0 2 
(1) 
0 4 
(2) 
Total 19 
(11) 
28 
(16) 
14 
(8) 
15 
(9) 
11 
(6) 
21 
(12) 
35 
(20) 
30 
(17) 
173 
(100) 
 
A media campaign to raise public awareness of the extent and cost of 
corruption 
 Cyprus 
N=? 
(%) 
India 
N=? 
(%) 
Pakistan 
N=? 
(%) 
South 
Africa 
N=? 
(%) 
UAE 
N=? 
(%) 
UK&NI 
N=? 
(%) 
USA 
N=? 
(%) 
Other 
N=? 
(%) 
Total 
plus % 
of pop 
N=? 
(%) 
 
Highly 
Effective 
7 
(4) 
5 
(3) 
5 
(3) 
2 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
6 
(3) 
7 
(4) 
6 
(3) 
39 
(23) 
Effective 5 (3) 
7 
(4) 
4 
(2) 
5 
(3) 
7 
(4) 
9 
(5) 
21 
(12) 
16 
(9) 
74 
(43) 
Neither 
Effective 
Nor 
Ineffective 
5 
(3) 
8 
(4) 
3 
(2) 
6 
(3) 
1 
(1) 
4 
(2) 
3 
(2) 
7 
(4) 
37 
(21) 
Ineffective 1 (1) 
3 
(2) 
2 
(1) 
2 
(1) 
2 
(1) 
2 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
0 13 
(8) 
Highly 
Ineffective 
1 
(1) 
3 
(2) 
0 0 0 0 1 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
6 
(3) 
Blank 0 2 (1) 
0 0 0 0 2 
(1) 
0 4 
(2) 
Total 19 (11) 
28 
(16) 
14 
(8) 
15 
(9) 
11 
(6) 
21 
(12) 
35 
(20) 
30 
(17) 
173 
(100) 
 
More resources to investigate and prosecute corruption cases 
 Cyprus 
N=? 
(%) 
India 
N=? 
(%) 
Pakistan 
N=? 
(%) 
South 
Africa 
N=? 
(%) 
UAE 
N=? 
(%) 
UK&NI 
N=? 
(%) 
USA 
N=? 
(%) 
Other 
N=? 
(%) 
Total 
plus % 
of pop 
N=? 
(%) 
 
Highly 
Effective 
12 
(7) 
11 
(6) 
8 
(5) 
11 
(6) 
4 
(2) 
10 
(6) 
16 
(9) 
13 
(8) 
85 
(49) 
Effective 6 (3) 
7 
(4) 
5 
(3) 
3 
(2) 
5 
(3) 
9 
(5) 
15 
(9) 
12 
(7) 
62 
(36) 
Neither 
Effective 
Nor 
Ineffective 
0 6 
(3) 
1 
(1) 
0 1 
(1) 
2 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
5 
(3) 
16 
(9) 
Ineffective 0 1 (1) 
0 1 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
0 1 
(1) 
0 4 
(2) 
Highly 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
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Ineffective (1) (1) (1) 
Blank 0 2 (1) 
0 0 0 0 2 
(1) 
0 4 
(2) 
Total 19 (11) 
28 
(16) 
14 
(8) 
15 
(9) 
11 
(6) 
21 
(12) 
35 
(20) 
30 
(17) 
173 
(100) 
 
A single independent agency dedicated to fighting corruption 
 Cyprus 
N=? 
(%) 
India 
N=? 
(%) 
Pakistan 
N=? 
(%) 
South 
Africa 
N=? 
(%) 
UAE 
N=? 
(%) 
UK&NI 
N=? 
(%) 
USA 
N=? 
(%) 
Other 
N=? 
(%) 
Total 
plus % 
of pop 
N=? 
(%) 
 
Highly 
Effective 
8 
(5) 
6 
(3) 
5 
(3) 
6 
(3) 
4 
(2) 
2 
(1) 
9 
(5) 
15 
(9) 
55 
(32) 
Effective 6 (3) 
8 
(5) 
2 
(1) 
7 
(4) 
6 
(3) 
14 
(8) 
15 
(9) 
7 
(4) 
65 
(38) 
Neither 
Effective 
Nor 
Ineffective 
3 
(2) 
6 
(3) 
6 
(3) 
2 
(1) 
0 1 
(1) 
7 
(4) 
6 
(3) 
31 
(18) 
Ineffective 1 (1) 
2 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
0 1 
(1) 
4 
(2) 
2 
(1) 
2 
(1) 
13 
(8) 
Highly 
Ineffective 
1 
(1) 
4 
(2) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 5 
(3) 
Blank 0 2 (1) 
0 0 0 0 2 
(1) 
0 4 
(2) 
Total 19 (11) 
28 
(16) 
14 
(8) 
15 
(9) 
11 
(6) 
21 
(12) 
35 
(20) 
30 
(17) 
173 
(100) 
 
 
Increased salaries for police officers 
 Cyprus 
N=? 
(%) 
India 
N=? 
(%) 
Pakistan 
N=? 
(%) 
South 
Africa 
N=? 
(%) 
UAE 
N=? 
(%) 
UK&NI 
N=? 
(%) 
USA 
N=? 
(%) 
Other 
N=? 
(%) 
Total 
plus % 
of pop 
N=? 
(%) 
 
Highly 
Effective 
2 
(1) 
6 
(3) 
2 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
2 
(1) 
3 
(2) 
6 
(3) 
23 
(13) 
Effective 4 (2) 
8 
(5) 
9 
(5) 
5 
(3) 
2 
(1) 
8 
(5) 
10 
(6) 
11 
(6) 
57 
(33) 
Neither 
Effective 
Nor 
Ineffective 
6 
(3) 
6 
(3) 
1 
(1) 
8 
(5) 
2 
(1) 
4 
(2) 
15 
(9) 
10 
(6) 
52 
(30) 
Ineffective 4 (2) 
4 
(2) 
0 1 
(1) 
6 
(3) 
4 
(2) 
3 
(2) 
2 
(1) 
24 
(14) 
Highly 
Ineffective 
3 
(2) 
2 
(1) 
2 
(1) 
0 0 3 
(2) 
2 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
13 
(8) 
Blank 0 2 (1) 
0 0 0 0 2 
(1) 
0 4 
(2) 
Total 19 (11) 
28 
(16) 
14 
(8) 
15 
(9) 
11 
(6) 
21 
(12) 
35 
(20) 
30 
(17) 
173 
(100) 
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Increased salaries for government employees 
 Cyprus 
N=? 
(%) 
India 
N=? 
(%) 
Pakistan 
N=? 
(%) 
South 
Africa 
N=? 
(%) 
UAE 
N=? 
(%) 
UK&NI 
N=? 
(%) 
USA 
N=? 
(%) 
Other 
N=? 
(%) 
Total 
plus % 
of pop 
N=? 
(%) 
 
Highly 
Effective 
2 
(1) 
6 
(3) 
2 
(1) 
2 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
5 
(3) 
20 
(12) 
Effective 3 (2) 
8 
(5) 
8 
(5) 
2 
(1) 
2 
(1) 
6 
(3) 
11 
(6) 
8 
(5) 
48 
(28) 
Neither 
Effective 
Nor 
Ineffective 
6 
(3) 
5 
(3) 
2 
(1) 
5 
(3) 
2 
(1) 
6 
(3) 
12 
(7) 
12 
(7) 
50 
(29) 
Ineffective 5 (3) 
5 
(3) 
0 4 
(2) 
6 
(3) 
5 
(3) 
5 
(3) 
3 
(2) 
33 
(19) 
Highly 
Ineffective 
3 
(2) 
2 
(1) 
2 
(1) 
2 
(1) 
0 3 
(2) 
4 
(2) 
2 
(1) 
18 
(10) 
Blank 0 2 (1) 
0 0 0 0 2 
(1) 
0 4 
(2) 
Total 19 (11) 
28 
(16) 
14 
(8) 
15 
(9) 
11 
(6) 
21 
(12) 
35 
(20) 
30 
(17) 
173 
(100) 
 
 
Greater internal financial controls and internal audits of government 
spending 
 Cyprus 
N=? 
(%) 
India 
N=? 
(%) 
Pakistan 
N=? 
(%) 
South 
Africa 
N=? 
(%) 
UAE 
N=? 
(%) 
UK&NI 
N=? 
(%) 
USA 
N=? 
(%) 
Other 
N=? 
(%) 
Total 
plus % 
of pop 
N=? 
(%) 
 
Highly 
Effective 
9 
(5) 
10 
(6) 
7 
(4) 
9 
(5) 
3 
(2) 
9 
(5) 
13 
(8) 
12 
(7) 
72 
(42) 
Effective 8 (5) 
7 
(4) 
4 
(2) 
5 
(3) 
6 
(3) 
9 
(5) 
15 
(9) 
12 
(7) 
66 
(38) 
Neither 
Effective 
Nor 
Ineffective 
1 
(1) 
5 
(3) 
3 
(2) 
1 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
2 
(1) 
4 
(2) 
5 
(3) 
22 
(13) 
Ineffective 0 3 (2) 
0 0 1 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
7 
(4) 
Highly 
Ineffective 
1 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
(1) 
Blank 0 2 (1) 
0 0 0 0 2 
(1) 
0 4 
(2) 
Total 19 (11) 
28 
(16) 
14 
(8) 
15 
(9) 
11 
(6) 
21 
(12) 
35 
(20) 
30 
(17) 
173 
(100) 
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Greater transparency of government tendering procedures 
 Cyprus 
N=? 
(%) 
India 
N=? 
(%) 
Pakistan 
N=? 
(%) 
South 
Africa 
N=? 
(%) 
UAE 
N=? 
(%) 
UK&NI 
N=? 
(%) 
USA 
N=? 
(%) 
Other 
N=? 
(%) 
Total 
plus % 
of pop 
N=? 
(%) 
 
Highly 
Effective 
8 
(5) 
10 
(6) 
9 
(5) 
12 
(7) 
4 
(2) 
10 
(6) 
15 
(9) 
19 
(11) 
87 
(50) 
Effective 8 (5) 
7 
(4) 
2 
(1) 
3 
(2) 
6 
(3) 
11 
(6) 
13 
(8) 
9 
(5) 
59 
(34) 
Neither 
Effective 
Nor 
Ineffective 
1 
(1) 
7 
(4) 
2 
(1) 
0 0 0 5 
(3) 
1 
(1) 
16 
(9) 
Ineffective 1 (1) 
1 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
0 1 
(1) 
0 0 1 
(1) 
5 
(3) 
Highly 
Ineffective 
1 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
(1) 
Blank 0 2 (1) 
0 0 0 0 2 
(1) 
0 4 
(2) 
Total 19 (11) 
28 
(16) 
14 
(8) 
15 
(9) 
11 
(6) 
21 
(12) 
35 
(20) 
30 
(17) 
173 
(100) 
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Disclosure by top government officials of their financial interests 
 Cyprus 
N=? 
(%) 
India 
N=? 
(%) 
Pakistan 
N=? 
(%) 
South 
Africa 
N=? 
(%) 
UAE 
N=? 
(%) 
UK&NI 
N=? 
(%) 
USA 
N=? 
(%) 
Other 
N=? 
(%) 
Total 
plus % 
of pop 
N=? 
(%) 
 
Highly 
Effective 
12 
(7) 
9 
(5) 
9 
(5) 
9 
(5) 
4 
(2) 
11 
(6) 
9 
(5) 
13 
(8) 
76 
(44) 
Effective 4 (2) 
8 
(5) 
3 
(2) 
5 
(3) 
7 
(4) 
7 
(4) 
20 
(12) 
11 
(6) 
65 
(38) 
Neither 
Effective 
Nor 
Ineffective 
1 
(1) 
6 
(3) 
2 
(1) 
0 0 2 
(1) 
2 
(1) 
4 
(2) 
17 
(10) 
Ineffective 1 (1) 
2 
(1) 
0 1 
(1) 
0 1 
(1) 
2 
(1) 
2 
(1) 
9 
(5) 
Highly 
Ineffective 
1 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
(1) 
Blank 0 2 (1) 
0 0 0 0 2 
(1) 
0 4 
(2) 
Total 19 (11) 
28 
(16) 
14 
(8) 
15 
(9) 
11 
(6) 
21 
(12) 
35 
(20) 
30 
(17) 
173 
(100) 
 
More research on the causes, nature and effect of corruption 
 Cyprus 
N=? 
(%) 
India 
N=? 
(%) 
Pakistan 
N=? 
(%) 
South 
Africa 
N=? 
(%) 
UAE 
N=? 
(%) 
UK&NI 
N=? 
(%) 
USA 
N=? 
(%) 
Other 
N=? 
(%) 
Total 
plus % 
of pop 
N=? 
(%) 
 
Highly 
Effective 
5 
(3) 
5 
(3) 
6 
(3) 
2 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
4 
(2) 
5 
(3) 
5 
(3) 
33 
(19) 
Effective 7 (4) 
10 
(6) 
6 
(3) 
7 
(4) 
5 
(3) 
10 
(6) 
17 
(10) 
16 
(9) 
78 
(45) 
Neither 
Effective 
Nor 
Ineffective 
5 
(3) 
7 
(4) 
2 
(1) 
3 
(2) 
2 
(1) 
5 
(3) 
8 
(5) 
6 
(3) 
38 
(22) 
Ineffective 1 (1) 
3 
(2) 
0 3 
(2) 
3 
(2) 
2 
(1) 
3 
(2) 
3 
(2) 
18 
(10) 
Highly 
Ineffective 
1 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
(1) 
Blank 0 2 (1) 
0 0 0 0 2 
(1) 
0 4 
(2) 
Total 19 (11) 
28 
(16) 
14 
(8) 
15 
(9) 
11 
(6) 
21 
(12) 
35 
(20) 
30 
(17) 
173 
(100) 
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Regular anti-corruption conferences that bring together all sectors and 
stakeholders 
 Cyprus 
N=? 
(%) 
India 
N=? 
(%) 
Pakistan 
N=? 
(%) 
South 
Africa 
N=? 
(%) 
UAE 
N=? 
(%) 
UK&NI 
N=? 
(%) 
USA 
N=? 
(%) 
Other 
N=? 
(%) 
Total 
plus % 
of pop 
N=? 
(%) 
 
Highly 
Effective 
5 
(3) 
5 
(3) 
6 
(3) 
1 
(1) 
0 2 
(1) 
3 
(2) 
6 
(3) 
28 
(16) 
Effective 5 (3) 
8 
(5) 
2 
(1) 
7 
(4) 
4 
(2) 
6 
(3) 
16 
(9) 
13 
(8) 
61 
(35) 
Neither 
Effective 
Nor 
Ineffective 
3 
(2) 
9 
(5) 
5 
(3) 
4 
(2) 
2 
(1) 
7 
(4) 
10 
(6) 
6 
(3) 
46 
(26) 
Ineffective 4 (2) 
3 
(2) 
0 3 
(2) 
5 
(3) 
5 
(3) 
3 
(2) 
4 
(2) 
27 
(16) 
Highly 
Ineffective 
2 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
0 0 1 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
7 
(4) 
Blank 0 2 (1) 
0 0 0 0 2 
(1) 
0 4 
(2) 
Total 19 (11) 
28 
(16) 
14 
(8) 
15 
(9) 
11 
(6) 
21 
(12) 
35 
(20) 
30 
(17) 
173 
(100) 
 
 
Prosecution of high profile individuals 
 Cyprus 
N=? 
(%) 
India 
N=? 
(%) 
Pakistan 
N=? 
(%) 
South 
Africa 
N=? 
(%) 
UAE 
N=? 
(%) 
UK&NI 
N=? 
(%) 
USA 
N=? 
(%) 
Other 
N=? 
(%) 
Total 
plus % 
of pop 
N=? 
(%) 
 
Highly 
Effective 
16 
(9) 
13 
(8) 
9 
(5) 
9 
(5) 
4 
(2) 
17 
(10) 
20 
(12) 
15 
(9) 
103 
(60) 
Effective 1 
(1) 
4 
(2) 
3 
(2) 
5 
(3) 
5 
(3) 
3 
(2) 
11 
(6) 
11 
(6) 
43 
(25) 
Neither 
Effective 
Nor 
Ineffective 
0 6 
(3) 
1 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
0 1 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
3 
(2) 
13 
(8) 
Ineffective 1 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
0 2 
(1) 
0 1 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
7 
(4) 
Highly 
Ineffective 
1 
(1) 
2 
(1) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
(2) 
Blank 0 2 
(1) 
0 0 0 0 2 
(1) 
0 4 
(2) 
Total 19 
(11) 
28 
(16) 
14 
(8) 
15 
(9) 
11 
(6) 
21 
(12) 
35 
(20) 
30 
(17) 
173 
(100) 
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